Institute for Policy Integrity

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The Institute for Policy Integrity produces three types of publications: policy briefs, reports, and academic articles/working papers. Our policy briefs provide incisive and focused analysis on timely policy topics. Our reports develop deeper research on our core issues. Our academic articles and working papers offer original scholarly research and analysis from established experts as well as fresh new voices.

Latest Publications

  • Understanding the Stay
    Policy Brief

    Understanding the Stay

    Implications of the Supreme Court’s Stay of the Clean Power Plan

    By Richard L. Revesz and Alexander Walker
    April 27, 2016

    Since the Supreme Court stayed EPA’s Clean Power Plan, which regulates carbon dioxide emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired power plants, opponents of the plan have been making unfounded assertions about the consequences of the stay. This policy brief aims to clarify the stay’s implications for EPA’s implementation work and the plan’s future compliance deadlines.

  • Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment

    Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment

    By Jason Schwartz (chapter author)
    April 25, 2016

    Jason Schwartz, legal director at the Institute for Policy Integrity, authored a chapter in the new Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment. Schwartz’s chapter explores the varied applications and approaches to cost-benefit analysis in the context of regulatory impact assessment.

  • Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State
    Academic Article/Working Paper

    Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Structure of the Administrative State

    The Case of Financial Services

    By Richard L. Revesz
    February 22, 2016

    The viability and desirability of conducting cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation is a subject of intense academic debate. Opponents claim that such analysis is feasible for environmental regulation but not for financial regulation because of the difference in the benefits that require monetization in the respective areas. This article argues that the recent debate misses an important part of the problem. In large part, cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation cannot currently be performed successfully because of institutional shortcomings, not analytical difficulties. Compared to Executive Branch agencies, independent agencies, like the major financial regulatory agencies, lack the capacity to do cost-benefit analyses of acceptable quality. Fortunately, there are good Executive Branch models that could be exported to the financial regulatory agencies.