



Via Electronic Submission

October 28, 2019

To: Carlsbad Field Office, Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior
Subject: Failure to Monetize Greenhouse Gases in the Environmental Assessment for the Carlsbad Field Office Oil and Gas Lease Sale, February 2020 (DOI-BLM-NM-P020-2019-1148-EA)
Submitted by: Environmental Defense Fund, Institute for Policy Integrity, Montana Environmental Information Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, Union of Concerned Scientists, Western Environmental Law Center, WildEarth Guardians¹

The following comments focus on the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) failure to monetize greenhouse gas emissions in the February 2020 lease sale environmental assessment (EA). In the EA, BLM calculates 28.48 million tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent in downstream emissions from leasing activity over 20 years—a substantial amount that will contribute to numerous adverse climate impacts. While the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requires BLM to disclose and assess the significance of the leasing's contributions to such actual environmental impacts—and an available tool, the social cost of greenhouse gases metric, allows the agency to do exactly that—the EA fails to estimate such actual, real-world climate impacts. Yet as the social cost metrics reveal, the scenario BLM proposes would result in tens of millions of dollars in annual climate costs compared to the no action scenario.

BLM has afforded the public too little time to provide meaningful comments, in violation of the principles and requirements of NEPA. With less than two weeks of total comment time, the public cannot assess the analyses that BLM conducted in this environmental assessment on oil and gas lease sales in the Carlsbad Field Office (CFO) region. Nevertheless, below are key points that address why BLM violated NEPA by failing to monetize greenhouse gas emissions in the EA and respond to BLM's arguments to the contrary. We have also attached a longer set of comments on the Carlsbad Field Office 2018 draft resource management plan (RMP), which provides further detail on these points.²

BLM makes a number of spurious arguments to defend its choice not to monetize the proposed scenario's climate impacts. In fact, these arguments are nearly identical to those included in the CFO

¹ Our organizations may separately or independently submit other comments on other issues raised by the DEIS.

² Joint Comments on Failure to Monetize Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Carlsbad Draft Resource Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement (Nov. 5, 2018) [hereinafter "Joint Comments"]. Available at: <https://policyintegrity.org/projects/update/comments-on-carlsbad-region-fossil-fuel-leasing>.

draft RMP on which BLM received public comments nearly a year ago.³ First, BLM states that it does not apply the social cost of greenhouse gases because “this action is not a rulemaking for which the [social cost of carbon] protocol was originally developed.”⁴ This explanation, however, fails to explain why the social cost of carbon is not appropriate for NEPA analysis. The social cost of greenhouse gases is an estimate of the damage caused by each additional unit of emissions. Therefore, the metric is equally applicable to any context in which the goal is to analyze the impact of greenhouse gases. Moreover, a number of agencies, including the Department of the Interior, have used the metric to assess a project’s climate impacts for NEPA assessment.⁵ Further, courts have upheld the use of the social cost of greenhouse gases in project analysis.⁶

BLM also dismisses the social cost of greenhouse gases as being only applicable to the cost-benefit analysis of rulemaking.⁷ However, while NEPA does not always require a full and formal cost-benefit analysis,⁸ agencies’ approaches to assessing costs and benefits in NEPA analysis must be balanced and reasonable.⁹ Though BLM claims that “[w]ithout a complete monetary cost-benefit analysis, which would include the social benefits of the Proposed Action to society as a whole . . . inclusion solely of an SCC cost analysis would be unbalanced,”¹⁰ the EA’s underlying resource management plans and environmental impact statements do, in fact, quantify and monetize economic benefits.¹¹ In particular, the CFO draft RMP monetizes “economic output” from oil and gas activity,¹² which is likely based on the market prices of oil and gas, and therefore captures the economic benefits of the leasing activity.¹³ Accordingly, it is arbitrary and capricious for BLM to not treat the climate impacts of leasing activity with the same level of rigor.

Next, BLM highlights the fact that the Interagency Working Group’s (IWG) technical support documents for calculating the social cost of greenhouse gases were rescinded by Executive Order 13,783. However, Executive Order 13,783 assumes that federal agencies will continue to “monetiz[e] the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions” and instructs agencies to ensure such estimates are “consistent with the

³ BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. DRAFT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE CARLSBAD FIELD OFFICE, PECOS DISTRICT, NEW MEXICO BLM/NM/PL-18-01-1610 (Aug. 2018) at 2-82 [hereinafter “CFO draft RMP”]. See also Joint Comments at 1.

⁴ BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE CARLSBAD FIELD OFFICE FEB. 2020 OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 106 (DOI-BLM-NM-p020-2019-1148-EA) (Oct. 15, 2019) (hereinafter “EA”).

⁵ See e.g., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT OF COOK INLET PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 244 (BOEM 2016-069) (Dec. 23, 2016).

⁶ See Joint Comments at 7-8.

⁷ EA at 106.

⁸ 40 C.F.R. §1502.23 (“[T]he weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not be displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis.”).

⁹ See, e.g., *Sierra Club v. Sigler*, 695 F.2d 957, 978–79 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that NEPA “mandates at least a broad, informal cost-benefit analysis,” and so agencies must “fully and accurately” and “objectively” assess environmental, economic, and technical costs); *Chelsea Neighborhood Ass’ns v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 516 F.2d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 1975) (“NEPA, in effect, requires a broadly defined cost-benefit analysis of major federal activities.”); *Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n*, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“NEPA mandates a rather finely tuned and ‘systematic’ balancing analysis” of “environmental costs” against “economic and technical benefits”); *Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Marsh*, 568 F. Supp. 985, 1000 (D.D.C. 1983) (“The cost-benefit analysis of NEPA is concerned primarily with environmental costs. . . . A court may examine the cost-benefit analysis only as it bears upon the function of insuring that the agency has examined the environmental consequences of a proposed project.”).

¹⁰ EA at 106.

¹¹ See, e.g., CFO draft RMP.

¹² CFO draft RMP at 4-454.

¹³ See Joint Comments at 8.

guidance contained in OMB Circular A-4.”¹⁴ Accordingly, by no means does the new Executive Order imply that agencies should not monetize important effects in their environmental impact statements. As the Executive Order requires consistency with Circular A-4, as agencies follow the Circular’s standards for using the best available data and methodologies, they will necessarily choose similar data, methodologies, and estimates as the IWG, since the IWG’s work continues to represent the best available estimates.¹⁵ The Executive Order does not preclude agencies from using the same range of estimates as developed by the IWG, so long as the agency explains that the data and methodology that produced those estimates are consistent with Circular A-4 and, more broadly, with standards for rational decisionmaking.

Finally, BLM falsely claims that the social cost of greenhouse gases protocol “does not measure the actual incremental impacts of a project on the environment.”¹⁶ The social cost of greenhouse gases is a metric designed to do just that: offer a value for the damages caused by any additional unit of greenhouse gas emissions. BLM adds that due to “the uncertainties associated with assigning a specific and accurate” value to the social cost of greenhouse gases, the metric “provides little benefit in assisting the authorized officer’s decision for project level analysis.”¹⁷ Yet numerous other agencies have had no trouble applying the manageable range of estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases to assess the significance of the climate impacts of their actions, including projects that are only expected to last a few years. Again, the social cost of greenhouse gases metric is designed to analyze any action or policy on a year-by-year basis, as it measures the impacts of one additional unit of emissions in a given year. NEPA requires BLM to use its judgment and available tools, and the agency cannot use uncertainty as a red herring to escape its statutory obligations.

BLM has given the public too little time and too little information to meaningfully review the EA. The attached joint comments on the 2018 Carlsbad Field Office draft resource management plan give extensive detail on why BLM must monetize emissions using the social cost of greenhouse gases metric. Those comments are hereby incorporated by reference.

Sincerely,

Susanne Brooks, Director of U.S. Climate Policy and Analysis, Environmental Defense Fund
Tomás Carbonell, Senior Attorney and Director of Regulatory Policy, Environmental Defense Fund
Rachel Cleetus, Ph.D., Lead Economist and Climate Policy Manager, Union of Concerned Scientists
Denise Grab, Western Regional Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Anne Hedges, Deputy Director, Montana Environmental Information Center
Jayni Hein, Policy Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Peter H. Howard, Ph.D., Economic Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Chase Huntley, Energy & Climate Change Program Director, The Wilderness Society
Bobby McEnaney, Dirty Energy Director, Natural Resources Defense Council
Rose Monahan, Associate Attorney, Sierra Club
Jeremy Nichols, Climate and Energy Program Director, WildEarth Guardians

¹⁴ Exec. Order No. 13,783 § 5(b), 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).

¹⁵ See Richard L. Revesz et al., *Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases*, 357 SCIENCE 6352 (2017) (explaining that, even after Executive Order 13,783, the social cost of greenhouse gas estimate of around \$50 per ton of carbon dioxide is still the best estimate).

¹⁶ EA at 106.

¹⁷ EA at 107.

Martha Roberts, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund
Iliana Paul, Policy Associate, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Richard L. Revesz, Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Max Sarinsky, Legal Fellow, Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law*
Jason A. Schwartz, Legal Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Thomas Singer, Ph.D., Senior Policy Advisor, Western Environmental Law Center
Peter Zalzal, Director of Special Projects and Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund

For any questions regarding these comments, please contact:

Jason A. Schwartz, Legal Director, Institute for Policy Integrity
139 MacDougal Street, 3rd Floor, New York, NY 10012
jason.schwartz@nyu.edu

*No part of this document purports to present New York University School of Law's views, if any.

Attachment: Joint Comments on Failure to Monetize Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Carlsbad Draft Resource Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement (Nov. 5, 2018)



November 5, 2018

To: Carlsbad RMP Team Lead, Bureau of Land Management

Subject: Comments on Failure to Monetize Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Carlsbad Draft Resource Management Plan/Environmental Impact Statement

Submitted by: Environmental Defense Fund, Institute for Policy Integrity, Montana Environmental Information Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, Western Environmental Law Center¹

The following comments focus on the failure to monetize climate damages in the Draft Resource Management Plan and Environmental Impact Statement (RMP) for the Carlsbad Field Office (CFO) planning area. The Carlsbad planning area has a high mineral development potential for “Reasonably Foreseeable Development,” according to BLM.² Although BLM does estimate and quantify downstream greenhouse gas emissions from mineral development, the RMP does not include a monetized estimate of the actual, real-world climate damages those emissions will produce.

In fact, BLM dedicates a subsection of chapter 2 on alternatives to defend why the agency has chosen not to use the social cost of greenhouse gases metric to monetize the plan’s emissions. The RMP reads: “SCC is not undertaken in this analysis because 1) it is not engaged in a rulemaking for which the protocol was originally developed; 2) the IWG, technical supporting documents, and associated guidance have been withdrawn; 3) NEPA does not require cost-benefit analysis; and 4) the full social benefits of carbon-based energy production have not been monetized, and quantifying only the costs of GHG emissions but not the benefits would yield information that is both potentially inaccurate and not useful.”³ We explain why BLM’s reasoning is flawed and how BLM has violated its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Specifically, we make the following points:

1. NEPA requires agencies to fully and accurately analyze and disclose to the public the environmental, public health, and social welfare differences between alternatives. The social cost of greenhouse gases is the best available tool to compare the climate impacts of alternatives.
2. NEPA requires agencies to assess the impacts of emissions, including an assessment of their significance. Yet BLM implies that it is impossible to assess the significance of emissions from the RMP. However, the social cost of greenhouse gases metric is designed to measure marginal additional damages and is therefore an appropriate and available tool to assess the significance of the emissions from a project like the RMP. Monetizing climate damages will directly contextualize the significance of emissions from the RMP.
3. Executive Order 13,783 does not bar agencies from using the same methodology and inputs applied by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) to develop its best estimates of social cost of

¹ Our organizations may separately and independently submit other comments on other issues raised by the RMP/DEIS.

² RMP at 4-1.

³ RMP at 2.82.

greenhouse gases and, in fact, by requiring agencies to use best practices, the Executive Order would point agencies toward the same or higher values of global climate damages as calculated by the IWG;

4. BLM must assess the significance of climate damages from not just carbon dioxide emissions but also methane and nitrous oxide emissions, and so BLM should use the social cost of methane and nitrous oxide metrics as well as the social cost of carbon metrics.

We explain each of these points in turn below.

I. BLM Should Monetize the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases in its RMP

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the statute under which environmental impact statements are required, directs agencies to fully and accurately analyze the environmental, public health, and social welfare differences between proposed alternatives, and to contextualize that information for decision-makers and the public. NEPA requires a more searching analysis than merely disclosing the amount of pollution. Rather, BLM must examine the “ecological[,]... economic, [and] social” impacts of those emissions, including an assessment of their “significance.”⁴ By failing to use available tools, such as the social cost of carbon, to analyze the significance of emissions, BLM violated NEPA.

Monetizing Climate Damages Fulfills the Obligations and Goals of NEPA

When a project has climate consequences that must be assessed under NEPA, monetizing the climate damages fulfills an agency’s legal obligations under NEPA in ways that simple quantification of tons of greenhouse gas emissions cannot. NEPA requires “hard look” consideration of beneficial and adverse effects of each alternative for major federal government actions. The U.S. Supreme Court has called the disclosure of impacts the “key requirement of NEPA,” and held that agencies must “consider and disclose the *actual environmental effects*” of a proposed project in a way that “brings those effects to bear on [the agency’s] decisions.”⁵ Courts have repeatedly concluded that an environmental impact statement must disclose relevant climate effects.⁶ NEPA requires “a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences,” to “foster both informed decisionmaking and informed public participation.”⁷ In particular, “[t]he impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impact analysis that NEPA requires,” and it is arbitrary to fail to “provide the necessary contextual information about the cumulative and incremental environmental impacts.”⁸ Furthermore, the analyses included in environmental assessments and impact statements “cannot be misleading.”⁹ An agency must provide sufficient

⁴ 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8(b), 1502.16(a)-(b).

⁵ *Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council*, 462 U.S. 87, 96 (1983) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (requiring assessment of the “ecological,” “economic,” “social,” and “health” “effects”) (emphasis added).

⁶ As the Ninth Circuit has held: “[T]he fact that climate change is largely a global phenomenon that includes actions that are outside of [the agency’s] control . . . does not release the agency from the duty of assessing the effects of its actions on global warming within the context of other actions that also affect global warming.” *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.*, 538 F.3d 1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008); see also *Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy*, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1028-29 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (failure to disclose project’s indirect carbon dioxide emissions violates NEPA).

⁷ *Ctr. for Biological Diversity*, 538 F.3d at 1194 (citations omitted).

⁸ *Id.* at 1217.

⁹ *High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service*, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1182 (D. Colo. 2014); accord. *Johnston v. Davis*, 698 F.2d 1088, 1094-95 (10th Cir. 1983) (disapproving of “misleading” statements resulting in “an unreasonable comparison of alternatives”); *Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Glickman*, 81 F.3d 437, 446 (4th Cir. 1996) (“For an EIS to serve these functions” of taking a hard look and allowing the public to play a role in decisionmaking, “it is essential that the EIS

informational context to ensure that decisionmakers and the public will not misunderstand or overlook the magnitude of a proposed action's climate risks compared to the no action alternative. As this section explains, by only quantifying the volume of greenhouse gas emissions, agencies fail to assess and disclose the actual climate consequences of an action and misleadingly present information in ways that will cause decisionmakers and the public to overlook important climate consequences. Using the social cost of greenhouse gas metrics to monetize climate damages fulfills NEPA's legal obligations in ways that quantification alone cannot.

BLM Must Assess Actual Incremental Climate Impacts, Not Just the Volume of Emissions

The tons of greenhouse gases emitted by a project are not the "actual environmental effects" under NEPA. Rather, the actual effects and relevant factors are the incremental climate impacts caused by those emissions, including:¹⁰

- property lost or damaged by sea-level rise, coastal storms, flooding, and other extreme weather events, as well as the cost of protecting vulnerable property and the cost of resettlement following property losses;
- changes in energy demand, from temperature-related changes to the demand for cooling and heating;
- lost productivity and other impacts to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, due to alterations in temperature, precipitation, CO₂ fertilization, and other climate effects;
- human health impacts, including cardiovascular and respiratory mortality from heat-related illnesses, changing disease vectors like malaria and dengue fever, increased diarrhea, and changes in associated pollution;
- changes in fresh water availability;
- ecosystem service impacts;
- impacts to outdoor recreation and other non-market amenities; and
- catastrophic impacts, including potentially rapid sea-level rise, damages at very high temperatures, or unknown events.

Even in combination with a general, qualitative discussion of climate change, by calculating only the tons of greenhouse gases emitted or a percentage comparison to sectoral, regional, or national emissions, an

not be based on misleading economic assumptions"); see also *Sierra Club v. Sigler*, 695 F.2d 957, 979 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that an agency's "skewed cost-benefit analysis" was "deficient under NEPA"); see generally *Bus. Roundtable v. SEC*, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (criticizing an agency for "inconsistently and opportunistically fram[ing] the costs and benefits of the rule" and for "fail[ing] adequately to quantify the certain costs or toe explain why those costs could not be quantified").

¹⁰ These impacts are all included to some degree in the three integrated assessment models (IAMs) used by the IWG (namely, the DICE, FUND, and PAGE models), though some impacts are modeled incompletely, and many other important damage categories are currently omitted from these IAMs. Compare Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, *Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis* at 6-8, 29-33 (2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf> [hereinafter 2010 TSD]; with Peter Howard, *Omitted Damages: What's Missing from the Social Cost of Carbon* (Cost of Carbon Project Report, 2014), http://costofcarbon.org/files/Omitted_Damages_Whats_Missing_From_the_Social_Cost_of_Carbon.pdf. For other lists of actual climate effects, including air quality mortality, extreme temperature mortality, lost labor productivity, harmful algal blooms, spread of west Nile virus, damage to roads and other infrastructure, effects on urban drainage, damage to coastal property, electricity demand and supply effects, water supply and quality effects, inland flooding, lost winter recreation, effects on agriculture and fish, lost ecosystem services from coral reefs, and wildfires, see EPA, *Multi-Model Framework for Quantitative Sectoral Impacts Analysis: A Technical Report for the Fourth National Climate Assessment* (2017); U.S. Global Change Research Program, *Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment* (2017); EPA, *Climate Change in the United States: Benefits of Global Action* (2015); Union of Concerned Scientists, *Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods, and the Implications for U.S. Coastal Real Estate* (2018).

agency fails to meaningfully assess the actual incremental impacts to property, human health, productivity, and so forth.¹¹ An agency therefore falls short of its legal obligations and statutory objectives by focusing just on volume estimates. Similarly, courts have held that merely quantifying the acres of timber to be harvested or the miles of road to be constructed does not constitute a “description of *actual* environmental effects,” even when paired with a qualitative “list of environmental concerns such as air quality, water quality, and endangered species,” when the agency fails to assess “the degree that each factor will be impacted.”¹²

By monetizing climate damages using the social cost of greenhouse gas metrics, BLM can satisfy NEPA’s mandate to analyze and disclose to the public the actual effects of emissions and their significance. The social cost of greenhouse gas methodology calculates how the emission of an additional unit of greenhouse gases affects atmospheric greenhouse concentrations, how that change in atmospheric concentrations changes temperature, and how that change in temperature incrementally contributes to the above list of economic damages, including property damages, energy demand effects, lost agricultural productivity, human mortality and morbidity, lost ecosystem services and non-market amenities, and so forth.¹³ The social cost of greenhouse gas tool therefore allows agencies to consider the actual effects of emissions and their significance in ways that merely providing a quantitative estimate of the volume of emissions cannot.

Climate Damages Depend on Stock and Flow, But Volume Estimates Only Measure Flow

The climate damage generated by each additional ton of greenhouse gas emissions depends on the background concentration of greenhouse gases in the global atmosphere. Once emitted, greenhouse gases can linger in the atmosphere for centuries, building up the concentration of radiative-forcing pollution and affecting the climate in cumulative, non-linear ways.¹⁴ As physical and economic systems become increasingly stressed by climate change, each marginal additional ton of emissions has a greater, non-linear impact. The climate damages generated by a given amount of greenhouse pollution is therefore a function not just of the pollution’s total volume but also the year of emission, and with every passing year an additional ton of emissions inflicts greater damage.¹⁵

As a result, focusing just on the volume or rate of emissions is insufficient to reveal the incremental effect on the climate. The change in the rate of emissions (flow) must be assessed given the background concentration of emissions (stock). A percent comparison to national emissions is perhaps even more misleading. A project that adds 23 million additional tons per year of carbon dioxide would have contributed to 0.43% of total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in the year 2012.¹⁶ In the year 2014, that

¹¹ See *High Country*, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (“Beyond quantifying the amount of emissions relative to state and national emissions and giving general discussion to the impacts of global climate change, [the agencies] did not discuss the impacts caused by these emissions.”); *Mont. Env’tl. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Office of Surface Mining*, 274 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1096–99 (D. Mont. 2017) (rejecting the argument that the agency “reasonably considered the impact of greenhouse gas emissions by quantifying the emissions which would be released if the [coal] mine expansion is approved, and comparing that amount to the net emissions of the United States”).

¹² *Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 387 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A calculation of the total number of acres to be harvested in the watershed is . . . not a sufficient description of the actual environmental effects that can be expected from logging those acres.”); see also *Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 470 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2006).

¹³ 2010 TSD, *supra* note 10, at 5.

¹⁴ Carbon dioxide also has cumulative effects on ocean acidification, in addition to cumulative radiative-forcing effects.

¹⁵ See 2010 TSD, *supra* note 10, at 33 (explaining that the social cost of greenhouse gas estimates grow over time).

¹⁶ Total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 2012 were 5,366.7 million metric tons (for all greenhouse gases, emissions were 6,529 MMT CO₂ eq). See EPA, *Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2016* at ES-6, tbl. ES-2 (2018).

same project with the same carbon pollution would have contributed to just 0.41% of total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions—a seemingly smaller relative effect, since the total amount of U.S. emissions increased from 2012 to 2014.¹⁷ However, because of rising background concentrations of global greenhouse gas stock, and because of growing stresses in physical and economic systems, the marginal climate damages per ton of carbon dioxide (as measured by the social cost of carbon) increased from \$33 in 2012 to \$35 in 2014 (in 2007\$).¹⁸ Consequently, those 23 million additional tons would have caused marginal climate damages costing \$759 million in the year 2012, but by 2014 that same 23 million tons would have caused \$805 million in climate damages. To summarize: the percent comparison to national emissions misleadingly implied that a project adding 23 million more tons of carbon dioxide would have a relatively less significant effect in 2014 than in 2012, whereas monetizing climate damages using the social cost of greenhouse gases would accurately reveal that the emissions in 2014 were much more damaging than the emissions in 2012—almost \$50 million more.

Capturing how marginal climate damages change as the background concentration changes is especially important because NEPA requires assessing both present and future impacts.¹⁹ Different project alternatives can have different greenhouse gas consequences over time. Most simply, different alternatives could have different start dates or other consequential changes in timing. For example, BLM does not seriously consider an option to delay oil and gas leases, but such an alternative could significantly change the climate consequences of leasing activity. For the reasons explained above, calculating volumes or percentages is insufficient to accurately compare the climate damages of project alternatives with varying greenhouse gas emissions over time.

By factoring in projections of the increasing global stock of greenhouse gases as well as increasing stresses to physical and economic systems, the social cost of greenhouse gas metrics enable accurate and transparent comparisons of projects with varying greenhouse gas emissions over time.

Monetization Provides the Required Informational Context that Volume Estimates Lack

NEPA requires sufficient informational context. Yet without proper context, numbers like a 0.2% increase in total U.S. emissions²⁰ will be misinterpreted by people as meaningless, as zero. Indeed, in a country of over 300 million people and over 6.5 billion tons of annual greenhouse gas emissions, it is far too easy to make highly significant effects appear relatively “miniscule.” For example, presenting all weather-related deaths as less than 0.1% of total U.S. deaths makes the risk of death by weather event

¹⁷ Total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 2014 were 5,568.8 million metric tons (and for all greenhouse gases, 6,763 MMT CO₂ eq.) *Id.*

¹⁸ Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, *Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis* at 25 tbl. A1 (2016) (calculating the central estimate at a 3% discount rate), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/scc_tsd_final_clean_8_26_16.pdf [hereinafter 2016 TSD].

¹⁹ NEPA requires agencies to weigh the “relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,” as well as “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

²⁰ RMP at 4-270.

sound trivial, but in fact that figure represents over 2,000 premature deaths per year²¹—hardly an insignificant figure.²²

Economic theory explains why monetization is a much better tool than volume estimates or percent comparisons to provide the necessary contextual information on climate damages. For example, many decisionmakers and interested citizens would wrongly reduce down to zero the climate risks associated with a 0.2% of U.S. emissions,²³ simply due to the leading zero before the decimal in that percentage. As Professor Cass Sunstein has explained—drawing from the work of recent Nobel laureate economist Richard Thaler—a well-documented mental heuristic called “probability neglect” causes people to irrationally reduce small probability risks entirely down to zero.²⁴ People have significant “difficulty understanding a host of numerical concepts, especially risks and probabilities.”²⁵ Characterizing an annual contribution of 13 MMTCO₂E from upstream oil and gas activity as just 0.2% of U.S. emissions misleadingly makes the climate impacts appear vanishingly small. By comparison, by applying the social cost of carbon dioxide (about \$59 per ton for year 2020 emissions in 2017\$²⁶), decisionmakers and the public can readily comprehend that a 13 million ton increase of carbon dioxide emitted just in the year 2020 will generate over \$767 million in climate damages.²⁷ BLM’s projections for downstream emissions—several billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions—also seem small when characterized as “3.6% of the end use emissions of all U.S. production,”²⁸ but they will cause hundreds of billions of dollars in climate damages.

Similarly, many people will be unable to distinguish the significance of project alternatives or scenario analyses with different emissions: for example, 46,191 metric tons per year of methane versus 13,235 metric tons per year of methane.²⁹ As the Environmental Protection Agency’s website explains, “abstract measurements” of so many tons of greenhouse gases can be rather inscrutable for the public, unless “translat[ed] . . . into concrete terms you can understand.”³⁰ Abstract volume estimates fail to give people the required informational context due to another well-documented mental heuristic called “scope neglect.” Scope neglect, as explained by Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, among others, causes people to ignore the size of a problem when estimating the value of addressing the problem. For

²¹ Compare Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stat., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, *Death Attributed to Heat, Cold, and Other Weather Events in the United States, 2006-2010* at 1 (2014) (reporting about 2000 weather-related deaths per year) with Nat’l Ctr. for Health Stat., *Deaths and Mortality*, <https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm> (reporting about 2.7 million U.S. deaths per year total).

²² The public willingness to pay to avoid mortality is typically estimated at around \$9.6 million (in 2016\$). E.g., 83 Fed. Reg. 12,086, 12,098 (Mar. 19, 2018) (U.S. Coast Guard rule using the Department of Transportation’s value of statistical life in a recent analysis of safety regulations). Losing 2,000 lives prematurely to weather-related events is equivalent to a loss of public welfare worth over \$19 billion per year.

²³ RMP at 4-268.

²⁴ Cass R. Sunstein, *Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law*, 112 Yale L. J. 61, 63, 72 (2002).

²⁵ Valerie Reyna & Charles Brainerd, *Numeracy, Ratio Bias, and Denominator Neglect in Judgments of Risk and Probability*, 18 Learning & Individual Differences 89 (2007).

²⁶ 2016 TSD, *supra* note 18.

²⁷ This calculation in no way accepts BLM’s quantification of only 13 MMTCO₂e for the year 2028 as accurate or complete. In a proper cost-benefit analysis, future costs and benefits would be discounted to present value.

²⁸ RMP at 4-270 to 4-271.

²⁹ RMP at 4-269 (comparing GHGs in year 2028 for Alt. A and B versus Alt. C and D). Use of these numbers in no way accepts BLM’s calculations as accurate or complete.

³⁰ EPA, *Greenhouse Gas Equivalencies Calculator*. Available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20180212182940/https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator> (last updated Sept. 2017) (“Did you ever wonder what reducing carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by 1 million metric tons means in everyday terms? The greenhouse gas equivalencies calculator can help you understand just that, translating abstract measurements into concrete terms you can understand.”).

example, in one often-cited study, subjects were unable to meaningfully distinguish between the value of saving 2,000 migratory birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds, as compared to saving 20,000 birds.³¹

Scope neglect means many decisionmakers and members of the public would be unable to meaningfully distinguish between the climate risks of 13,000 versus 46,000 metric tons of methane. While decisionmakers and the public certainly can discern that one number is higher, without any context it may be difficult to weigh the relative magnitude of the climate risks. In contrast, the different climate risks would have been readily discernible through application of the social cost of greenhouse gas metrics. In this example, while the difference between 13,000 versus 46,000 metric tons may seem trivial, in fact those 33,000 extra tons of methane emitted in a single year will inflict over \$61 million in climate damages.³²

In general, non-monetized effects are often irrationally treated as worthless.³³ On several occasions, courts have struck down administrative decisions for failing to give weight to non-monetized effects.³⁴ Most relevantly, in *Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA*, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found it arbitrary and capricious to give zero value “to the most significant benefit of more stringent [fuel economy] standards: reduction in carbon emissions.”³⁵ Monetizing climate damages provides the informational context required by NEPA, whereas a simple tally of emissions volume and rote, qualitative, generic description of climate change are misleading and fail to give the public and decisionmakers the required information about the magnitude of discrete climate effects.³⁶

Climate Effects Must Be Monetized If Other Costs and Benefits Are Monetized

Though NEPA does not always require a full and formal cost-benefit analysis,³⁷ agencies’ approaches to assessing costs and benefits must be balanced and reasonable. Courts have warned agencies, for example, that “[e]ven though NEPA does not require a cost-benefit analysis,” an agency cannot selectively monetize benefits in support of its decision while refusing to monetize the costs of its action.³⁸

³¹ Daniel Kahneman et al., *Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions? An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues*, 19 J. Risk & Uncertainty 203, 212-213 (1999).

³² 2016 TSD Addendum (social cost of methane in 2028 is \$1500 in 2007\$; converted to current dollars, is \$1870).

³³ Richard Revesz, *Quantifying Regulatory Benefits*, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 1424, 1434-35, 1442 (2014).

³⁴ See *id.* at 1428, 1434.

³⁵ 538 F.3d at 1199.

³⁶ See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (requiring agencies to “identify and develop methods and procedures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations”).

³⁷ 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (“[T]he weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not be displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis.”); *but see e.g., Sierra Club v. Sigler*, 695 F.2d 957, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that NEPA “mandates at least a broad, informal cost-benefit analysis,” and so agencies must “fully and accurately” and “objectively” assess environmental, economic, and technical costs); *Chelsea Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 516 F.2d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 1975) (“NEPA, in effect, requires a broadly defined cost-benefit analysis of major federal activities.”); *Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n*, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“NEPA mandates a rather finely tuned and ‘systematic’ balancing analysis” of “environmental costs” against “economic and technical benefits”); *Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Marsh*, 568 F. Supp. 985, 1000 (D.D.C. 1983) (“The cost-benefit analysis of NEPA is concerned primarily with environmental costs. . . . A court may examine the cost-benefit analysis only as it bears upon the function of insuring that the agency has examined the environmental consequences of a proposed project.”).

³⁸ *High Country Conservation Advocates*, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1191; *accord. MEIC v. Office of Surface Mining*, 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1094-99 (holding it was arbitrary for the agency to quantify benefits in an EIS while failing to use the social cost of carbon to quantify costs, as well as arbitrary to imply there would be no effects from greenhouse gas emissions).

In *High Country Conservation Advocates v. Forest Service*, the U.S. District Court of Colorado found that it was “arbitrary and capricious to quantify the *benefits* of the lease modifications and then explain that a similar analysis of the *costs* was impossible when such an analysis was in fact possible.”³⁹ The court explained that, to support a decision on coal mining activity, the agencies had “weighed several specific economic benefits—coal recovered, payroll, associated purchases of supplies and services, and royalties,” but arbitrarily failed to monetized climate costs using the readily available social cost of carbon protocol.⁴⁰ Similarly, in *Montana Environmental Information Center v. Office of Surface Mining (MEIC v. OSM)*, the U.S. District Court of Montana followed the lead set by *High Country* and likewise held an environmental assessment to be arbitrary and capricious because it quantified the benefits of action (such as employment payroll, tax revenue, and royalties) while failing to use the social cost of carbon to quantify the costs.⁴¹

High Country and *MEIC v. OSM* are the latest applications of a broader line of case law in which courts find it arbitrary and capricious to apply inconsistent protocols for analyzing some effects compared to others, especially when the inconsistency obscures some of the most significant effects.⁴² For example, in *Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration*, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that, because the agency had monetized other uncertain costs and benefits of its vehicle fuel efficiency standard—like traffic congestion and noise costs—its “decision not to monetize the benefit of carbon emissions reduction was arbitrary and capricious.”⁴³ Specifically, it was arbitrary to “assign[] no value to *the most significant benefit* of more stringent [vehicle fuel efficiency] standards: reduction in carbon emissions.”⁴⁴ When an agency bases a decision on cost-benefit analysis, it is arbitrary to “put a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and overvaluing the costs.”⁴⁵ Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has chastised agencies for “inconsistently and opportunistically fram[ing] the costs and benefits of the rule [and] fail[ing] adequately to quantify certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified”⁴⁶; and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has remanded an environmental impact statement because “unrealistic” assumptions “misleading[ly]” skewed comparison of the project’s positive and negative effects.⁴⁷

Here, the RMP monetizes “economic benefits” similar to those highlighted in *High Country* and *MEIC*, including direct and indirect labor earnings and “economic output related to oil and gas activity,”⁴⁸ as well as tax revenue.⁴⁹ BLM seemingly tries to skirt the precedent set by *MEIC v. OSM* by identifying these economic benefits as “economic impacts.” The RMP reads, “[a]ny increased economic activity, in terms

³⁹ 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1191.

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ 274 F. Supp. 3d at 1094-99 (also holding that it was arbitrary to imply that there would be zero effects from greenhouse gas emissions).

⁴² Other cases from different courts that have declined to rule against failures to use the social cost of carbon in NEPA analyses are all distinguishable by the scale of the action or by whether other effects were quantified and monetized in the analysis. See *League of Wilderness Defenders v. Connaughton*, No. 3:12-cv-02271-HZ (D. Ore., Dec. 9, 2014); *EarthReports v. FERC*, 15-1127, (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2016); *WildEarth Guardians v. Zinke*, 1:16-CV-00605-RJ, at 23-24, (D. N.M. Feb. 16, 2017).

⁴³ 538 F.3d 1172, 1203 (9th Cir. 2008).

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 1199.

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 1198.

⁴⁶ *Bus. Roundtable v. SCC*, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

⁴⁷ *Johnston v. Davis*, 698 F.2d 1088, 1094–95 (10th Cir. 1983)

⁴⁸ RMP 4-454; *id.* at 4-455 tbl. 4-204 (noting that the monetized estimates include “direct effects and secondary regional economic effects”).

⁴⁹ RMP 4-475 to 4-476; see also *id.* at 4-286 (discussing effects on royalties).

of revenue, employment, labor income, total value added, and output . . . is simply an economic impact, rather than an economic benefit, inasmuch as such impacts might be viewed by another person as negative or undesirable impacts.”⁵⁰ However, in *MEIC v. OSM*, the District Court of the District of Montana dismissed this same argument as “a distinction without a difference.”⁵¹ “Output,” for example, is most likely calculated based on the market prices of oil and gas,⁵² and federal guidelines on economic analysis recognize that willingness-to-pay estimates based on market prices reflect social benefits and costs.⁵³ While in the RMP, BLM implies that calculations of output do not reflect “the social benefits of the proposed action to society as a whole,”⁵⁴ that misunderstands how market prices work. In a competitive market, like for oil and gas, the market price reflects aggregate willingness to pay based on social utility. In calculating oil and gas output and related labor earnings and taxes, the RMP has presented a monetized estimate of the supposed social benefits of the oil and gas activity in the Carlsbad planning area. Consequently, it must also use readily available tools to monetize the social costs of the oil and gas activity in the Carlsbad planning area.

Furthermore, despite BLM’s attempts to use terminology to distinguish the impacts it wants to monetize from those impacts it would prefer not to monetize, NEPA regulations group all these impacts under the same category of “effects”: economic and social impacts are listed as “effects” alongside ecological and health impacts, and all these effects must be discussed in as much detail as possible in an environmental impact statement.⁵⁵ It is arbitrary to apply inconsistent protocols for analysis of some effects compared to others, and to monetize some effects but not others that are equally monetizeable.

II. The Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas Metric Is Appropriate for a Project-Level EIS with Emissions of this Magnitude

The RMP claims that the social cost of greenhouse gas methodology is not appropriate for use outside of the rulemaking context and “does not measure the actual incremental impacts of a project on the environment.”⁵⁶ The RMP also states that: “While it is possible in many cases to quantify potential quantities of GHG emissions or the amount of carbon sequestered from particular activities, the tools necessary to quantify the incremental climatic impacts of those specific activities are presently unavailable. While there are difficulties in attributing specific climate change impacts to any given project or activity and quantifying those impacts, projected GHG emissions can serve as a proxy for a proposed action’s climate change impacts.”⁵⁷ However, BLM is wrong: the social cost of greenhouse gas protocol is such a tool to monetize the incremental climate impacts of specific projects.

⁵⁰ RMP at 2-82.

⁵¹ *Supra* note 38 at 40, n.9. *See also* RMP at 1-6 (referring to “the economic benefits of current and future oil and gas development”).

⁵² *See* RMP at 4-453 (“from an economic standpoint . . . oil and gas-related activities . . . account for the large majority of mining-related output, value-added, and employment”).

⁵³ *See* OMB, *Circular A-4* at 18-19 (2003) (explaining that “Market prices provide rich data for estimating benefits and costs based on willingness-to-pay if the goods and services . . . are traded in well-functioning competitive markets.”).

⁵⁴ RMP at 2-82.

⁵⁵ 40 C.F.R. §1508.8.

⁵⁶ RMP at 2-82.

⁵⁷ RMP at 4-268.

Monetization Is Appropriate and Useful in Any Decision with Significant Climate Impacts, and Its Use Should Not Be Limited to Regulatory Analyses

Though the federal Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases originally developed its estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases to harmonize the metrics used by agencies in their various regulatory impact analyses, there is nothing in the numbers' development that would limit applications to other decisionmaking contexts. The social cost of greenhouse gases measures the marginal cost of any additional unit of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere. The government action that precipitated a particular unit of emissions—whether a regulation, the granting of a permit, or a project approval—is irrelevant to the marginal climate damages caused by the emissions. Whether emitted by a leaking pipeline or the fossil fuel extraction process, whether emitted because of a regulation or a resource management decision, whether emitted in New Mexico or Maine or anywhere else, the marginal climate damages per unit of emissions remain the same. Indeed, the social cost of greenhouse gases has been used by many federal and state agencies in environmental impact analyses⁵⁸ and in resource management decisions.⁵⁹

The Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas Metrics Provides a Tool to Assess the Significance of Individual Physical Impacts

The social cost of greenhouse gas methodology is well suited to measure the marginal climate damages of individual projects. These protocols were developed to assess the cost of actions with “marginal” impacts on cumulative global emissions, and the metrics estimate the dollar figure of damages for one extra unit of greenhouse gas emissions. This marginal cost is calculated using integrated assessment models. These models translate emissions into changes in atmospheric greenhouse concentrations, atmospheric concentrations into changes in temperature, and changes in temperature into economic damages. A range of plausible socio-economic and emissions trajectories are used to account for the scope of potential scenarios and circumstances that may actually result in the coming years and decades. The marginal cost is attained by first running the models using a baseline emissions trajectory, and then running the same models again with one additional unit of emissions. The difference in damages between the two runs is the marginal cost of one additional unit. The approach assumes that the marginal damages from increased emissions will remain constant for small emissions increases relative to gross global emissions. In other words, the monetization tools are in fact perfectly suited to measuring the marginal effects of individual projects or other discrete agency actions.

Some of the incremental impacts on the environment that the social cost of greenhouse gas protocol captures—and which the RMP fails to analyze—include property lost or damaged; impacts to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; impacts to human health; changes in fresh water availability; ecosystem service impacts; impacts to outdoor recreation and other non-market amenities; and some catastrophic impacts, including potentially rapid sea-level rise, damages at very high temperatures, or

⁵⁸ For example, in August 2017, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management called the social cost of carbon “a useful measure to assess the benefits of CO2 reductions and inform agency decisions,” and applied the metric in an environmental impact statement to monetize the emissions difference of about 5 million metric tons per year between the proposed oil and gas development project and the no-action baseline, *Draft Environmental Impact Statement—Liberty Development Project in the Beaufort Sea, Alaska* at 3-129, 4-50 (2017). More generally, agencies have used IWG’s social cost of greenhouse gas estimates not only in scores of rulemakings but also in NEPA analyses for resource management decisions. See Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, *Think Global: International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon*, 42 Columbia J. Env’tl. L. 203, 270-84 (2017) (listing all uses by federal agencies through July 2016).

⁵⁹ States have used the social cost of greenhouse gases in decisions about electricity planning. See Iliana Paul et al., *The Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases and State Policy: A Frequently Asked Questions Guide* (Policy Integrity Report, 2017), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/SCC_State_Guidance.pdf.

unknown events.⁶⁰ A key advantage of using the social cost of greenhouse gas tool is that each physical impact—such as sea-level rise and increasing temperatures—need not be assessed in isolation. Instead, the social cost of greenhouse gas tool conveniently groups together the multitude of climate impacts and, consistent with NEPA regulations,⁶¹ enables agencies to assess whether all those impacts are cumulatively significant and to then compare those impacts with other impacts or alternatives using a common metric.

The Tons of Greenhouse Gas Emissions at Stake Here Are Clearly Significant

BLM quantifies the downstream greenhouse gas emissions from this plan, which could reach hundreds of millions of metric tons per year.⁶² Yet BLM refuses to take the straightforward next step of applying the social cost of greenhouse gas values to those quantified tons. In the Carlsbad RMP, BLM implies that it does not monetize the effects of the project's downstream emissions because it is not possible to attribute significance to a single project's emissions, alleging that "there are difficulties in attributing specific climate change impacts to any given project or activity and quantifying those impacts."⁶³

While there may not be a bright-line test for determining significance, the emissions BLM estimates for this project are clearly significant and warrant monetization. This is especially true since, once emissions have been quantified, the additional step of monetization through application of the Interagency Working Group's 2016 estimates only entails a simple arithmetic calculation.⁶⁴ It is difficult to understand how NEPA's mandate that an agency take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of its actions can be satisfied if BLM fails to analyze the impacts of the greenhouse gas emissions that it quantifies.

In *High Country*, the District Court for the District of Colorado found that it was arbitrary for the Forest Service not to monetize the "1.23 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions [from methane] the West Elk mine emits annually."⁶⁵ That suggests a threshold for monetization far below the tons of greenhouse gases that BLM estimates are at stake here. In *MEIC v. OSM*, the District Court for the District of Montana found it was arbitrary for the Office of Surface Mining not to monetize the 23.16

⁶⁰ These impacts are all included to some degree in the three integrated assessment models (IAMs) used by the IWG (namely, the DICE, FUND, and PAGE models), though some impacts are modeled incompletely, and many other important damage categories are currently omitted from these IAMs. Compare Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, *Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis* at 6-8, 29-33 (2010), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf> [hereinafter 2010 TSD]; with Peter Howard, *Omitted Damages: What's Missing from the Social Cost of Carbon* (Cost of Carbon Project Report, 2014), http://costofcarbon.org/files/Omitted_Damages_Whats_Missing_From_the_Social_Cost_of_Carbon.pdf. For other lists of actual climate effects, including air quality mortality, extreme temperature mortality, lost labor productivity, harmful algal blooms, spread of west nile virus, damage to roads and other infrastructure, effects on urban drainage, damage to coastal property, electricity demand and supply effects, water supply and quality effects, inland flooding, lost winter recreation, effects on agriculture and fish, lost ecosystem services from coral reefs, and wildfires, see EPA, *Multi-Model Framework for Quantitative Sectoral Impacts Analysis: A Technical Report for the Fourth National Climate Assessment* (2017); U.S. Global Change Research Program, *Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment* (2017); EPA, *Climate Change in the United States: Benefits of Global Action* (2015); Union of Concerned Scientists, *Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods, and the Implications for U.S. Coastal Real Estate* (2018).

⁶¹ 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7) (explaining that actions can be significant if related to individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts).

⁶² RMP at 4-271.

⁶³ *Id.* at 4-268.

⁶⁴ Agencies simply need to multiply their estimate of tons in each year by the IWG's 2016 values for the corresponding year of emissions (adjusted for inflation to current dollars). If the emissions change occurs in the future, agencies would then discount the products back to present value.

⁶⁵ 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1191 (quoting an e-mail comment on the draft statement for the quantification of tons).

million metric tons, which constituted “approximately 0.35 percent of the total U.S. emissions.”⁶⁶ In terms of relative percentage, BLM’s estimate that upstream oil and gas activity under this RMP alone will contribute 0.2% of total U.S. emissions is nearly as high, and this percentage estimate does not include the billions of tons of downstream emissions. In *Center for Biological Diversity*, the Ninth Circuit found that it was arbitrary for the Department of Transportation not to monetize the 35 million metric ton difference in lifetime emissions from increasing the fuel efficiency of motor vehicles:⁶⁷ given the estimated lifetime of vehicles sold in the years 2008-2011 (sometimes estimated at about 15 years on average), this could represent as little two million metric tons per year. In a recent environmental impact statement from the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management published in August 2017, the agency explained that the social cost of carbon was “a useful measure” to apply to a NEPA analysis of an action anticipated to have a difference in greenhouse gas emissions compared to the no-action baseline of about 25 million metric tons over a 5-year period,⁶⁸ or about 5 million metric tons per year.

Under any reasonable application of the social cost of greenhouse gas metrics, the upstream and downstream emissions from fossil fuel development under the Carlsbad RMP will cause billions of dollars in climate damages. Tellingly, BLM had no problem concluding in its RMP that it was appropriate to monetize, for example, as little as a \$2 million change in labor earnings between alternatives.⁶⁹ A potential climate cost of billions of dollars is also clearly significant, particularly in the context of a document the very purpose of which is to evaluate a project’s *environmental* impacts.

Monetizing Climate Damages Is Appropriate and Useful Regardless of Whether Every Effect Can Be Monetized in a Full Cost-Benefit Analysis

The RMP argues that it would be inappropriate to use the social cost of greenhouse gas metrics “[w]ithout a complete monetary cost-benefit analysis.”⁷⁰ First, as described above, BLM does in fact present the supposed social benefits of the oil and gas activity under the BLM by calculating output, as well as labor earnings and taxes.

Second, monetizing one key impact still provides useful information for decisionmakers and the public even when monetizing other impacts is not feasible. The social cost of greenhouse gases enables a more accurate and transparent comparison of alternatives along the dimension of climate impacts even if other costs and benefits cannot be quantified, and “breakeven analysis” could provide a framework for making decisions when some effects but not others are monetized. Climate damages can and should be monetized even if other costs and benefits are harder to quantify or monetize and so must be discussed qualitatively. Many effects can readily be quantified and monetized, and agencies should generally do so when feasible; other effects, like water quality, are notoriously difficult to quantify and monetize, due to the geographically idiosyncratic nature of individual water bodies. Greenhouse gases, by comparison, have the same impact on climate change no matter where they are emitted, and those impacts are readily monetized using the social cost of greenhouse methodology. Regardless of whether all other effects can be monetized, using the social cost of greenhouse gases provides useful and necessary information to the public and decisionmakers. In particular, whether or not other effects are monetized, using the social cost of greenhouse gases will facilitate comparison between alternative options along the dimension of climate change. As discussed above, different alternatives could have varying

⁶⁶ *MEIC v. Office of Surface Mining* at 36-37.

⁶⁷ 538 F.3d at 1187.

⁶⁸ BOEM, *Liberty Development and Production Plan Draft EIS* at 3-129, 4,50 (2017) (89,940,000 minus 64,570,000 is about 25 million).

⁶⁹ RMP at 4-459.

⁷⁰ RMP at 2-82.

greenhouse gas consequences over time, and monetization provides the best means of comparing project alternatives along the dimension of climate change.

Moreover, analytical frameworks exist to weigh qualitative effects alongside monetized effects. NEPA regulations, for example, first state that if there are “important qualitative considerations,” then the ultimate “weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives” should not be displayed exclusively as a “monetary cost-benefit analysis.” Nevertheless, NEPA regulations further acknowledge that when monetization of costs and benefits is “relevant to the choice among environmentally different alternatives,” “that analysis” can be presented alongside “any analyses of unquantified environmental impacts, values, and amenities.”⁷¹ In other words, the monetization of some impacts does not require the monetization of all impacts.

The Office of Management and Budget’s *Circular A-4*⁷² guidance to agencies on conducting economic analysis also provides a framework for weighing monetized and qualitative costs and benefits, called break-even analysis:

It will not always be possible to express in monetary units all of the important benefits and costs. When it is not, the most efficient alternative will not necessarily be the one with the largest quantified and monetized net-benefit estimate. In such cases, you should exercise professional judgment in determining how important the non-quantified benefits or costs may be in the context of the overall analysis. If the non-quantified benefits and costs are likely to be important, you should carry out a “threshold” analysis to evaluate their significance. Threshold or “break-even” analysis answers the question, “How small could the value of the non-quantified benefits be (or how large would the value of the non-quantified costs need to be) before the rule would yield zero net benefits?” In addition to threshold analysis you should indicate, where possible, which non-quantified effects are most important and why.⁷³

Even without using something as formal as a break-even analysis, it is clear that monetizing climate damages provides useful information whether or not every effect can be monetized in a full cost-benefit analysis.

III. BLM Should Use the Interagency Working Group’s 2016 Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon, Methane, and Nitrous Oxide

In 2016, the IWG published updated central estimates for the social cost of greenhouse gases: \$50 per ton of carbon dioxide, \$1440 per ton of methane, and \$18,000 per ton of nitrous oxide (in 2017 dollars for year 2020 emissions).⁷⁴ Agencies must continue to use estimates of a similar or higher⁷⁵ value in their analyses and decisionmaking. A recent Executive Order disbanding the IWG does not change the fact that the IWG estimates still reflect the best available data and methodologies.

⁷¹ 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23.

⁷² Though *Circular A-4* focus on agencies’ regulatory analyses under Executive Order 12,866, the document nevertheless more generally has distilled best practices on economic analysis and is a useful guide to all agencies undertaking an assessment of costs and benefits.

⁷³ OMB, *Circular A-4* at 2 (2003).

⁷⁴ U.S. Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, “Technical support document: Technical update of the social cost of carbon for regulatory impact analysis under executive order 12866 & Addendum: Application of the methodology to estimate the social cost of methane and the social cost of nitrous oxide” (2016), available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira/social-cost-of-carbon>.

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz et al., *Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of Climate Change*, 508 *NATURE* 173 (2014) (explaining that current estimates omit key damage categories and, therefore, are very likely underestimates).

IWG's Methodology Is Rigorous, Transparent, and Based on Best Available Data

Beginning in 2009, the IWG assembled experts from a dozen federal agencies and White House offices to “estimate the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year” based on “a defensible set of input assumptions that are grounded in the existing scientific and economic literature.”⁷⁶ IWG’s methods combined three frequently used models built to predict the economic costs of the physical impacts of each additional ton of carbon.⁷⁷ The models together incorporate such damage categories as: agricultural and forestry impacts, coastal impacts due to sea level rise, impacts from extreme weather events, impacts to vulnerable market sectors, human health impacts including malaria and pollution, outdoor recreation impacts and other non-market amenities, impacts to human settlements and ecosystems, and some catastrophic impacts.⁷⁸ IWG ran these models using a baseline scenario including inputs and assumptions drawn from the peer-reviewed literature, and then ran the models again with an additional unit of carbon emissions to determine the increased economic damages.⁷⁹ IWG’s social cost of carbon estimates were first issued in 2010 and have been updated several times to reflect the latest and best scientific and economic data.⁸⁰

Following the development of estimates for carbon dioxide, the same basic methodology was used in 2016 to develop the social cost of methane and social cost of nitrous oxide—estimates that captures the distinct heating potential of methane and nitrous oxide emissions.⁸¹ These additional metrics used the same economic models, the same treatment of uncertainty, and the same methodological assumptions that IWG applied to the social cost of carbon, and these new estimates underwent rigorous peer-review.⁸²

IWG’s methodology has been repeatedly endorsed by reviewers. In 2014, the U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded that IWG had followed a “consensus-based” approach, relied on peer-reviewed academic literature, disclosed relevant limitations, and adequately planned to incorporate new information through public comments and updated research.⁸³ In 2016 and 2017, the National Academies of Sciences issued two reports that, while recommending future improvements to the methodology, supported the continued use of the existing IWG estimates.⁸⁴ And in 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Department of Energy’s reliance on IWG’s social cost of

⁷⁶ IWG, *Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866* (2010) (“2010 TSD”). Available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf>.

⁷⁷ *Id.* at 5. These models are DICE (the Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy), FUND (the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and Distribution), and PAGE (Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse Effect).

⁷⁸ *Id.* at 6-8.

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 24-25.

⁸⁰ IWG, *Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon* at 5–29 (2016). Available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/scc_tsd_final_clean_8_26_16.pdf.

⁸¹ See 2016 IWG Addendum at 2.

⁸² *Id.* at 3.

⁸³ Gov’t Accountability Office, *Regulatory Impact Analysis: Development of Social Cost of Carbon Estimates* 12-19 (2014). Available at <http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665016.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Nat’l Acad. Sci., Engineering & Med., *Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide* 3 (2017), <https://www.nap.edu/read/24651/chapter/1>; Nat’l Acad. Sci., Engineering & Med., *Assessment of Approaches to Updating the Social Cost of Carbon: Phase 1 Report on a Near-Term Update* 1–2 (2016); <https://www.nap.edu/read/21898/chapter/1>.

carbon was reasonable.⁸⁵ It is, therefore, unsurprising that leading economists and climate policy experts have endorsed the Working Group's values as the best available estimates.⁸⁶

A Recent Executive Order Does Not Change the Requirements to Monetize Climate Damages

In March 2017, President Trump disbanded the IWG and withdrew their technical support documents.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, Executive Order 13,783 assumes that federal agencies will continue to “monetiz[e] the value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions” and instructs agencies to ensure such estimates are “consistent with the guidance contained in OMB Circular A-4.”⁸⁸ Consequently, while federal agencies no longer benefit from ongoing technical support from the IWG on use of the social cost of greenhouse gases, by no means does the new Executive Order imply that agencies should not monetize important effects in their environmental impact statements. The Executive Order does not prohibit agencies from relying on the same choice of models as the IWG, the same inputs and assumptions as the IWG, the same statistical methodologies as the IWG, or the same ultimate values as derived by the IWG. To the contrary, because the Executive Order requires consistency with Circular A-4, as agencies follow the Circular's standards for using the best available data and methodologies, they will necessarily choose similar data, methodologies, and estimates as the IWG, since the IWG's work continues to represent the best available estimates.⁸⁹ The Executive Order does not preclude agencies from using the same range of estimates as developed by the IWG, so long as the agency explains that the data and methodology that produced those estimates are consistent with Circular A-4 and, more broadly, with standards for rational decisionmaking.

Similarly, the Executive Order's withdrawal of the Council on Environmental Quality's guidance on greenhouse gases,⁹⁰ does not—and legally cannot—remove agencies' statutory requirement to fully analyze and disclose the environmental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. As the Council on Environmental Quality explained in its withdrawal, the “guidance was not a regulation,” and “[t]he withdrawal of the guidance does not change any law, regulation, or other legally binding requirement.”⁹¹ In other words, when the guidance originally recommended the appropriate use of the social cost of greenhouse gases in environmental impact statements,⁹² it was simply explaining that use of the social cost of greenhouse gases is consistent with longstanding NEPA regulations and case law, all of which are still in effect today.

⁸⁵ *Zero Zone*, 832 F.3d at 679.

⁸⁶ See, e.g., Richard Revesz et al., *Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases*, 357 *Science* 655 (2017); Michael Greenstone et al., *Developing a Social Cost of Carbon for U.S. Regulatory Analysis: A Methodology and Interpretation*, 7 *Rev. Env'tl. Econ. & Pol'y* 23, 42 (2013); Richard L. Revesz et al., *Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of Climate Change*, 508 *Nature* 173 (2014) (co-authored with Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow, among others).

⁸⁷ Exec. Order No. 13,783 § 5(b), 82 *Fed. Reg.* 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).

⁸⁸ *Id.* § 5(c).

⁸⁹ See Richard L. Revesz et al., *Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases*, 357 *SCIENCE* 6352 (2017) (explaining that, even after Trump's Executive Order, the social cost of greenhouse gas estimate of around \$50 per ton of carbon dioxide is still the best estimate).

⁹⁰ Exec. Order 13,783 § 3(c)

⁹¹ 82 *Fed. Reg.* 16,576, 16,576 (Apr. 5, 2017).

⁹² See CEQ, *Revised Draft Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews* at 16 (Dec. 2014), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nepa_revised_draft_ghg_guidance_searchable.pdf (“[A]lthough developed specifically for regulatory impact analyses, the Federal social cost of carbon, which multiple Federal agencies have developed and used to assess the costs and benefits of alternatives in rulemakings, offers a harmonized, interagency metric that can provide decisionmakers and the public with some context for meaningful NEPA review.”).

Notably, some agencies under the Trump administration have continued to use the IWG estimates even following the Executive Order. For example, in August 2017, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management called the social cost of carbon “a useful measure” and applied it to analyze the consequences of offshore oil and gas drilling.⁹³ And in July 2017, the Department of Energy used the IWG’s estimates for carbon and methane emissions to analyze energy efficiency regulation, describing the social cost of methane as having “undergone multiple stages of peer review.”⁹⁴

As the RMP notes,⁹⁵ two agencies have developed new “interim” values of the social cost of greenhouse gases following the Executive Order. Relying on faulty economic theory, these “interim” estimates drop the social cost of carbon from \$50 per ton in year 2020 down to as little as \$1 per ton, and drop the social cost of methane from \$1420 per ton in year 2020 down to \$58. These “interim” estimates are inconsistent with accepted science and economics; the IWG’s 2016 estimates remain the best available estimates. The IWG’s methodology and estimates have been repeatedly endorsed by reviewers as transparent, consensus-based, and firmly grounded in the academic literature. By contrast, the “interim” estimates ignore the interconnected, global nature of our climate-vulnerable economy, and obscure the devastating effects that climate change will have on younger and future generations. The RMP suggests it will not use the interim estimates because they were intended only “for use in the rulemaking context.”⁹⁶ These comments have already explained above why the social cost of greenhouse gas methodology is in fact appropriate and often required outside the rulemaking context. But BLM should not use the “interim” social cost of greenhouse gas estimates because of their methodological flaws, as described more fully below.

Uncertainty Supports Higher Social Cost of Greenhouse Gas Estimates, and Is Never a Reason to Abandon the Metric

BLM alleges in the RMP that because the social cost of greenhouse gas estimates are “generated in a range,” they “provide [] little benefit in assisting the BLM’s decision for project level analysis.”⁹⁷ To start, countless agencies have found the social cost of greenhouse gas estimates to be “a useful measure” in their environmental impact statements, and have had no problem either applying the full range of estimates or focusing on the IWG’s central estimate.⁹⁸ As for the broader implication that uncertainty in the estimates means they should not be used, it would be much more misleading to not monetize climate damages, thereby treating them as worthless. More generally, uncertainty is *not* a reason to abandon the social cost of greenhouse gas methodologies;⁹⁹ quite the contrary, uncertainty supports higher estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases, because most uncertainties regarding climate change entail tipping points, catastrophic risks, and unknown unknowns about the damages of climate change. Because the key uncertainties of climate change include the risk of irreversible catastrophes, applying an options value framework to the regulatory context strengthens the case for ambitious regulatory action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

There are numerous well-established, rigorous analytical tools available to help agencies characterize and quantitatively assess uncertainty, such as Monte Carlo simulations, and the IWG’s social cost of

⁹³ *Draft Environmental Impact Statement—Liberty Development Project in the Beaufort Sea, Alaska* at 3-129.

⁹⁴ Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Walk-In Cooler and Freezer Refrigeration Systems, 82 Fed. Reg. 31,808, 31,811, 31,857 (July 10, 2017).

⁹⁵ RMP at 2-82.

⁹⁶ RMP 2-82.

⁹⁷ RMP 2-82.

⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Draft Environmental Impact Statement—Liberty Development Project in the Beaufort Sea, Alaska* at 3-129.

⁹⁹ *Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA*, 538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hile the record shows that there is a range of values, the value of carbon emissions reductions is certainly not zero.”).

greenhouse gas protocol incorporates those tools. To further address uncertainty, the IWG recommended to agencies a range of four estimates: three central or mean-average estimates at a 2.5%, 3%, and 5% discount rate respectively, and a 95th percentile value at the 3% discount rate. While the IWG's technical support documents disclosed fuller probabilities distributions, these four estimates were chosen by agencies to be the focus for decisionmaking. In particular, application of the 95th percentile value was not part of an effort to show the probability distribution around the 3% discount rate; rather, the 95th percentile value serves as a methodological shortcut to approximate the uncertainties around low-probability but high-damage, catastrophic, or irreversible outcomes that are currently omitted or undercounted in the economic models.

The shape of the distribution of climate risks and damages includes a long tail of lower-probability, high-damage, irreversible outcomes due to “tipping points” in planetary systems, inter-sectoral interactions, and other deep uncertainties. Climate damages are not normally distributed around a central estimate, but rather feature a significant right skew toward catastrophic outcomes. In fact, a 2015 survey of economic experts concludes that catastrophic outcomes are increasingly likely to occur.¹⁰⁰ Because the three integrated assessment models that the IWG's methodology relied on are unable to systematically account for these potential catastrophic outcomes, a 95th percentile value was selected instead to account for such uncertainty. There are no similarly systematic biases pointing in the other direction which might warrant giving weight to a low-percentile estimate.

Additionally, the 95th percentile value addresses the strong possibility of widespread risk aversion with respect to climate change. The integrated assessment models do not reflect that individuals likely have a higher willingness to pay to reduce low-probability, high-impact damages than they do to reduce the likelihood of higher-probability but lower impact damages with the same expected cost. Beyond individual members of society, governments also have reasons to exercise some degree of risk aversion to irreversible outcomes like climate change.

The National Academies of Sciences did recommend that the IWG document its full treatment of uncertainty in an appendix and disclose low-probability as well as high-probability estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases.¹⁰¹ However, that does not mean it would be appropriate for individual agencies to rely on low-percentile estimates to justify decisions. While disclosing low-percentile estimates as a sensitivity analysis may promote transparency, relying on such an estimate for decisionmaking—in the face of contrary guidance from the best available science and economics on uncertainty and risk—would not be a “credible, objective, realistic, and scientifically balanced” approach to uncertainty, as required by Circular A-4.¹⁰²

In short, the 95th percentile estimate attempts to capture risk aversion and uncertainties around lower-probability, high-damage, irreversible outcomes that are currently omitted or undercounted by the models. There is no need to balance out this estimate with a low-percentile value, because the reverse assumptions are not reasonable:

¹⁰⁰ Policy Integrity, *Expert Consensus on the Economics of Climate Change 2* (2015), available at <http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/ExpertConsensusReport.pdf> [hereinafter *Expert Consensus*] (“Experts believe that there is greater than a 20% likelihood that this same climate scenario would lead to a ‘catastrophic’ economic impact (defined as a global GDP loss of 25% or more).”). See also Robert Pindyck, *The Social Cost of Carbon Revisited* (National Bureau of Economic Research, No. w22807, 2016).

¹⁰¹ Nat'l Acad. Of Sci., *Assessment of Approaches to Updating the Social Cost of Carbon 49* (2016) (“[T]he IWG could identify a high percentile (e.g., 90th, 95th) and corresponding low percentile (e.g., 10th, 5th) of the SCC frequency distributions on each graph.”).

¹⁰² Circular A-4 at 39.

- There is no reason to believe the public or the government will be systematically risk seeking with respect to climate change.¹⁰³
- The consequences of overestimating the risk of climate damages (i.e., spending more than we need to on mitigation and adaptation) are not nearly as irreversible as the consequences of underestimating the risk of climate damage (i.e., failing to prevent catastrophic outcomes).
- Though some uncertainties might point in the direction of lower social cost of greenhouse gas values, such as those related to the development of breakthrough adaptation technologies, the models already account for such uncertainties around adaptation; on balance, most uncertainties strongly point toward higher, not lower, social cost of greenhouse gas estimates.¹⁰⁴
- There is no empirical basis for any “long tail” of potential benefits that would counteract the potential for extreme harm associated with climate change.

Moreover, even the best existing estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases are likely underestimated because the models currently omit many significant categories of damages—such as depressed economic growth, pests, pathogens, erosion, air pollution, fire, dwindling energy supply, health costs, political conflict, and ocean acidification, as well as tipping points, catastrophic risks, and unknown unknowns—and because of other methodological choices.¹⁰⁵

Consequently, uncertainty suggests an even higher social cost of greenhouse gases and so is not a reason to abandon the metric, which would misleadingly suggest that climate damages are worthless.

A Global Perspective on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases Is Required to Capture All Factors Bearing on U.S. Public Welfare

BLM mentions the availability of new “interim” estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases that make changes “to the consideration of domestic versus international impacts and the consideration of appropriate discount rates.”¹⁰⁶ Those two changes are inappropriate and violate the obligations under NEPA to assess environmental consequences. This section explains why the interim estimates’ focus on so-called “domestic-only” damages falls short of the agency’s responsibilities under NEPA; the next section explains the problems with the interim estimates’ use of a discount rate that ignores impacts to future generations.

¹⁰³ As a 2009 survey revealed, the vast majority of economic experts support the idea that “uncertainty associated with the environmental and economic effects of greenhouse gas emissions increases the value of emission controls, assuming some level of risk-aversion.” See *Expert Consensus*, *supra* note 100, at 3 (citing 2009 survey).

¹⁰⁴ See Richard L. Revesz et al., *Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of Climate Change*, 508 *NATURE* 173 (2014). R. Tol, *The Social Cost of Carbon*, 3 *Annual Rev. Res. Econ.* 419 (2011) (“[U]ndesirable surprises seem more likely than desirable surprises. Although it is relatively easy to imagine a disaster scenario for climate change—for example, involving massive sea level rise or monsoon failure that could even lead to mass migration and violent conflict—it is not at all easy to imagine that climate change will be a huge boost to human welfare.”).

¹⁰⁵ See Revesz et al., *Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of Climate Change*, *supra* note 104; Peter Howard, *Omitted Damages: What’s Missing from the Social Cost of Carbon* (Cost of Carbon Project Report, 2014); Frances C. Moore & Delavane B. Diaz, *Temperature Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy*, 5 *NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE* 127 (2015) (demonstrating SCC may be biased downward by more than a factor of six by failing to include the climate’s effect on economic growth).

¹⁰⁶ RMP 2-82.

NEPA contains a provision on “International and National Coordination of Efforts” that broadly requires that “all agencies of the Federal Government *shall* . . . recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems.”¹⁰⁷ Using a global social cost of greenhouse gases to analyze and set policy fulfills these instructions. Furthermore, the Act requires agencies to, “where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind’s world environment.”¹⁰⁸ By continuing to use the global social cost of greenhouse gases to spur reciprocal foreign actions, federal agencies “lend appropriate support” to the NEPA’s goal of “maximize[ing] international cooperation” to protect “mankind’s world environment.” Furthermore, not only is it consistent with Circular A-4 and best economic practices to estimate the global damages of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in regulatory analyses and environmental impact statements, but no existing methodology for estimating a “domestic-only” value is reliable, complete, or consistent with Circular A-4.

From 2010 through 2016, federal agencies based their regulatory decision and NEPA reviews on global estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases. Though agencies sometimes also disclosed a “highly speculative” range that tried to capture exclusively U.S. climate costs, emphasis on a global value was recognized as more accurate given the science and economics of climate change, as more consistent with best economic practices, and as crucial to advancing U.S. strategic goals.¹⁰⁹

Opponents of climate regulation challenged the global number in court and other forums, and often attempted to use Circular A-4 as support.¹¹⁰ Specifically, opponents have seized on Circular A-4’s instructions to “focus” on effects to “citizens and residents of the United States,” while any significant effects occurring “beyond the borders of the United States . . . should be reported separately.”¹¹¹ Importantly, despite this language and such challenges, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had no trouble concluding that a global focus for the social cost of greenhouse gases was reasonable:

AHRI and Zero Zone [the industry petitioners] next contend that DOE [the Department of Energy] arbitrarily considered the global benefits to the environment but only considered the national costs. They emphasize that the [statute] only concerns “national energy and water conservation.” In the New Standards Rule, DOE did not let this submission go unanswered. It explained that climate change “involves a global externality,” meaning that carbon released in the United States affects the climate of

¹⁰⁷ 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(f) (emphasis added).

¹⁰⁸ 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(f); *see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey*, 986 F.2d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (confirming that Subsection F is mandatory); *Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC*, 647 F.2d 1345, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“This NEPA prescription, I find, looks toward cooperation, not unilateral action, in a manner consistent with our foreign policy.”); *cf. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, GUIDANCE ON NEPA ANALYSIS FOR TRANSBOUNDARY IMPACTS* (1997), *available at* <http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/transguide.pdf>; Exec. Order No. 12,114, *Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions*, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 §§ 1-1, 2-1 (Jan. 4, 1979) (applying to “major Federal actions . . . having significant effects on the environment outside the geographical borders of the United States,” and enabling agency officials “to be informed of pertinent environmental considerations and to take such considerations into account . . . in making decisions regarding such actions”).

¹⁰⁹ *See generally* Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, *Think Global: International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon*, 42 *Columbia J. Envtl. L.* 203 (2017).

¹¹⁰ Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, *Determining the Proper Scope of Climate Change Policy Benefits in U.S. Regulatory Analyses: Domestic versus Global Approaches*, 10 *Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y* 245 (2016) (citing Circular A-4 to argue against a global perspective on the social cost of carbon); *see also, e.g.,* Petitioners Brief on Procedural and Record-Based Issues at 70, in *West Virginia v. EPA*, case 15-1363, D.C. Cir. (filed February 19, 2016) (challenging EPA’s use of the global social cost of carbon).

¹¹¹ Circular A-4 at 15. Note that A-4 slightly conflates “accrue to citizens” with “borders of the United States”: U.S. citizens have financial and other interests tied to effects beyond the borders of the United States, as discussed further below.

the entire world. According to DOE, national energy conservation has global effects, and, therefore, those global effects are an appropriate consideration when looking at a national policy. Further, AHRI and Zero Zone point to no global costs that should have been considered alongside these benefits. Therefore, DOE acted reasonably when it compared global benefits to national costs.¹¹²

Circular A-4's reference to effects "beyond the borders" confirms that it is appropriate for agencies to consider the global effects of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. While Circular A-4 may suggest that most typical decisions should focus on U.S. effects, the Circular cautions agencies that special cases call for different emphases:

[Y]ou cannot conduct a good regulatory analysis according to a formula. Conducting high-quality analysis requires competent professional judgment. ***Different regulations may call for different emphases*** in the analysis, ***depending on the nature and complexity*** of the regulatory issues and the sensitivity of the benefit and cost estimates to the key assumptions.¹¹³

In fact, Circular A-4 elsewhere assumes that agencies' analyses will not always be conducted from purely the perspective of the United States, as one of its instructions only applies "as long as the analysis is conducted from the United States perspective,"¹¹⁴ suggesting that in some circumstances it is appropriate for the analysis to be global. For example, EPA and DOT have adopted a global perspective on the analysis of potential monopsony benefits to U.S. consumers resulting from the reduced price of foreign oil imports following energy efficiency increases, and EPA assesses the global potential for leakage of greenhouse gas emissions owing to U.S. regulation.¹¹⁵

Perhaps more than any other issue, the nature of the issue of climate change requires precisely such a "different emphasis" from the default domestic-only assumption. To avoid a global "tragedy of the commons" that could irreparably damage all countries, including the United States, every nation should ideally set policy according to the global social cost of greenhouse gases.¹¹⁶ Climate and clean air are global common resources, meaning they are freely available to all countries, but any one country's use—i.e., pollution—imposes harms on the polluting country as well as the rest of the world. Because greenhouse pollution does not stay within geographic borders but rather mixes in the atmosphere and affects climate worldwide, each ton emitted by the United States not only creates domestic harms, but also imposes large externalities on the rest of the world. Conversely, each ton of greenhouse gases abated in another country benefits the United States along with the rest of the world.

If all countries set their greenhouse emission levels based on only domestic costs and benefits, ignoring the large global externalities, the aggregate result would be substantially sub-optimal climate protections and significantly increased risks of severe harms to all nations, including the United States. Thus, basic economic principles demonstrate that the United States stands to benefit greatly if all countries apply global social cost of greenhouse gas values in their regulatory decisions and project

¹¹² Zero Zone v. Dept. of Energy, 832 F.3d 654, 679 (7th Cir. 2016).

¹¹³ Circular A-4 at 3 (emphasis added).

¹¹⁴ *Id.* at 38 (counting international transfers as costs and benefits "as long as the analysis is conducted from the United States perspective").

¹¹⁵ See Howard & Schwartz, *supra* note 109, at 268-69.

¹¹⁶ See Garrett Hardin, *The Tragedy of the Commons*, 162 Science 1243 (1968) ("[E]ach pursuing [only its] own best interest . . . in a commons brings ruin to all.").

reviews. Indeed, the United States stands to gain hundreds of billions or even trillions of dollars in direct benefits from efficient foreign action on climate change.¹¹⁷

In order to ensure that other nations continue to use global social cost of greenhouse gas values, it is important that the United States itself continue to do so.¹¹⁸ The United States is engaged in a repeated strategic dynamic with several significant players—including the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, and others—that have already adopted a global framework for valuing the social cost of greenhouse gases.¹¹⁹ For example, Canada and Mexico have explicitly borrowed the IWG’s global SCC metric to set their own fuel efficiency standards.¹²⁰ For the United States to now depart from this collaborative dynamic by reverting to a domestic-only estimate would undermine the country’s long-term interests and could jeopardize emissions reductions underway in other countries, which are already benefiting the United States.

For these and other reasons, the IWG properly relied on global estimates to develop its SCC metric, and many federal agencies have since relied on this global metric to evaluate and justify their decisions. At the same time, some agencies have, in addition to the global estimate, also disclosed a “highly speculative” estimate of the domestic-only effects of climate change. In particular, the Department of Energy always includes a chapter on a domestic-only value of carbon emissions in the economic analyses supporting its energy efficiency standards; EPA has also often disclosed similar estimates.¹²¹ Such an approach is consistent with Circular A-4’s suggestion that agencies should usually disclose domestic effects separately from global effects. However, as we have discussed, reliance on a domestic-only methodology would be inconsistent with both the inherent nature of climate change and the standards of Circular A-4. Consequently, it is appropriate under Circular A-4 for agencies to continue to rely on global estimates of the social cost of greenhouses to justify their regulatory decisions or their choice of alternatives under NEPA.

Moreover, no current methodology can accurately estimate a “domestic-only” value of the social cost of greenhouse gases. OMB, the National Academies of Sciences, and the economic literature all agree that existing methodologies for calculating a “domestic-only” value of the social cost of greenhouse gases are deeply flawed and result in severe and misleading underestimates. In developing the social cost of carbon, the IWG did offer some such domestic estimates. Using the results of one economic model (FUND) as well as the U.S. share of global gross domestic product (GDP), the group generated an “approximate, provisional, and **highly speculative**” range of 7–23% of the global social cost of carbon as an estimate of the purely direct climate effects to the United States.¹²² Yet, as the IWG itself acknowledged, this range is almost certainly an underestimate because it ignores significant, indirect

¹¹⁷ Policy Integrity, *Foreign Action, Domestic Windfall: The U.S. Economy Stands to Gain Trillions from Foreign Climate Action* (2015), <http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/ForeignActionDomesticWindfall.pdf>

¹¹⁸ See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* 10-11 (1984) (on repeated prisoner’s dilemma games).

¹¹⁹ See Howard & Schwartz, *supra* note 109, at Appendix B.

¹²⁰ See Heavy-Duty Vehicle and Engine Greenhouse Gas Emission Regulations, SOR/2013-24, 147 Can. Gazette pt. II, 450, 544 (Can.), available at <http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2013/2013-03-13/html/sor-dors24-eng.html> (“The values used by Environment Canada are based on the extensive work of the U.S. Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon.”); Jason Furman & Brian Deese, *The Economic Benefits of a 50 Percent Target for Clean Energy Generation by 2025*, White House Blog, June 29, 2016 (summarizing the North American Leader’s Summit announcement that U.S., Canada, and Mexico would “align” their SCC estimates).

¹²¹ Howard & Schwartz, *supra* note 109, at 220-21.

¹²² INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 at 11 (2010) (emphasis added).

costs to trade, human health, and security that are likely to “spill over” into the United States as other regions experience climate change damages, among other effects.¹²³

Neither the existing IAMs nor a share of global GDP are appropriate bases for calculating a domestic-only estimate. The IAMs were never designed to calculate a domestic SCC, since a global SCC is the economic efficient value. FUND, like other IAMs, includes some simplifying assumptions: of relevance, FUND and the other IAMs are not able to capture the adverse effects that the impacts of climate change in other countries will have on the United States through trade linkages, national security, migration, and other forces.¹²⁴ This is why the IWG characterized the domestic-only estimate from FUND as a “highly speculative” underestimate. Similarly, a domestic-only estimate based on some rigid conception of geographic borders or U.S. share of world GDP will fail to capture all the climate-related costs and benefits that matter to U.S. citizens.¹²⁵ U.S. citizens have economic and other interests abroad that are not fully reflected in the U.S. share of global GDP. GDP is a “monetary value of final goods and services—that is, those that are bought by the final user—produced in a country in a given period of time.”¹²⁶ GDP therefore does not reflect significant U.S. ownership interests in foreign businesses, properties, and other assets, as well as consumption abroad including tourism,¹²⁷ or even the 8 million Americans living abroad.¹²⁸ At the same time, GDP is also over-inclusive, counting productive operations in the United States that are owned by foreigners. Gross National Income (GNI), by contrast, defines its scope not by location but by ownership interests.¹²⁹ However, not only has GNI fallen out of favor as a metric used in international economic policy,¹³⁰ but using a domestic-only SCC based on GNI would make the SCC metrics incommensurable with other costs in regulatory impact analyses, since most regulatory costs are calculated by U.S. agencies regardless of whether they fall to U.S.-owned entities or to foreign-owned entities operating in the United States.¹³¹ Furthermore, both GDP and GNI are dependent on what happens in other countries, due to trade and the international flow of capital. The artificial constraints of both metrics counsel against a rigid split based on either U.S. GDP or U.S. GNI.¹³²

¹²³ *Id.* (explaining that the IAMs, like FUND, do “not account for how damages in other regions could affect the United States (e.g., global migration, economic and political destabilization”).

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Dept. of Defense, *National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate* (2015), available at <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-national-implications-of-climate-change.pdf?source=govdelivery>.

¹²⁵ A domestic-only SCC would fail to “provide to the public and to OMB a careful and transparent analysis of the anticipated consequences of economically significant regulatory actions.” Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, *Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer 2* (2011).

¹²⁶ Tim Callen, *Gross Domestic Product: An Economy’s All*, IMF, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/gdp.htm> (last updated Mar. 28, 2012).

¹²⁷ “U.S. residents spend millions each year on foreign travel, including travel to places that are at substantial risk from climate change, such as European cities like Venice and tropical destinations like the Caribbean islands.” David A. Dana, *Valuing Foreign Lives and Civilizations in Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Case of the United States and Climate Change Policy* (Northwestern Faculty Working Paper 196, 2009), <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1195&context=facultyworkingpapers>.

¹²⁸ Assoc. of Americans Resident Overseas, <https://www.aaro.org/about-aaro/6m-americans-abroad>. Admittedly 8 million is only 0.1% of the total population living outside the United States.

¹²⁹ *GNI, Atlas Method (Current US\$)*, THE WORLD BANK, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD>.

¹³⁰ *Id.*

¹³¹ U.S. Office of Management and Budget & Secretariat General of the European Commission, *Review of Application of EU and US Regulatory Impact Assessment Guidelines on the Analysis of Impacts on International Trade and Development* 13 (2008).

¹³² Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,415 (July 30, 2008) (“Furthermore, international effects of climate change may also affect domestic benefits directly and indirectly to the extent U.S. citizens value international impacts (e.g., for tourism reasons, concerns for the existence of

Of course, there already are and will continue to be significant, quantifiable, localized effects of climate change.¹³³ For example, a peer-reviewed EPA report, *Climate Change in the United States: Benefits of Global Action*, found that by the end of the century, the U.S. economy could face damages of \$110 billion annually in lost labor productivity alone due to extreme temperatures, plus \$11 billion annually in agricultural damages, \$180 billion in losses to key economic sectors due to water shortages, and \$5 trillion in damages U.S. coastal property.¹³⁴ But the existence of those examples of quantifiable estimates of localized damages does not mean that the current IAMs are able to extrapolate a U.S.-only number that accurately reflects total domestic damages—especially since, as already explained, the IAMs do not reflect spill overs.

As a result, in 2015, OMB concluded, along with several other agencies, that “good methodologies for estimating domestic damages do not currently exist.”¹³⁵ Similarly, the NAS recently concluded that current IAMs cannot accurately estimate the domestic social cost of greenhouse gases, and that estimates based on U.S. share of global GDP would be likewise insufficient.¹³⁶ William Nordhaus, the developer of the DICE model, cautioned earlier this year that “regional damage estimates are both incomplete and poorly understood,” and “there is little agreement on the distribution of the SCC by region.”¹³⁷ In short, any domestic-only estimate will be inaccurate, misleading, and out of step with the best available economic literature, in violation of Circular A-4’s standards for information quality.

For more details on the justification for a global value of the social cost of greenhouse gases, please see Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, *Think Global: International Reciprocity as Justification for a Global Social Cost of Carbon*, 42 Columbia J. Env’tl. L. 203 (2017). Another strong defense of the global valuation as consistent with best economic practices appears in a letter published in a recent issue of *The Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, co-authored by the late Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow.¹³⁸

A Strong Consensus Exists to Use a 3% or Lower (or Declining) Discount Rate for a Central Estimate

In the RMP, BLM alleges that the “range” of estimates for the social cost of greenhouse gases—which is largely a function of using different assumptions about the discount rate—makes the metric not useful.¹³⁹ Not only was this line of thinking rejected by the Ninth Circuit in *Center for Biological Diversity*—“while . . . there is a range of values, the value of carbon emissions reduction is certainly not

ecosystems, and/or concern for others); U.S. international interests are affected (e.g., risks to U.S. national security, or the U.S. economy from potential disruptions in other nations).”).

¹³³ See generally U.S. Global Change Research Program, *Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment* (2017) (substantiating that significant climate impacts are already underway in the United States and are project to worsen); see also, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, *Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods, and the Implications for U.S. Coastal Real Estate* (2018).

¹³⁴ EPA, *Climate Change in the United States: Benefits of Global Action* (2015); see also EPA, *Multi-Model Framework for Quantitative Sectoral Impacts Analysis: A Technical Report for the Fourth National Climate Assessment* (2017) (quantifying physical and economic damages to multiple U.S. sectors, but acknowledging that only a “small portion of the impacts of climate change are estimated”).

¹³⁵ In November 2013, OMB requested public comments on the social cost of carbon. In 2015, OMB along with the rest of the Interagency Working Group issued a formal response to those comments. Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, *Response to Comments: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive Order 12,866* at 36 (July 2015) [hereinafter, OMB 2015 Response to Comments].

¹³⁶ Nat’l Acad. Sci., *Valuing Climate Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide* at 53 (2017).

¹³⁷ William Nordhaus, *Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon*, 114 PNAS 1518, 1522 (2017).

¹³⁸ Richard Revesz, Kenneth Arrow et al., *The Social Cost of Carbon: A Global Imperative*, 11 REEP 172 (2017).

¹³⁹ RMP 2-82.

zero”¹⁴⁰—but the range of values recommended by the Interagency Working Group¹⁴¹ and endorsed by the National Academies of Sciences¹⁴² is rather manageable. In 2016, the IWG recommended values at discount rates from 2.5% to 5%, calculated as between \$12 and \$62 for year 2020 emissions.¹⁴³ Numerous federal agencies have had no difficulty either applying this range in their environmental impact statements or else focusing on the central estimate at a 3% discount rate.¹⁴⁴ Most recently, in August 2017, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management applied the IWG’s range of estimates calculated at three discount rates (2.5%, 3%, and 5%) to its environmental impact statement for an offshore oil development plan,¹⁴⁵ and called this range of estimates “a useful measure to assess the benefits of CO₂ reductions and inform agency decisions.”¹⁴⁶

More importantly, there is widespread consensus that a central estimate calculated at a 3% or lower discount rate, or else using a declining discount rate, is most appropriate, while a 7% discount rate would be wholly inappropriate in the context of intergenerational climate damages. Because of the long lifespan of greenhouse gases and the long-term or irreversible consequences of climate change, the effects of today’s emissions changes will stretch out over the next several centuries. The time horizon for an agency’s analysis of climate effects, as well as the discount rate applied to future costs and benefits, determines how an agency treats future generations. Current central estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases are based on a 3% discount rate and a 300-year time horizon. Executive Order 13,783 disbanded the Interagency Working Group in March 2017 and instructs agencies to reconsider the “appropriate discount rates” when monetizing the value of climate effects.¹⁴⁷ By citing the official guidance on typical regulatory impact analyses (namely, *Circular A-4*), the Order implicitly called into question the IWG’s choice not to use a 7% discount rate. However, use of a 7% discount would not only be inconsistent with best economic practices but would violate NEPA’s requirements to consider impacts on future generations.

NEPA requires agencies to weigh the “relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity,” as well as “any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.”¹⁴⁸ That requirement is prefaced with a congressional declaration of policy that explicitly references the needs of future generations:

The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment . . . declares that it is the continuing policy of

¹⁴⁰ 538 F.3d at 1200.

¹⁴¹ See 2016 TSD, *supra* note 18.

¹⁴² See National Academies of Sciences, *Assessment of Approaches to Updating the Social Cost of Carbon* (2016) [hereinafter First NAS Report] (endorsing continued near-term use of the IWG numbers); in 2017, the NAS recommended moving to a declining discount rate, see National Academies of Sciences, *Valuing Climate Damages* (2017) [hereinafter Second NAS Report].

¹⁴³ 2016 TSD, *supra* note 18. The values given here are in 2007\$. The IWG also recommended a 95th percentile value of \$123.

¹⁴⁴ E.g., BLM, *Envtl. Assessment—Waste Prevention, Prod. Subject to Royalties, and Res. Conservation* at 52 (2016); BLM, *Final Env'tl. Assessment: Little Willow Creek Protective Oil and Gas Lease*, DOI-BLM-ID-B010-2014-0036-EA, at 82 (2015); Office of Surface Mining, *Final Env'tl. Impact Statement—Four Corners Power Plant and Navajo Mine Energy Project* at 4.2-26 to 4.2-27 (2015) (explaining the social cost of greenhouse gases “provide[s] further context and enhance[s] the discussion of climate change impacts in the NEPA analysis.”); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Draft Env'tl. Impact Statement for the Missouri River Recovery Mgmt. Project* at 3-335 (2016); U.S. Forest Serv., *Rulemaking for Colorado Roadless Areas: Supplemental Final Env'tl. Impact Statement* at 120-123 (Nov. 2016) (using both the social cost of carbon and social cost of methane relating to coal leases).

¹⁴⁵ BOEM, *Liberty Development Project: Draft Environmental Impact Statement*, at 4-247 (2017).

¹⁴⁶ *Id.* at 3-129.

¹⁴⁷ Exec. Order No. 13,783 § 5(c).

¹⁴⁸ 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and **future generations** of Americans.¹⁴⁹

When the Congressional Conference Committee adopted that language, it reported that the first “broad national goal” under the statute is to “fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for future generations. It is recognized in this [congressional] statement [of policy] that each generation has a responsibility to improve, enhance, and maintain the quality of the environment *to the greatest extent possible for the continued benefit of future generations.*”¹⁵⁰

Because applying a 7% discount rate to the social cost of greenhouse gases could drop the valuation essentially to \$0, use of such a rate effectively ignores the needs of future generations. Doing so would arbitrarily fail to consider an important statutory factor that Congress wrote into the requirements of NEPA.

Moreover, a 7% discount rate is inconsistent with best economic practices, including under Circular A-4. In 2015, OMB explained that “Circular A-4 is a **living document**. . . . [T]he use of **7 percent is not considered appropriate** for intergenerational discounting. There is wide support for this view in the academic literature, and it is recognized in Circular A-4 itself.”¹⁵¹ While Circular A-4 tells agencies generally to use a 7% discount rate in addition to lower rates for typical rules,¹⁵² the guidance does not intend for default assumptions to produce analyses inconsistent with best economic practices. Circular A-4 clearly supports using lower rates to the exclusion of a 7% rate for the costs and benefits occurring over the extremely long, 300-year time horizon of climate effects.

Circular A-4 requires agency analysts to do more than rigidly apply default assumptions: “You cannot conduct a good regulatory analysis according to a formula. Conducting high-quality analysis requires competent professional judgment.”¹⁵³ As such, analysis must be “based on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, and economic information available,”¹⁵⁴ and agencies must “[u]se **sound and defensible values** or procedures to monetize benefits and costs, and ensure that key analytical assumptions are defensible.”¹⁵⁵ Rather than assume a 7% discount rate should be applied automatically to every analysis, Circular A-4 requires agencies to justify the choice of discount rates for each analysis: “[S]tate in your report what assumptions were used, *such as . . . the discount rates* applied to future benefits and costs,” and explain “clearly how you arrived at your estimates.”¹⁵⁶ Based on Circular A-4’s criteria, there are numerous reasons why applying a 7% discount rate to climate effects that occur over a 300-year time horizon would be unjustifiable.

¹⁴⁹ 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁰ See 115 Cong. Rec. 40419 (1969) (emphasis added); see also same in S. Rep. No. 91-296 (1969).

¹⁵¹ Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, *Response to Comments: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis under Executive Order 12,866* at 36 (July 2015) (emphasis added) [hereinafter, OMB 2015 Response to Comments].

¹⁵² Office of Mgmt. & Budget, *Circular A-4* at 36 (2003) (“For regulatory analysis, you should provide estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent and 7 percent....If your rule will have important intergenerational benefits or costs you might consider a further sensitivity analysis using a lower but positive discount rate in addition to calculating net benefits using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent.”).

¹⁵³ *Id.* at 3.

¹⁵⁴ *Id.* at 17.

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 27 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁶ *Id.* at 3 (emphasis added).

First, basing the discount rate on the consumption rate of interest is the correct framework for analysis of climate effects; a discount rate based on the private return to capital is inappropriate. Circular A-4 does suggest that a 7% rate should be a “default position” for regulations that primarily displace capital investments; however, the Circular explains that “[w]hen regulation primarily and directly affects private consumption . . . a lower discount rate is appropriate.”¹⁵⁷ The 7% discount rate is based on a private sector rate of return on capital, but private market participants typically have short time horizons. By contrast, climate change concerns the public well-being broadly. Rather than evaluating an optimal outcome from the narrow perspective of investors alone, applying economic theory to climate policy requires analysts to make the optimal choices based on societal preferences and social discount rates. Moreover, because climate change is expected to largely affect large-scale consumption, as opposed to capital investment,¹⁵⁸ a 7% rate is inappropriate.

In 2013, OMB called for public comments on the social cost of greenhouse gases. In its 2015 Response to Comment document,¹⁵⁹ OMB (together with the other agencies from the IWG) explained that

the consumption rate of interest is the correct concept to use . . . as the impacts of climate change are measured in consumption-equivalent units in the three IAMs used to estimate the SCC. This is consistent with OMB guidance in Circular A-4, which states that when a regulation is expected to primarily affect private consumption—for instance, via higher prices for goods and services—it is appropriate to use the consumption rate of interest to reflect how private individuals trade-off current and future consumption.¹⁶⁰

The Council of Economic Advisers similarly interprets Circular A-4 as requiring agencies to choose the appropriate discount rate based on the nature of the regulation: “[I]n Circular A-4 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the appropriate discount rate to use in evaluating the net costs or benefits of a regulation depends on whether the regulation primarily and directly affects private consumption or private capital.”¹⁶¹ The National Academies of Sciences also explained that a consumption rate of interest is the appropriate basis for a discount rate for climate effects.¹⁶² For this

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at 33 (emphasis added).

¹⁵⁸ “There are two rationales for discounting future benefits—one based on consumption and the other on investment. The consumption rate of discount reflects the rate at which society is willing to trade consumption in the future for consumption today. Basically, we discount the consumption of future generations because we assume future generations will be wealthier than we are and that the utility people receive from consumption declines as their level of consumption increases. . . . The investment approach says that, as long as the rate of return to investment is positive, we need to invest less than a dollar today to obtain a dollar of benefits in the future. Under the investment approach, the discount rate is the rate of return on investment. If there were no distortions or inefficiencies in markets, the consumption rate of discount would equal the rate of return on investment. There are, however, many reasons why the two may differ. As a result, using a consumption rather than investment approach will often lead to very different discount rates.” Maureen Cropper, *How Should Benefits and Costs Be Discounted in an Intergenerational Context?*, 183 *RESOURCES* 30, 33.

¹⁵⁹ Note that this document was not withdrawn by Executive Order 13,783.

¹⁶⁰ OMB 2015 Response to Comments, *supra* note 151, at 22.

¹⁶¹ Council of Econ. Advisers, *Discounting for Public Policy: Theory and Recent Evidence on the Merits of Updating the Discount Rate* at 1 (CEA Issue Brief, 2017), available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/201701_cea_discounting_issue_brief.pdf. In theory, the two rates would be the same, but “given distortions in the economy from taxation, imperfect capital markets, externalities, and other sources, the SRTP and the marginal product of capital need not coincide, and analysts face a choice between the appropriate opportunity cost of a project and the appropriate discount rate for its benefits.” *Id.* at 9. The correct discount rate for climate change is the social return to capital (i.e., returns minus the costs of externalities), not the private return to capital (which measures solely the returns).

¹⁶² NAS Second Report, *supra* note 142, at 28; see also Kenneth Arrow et al., *Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?*, 272 *Science* 221 (1996) (explaining that a consumption-based discount rate is appropriate for climate change).

reason, 7% is an inappropriate choice of discount rate for the impacts of climate change.¹⁶³ Finally, each of the three integrated assessment models upon which the social cost of greenhouse gas estimates are based—DICE, FUND, and PAGE—uses consumption discount rates; a capital discount rate is thus inconsistent with the underlying models. For these reasons, 7% is an inappropriate choice of discount rate for the impacts of climate change.

Second, **uncertainty over the long time horizon** of climate effects should drive analysts to select a lower discount rate. As an example of when a 7% discount rate is appropriate, Circular A-4 identifies an EPA rule with a 30-year timeframe of costs and benefits.¹⁶⁴ By contrast, greenhouse gas emissions generate effects stretching out across 300 years. As Circular A-4 notes, while “[p]rivate market rates provide a reliable reference for determining how society values time within a generation, but for extremely long time periods no comparable private rates exist.”¹⁶⁵

Circular A-4 discusses how uncertainty over long time horizons drives the discount rate lower: “the longer the horizon for the analysis,” the greater the “uncertainty about the appropriate value of the discount rate,” which supports a lower rate.¹⁶⁶ Circular A-4 cites the work of renowned economist Martin Weitzman and concludes that the “certainty-equivalent discount factor corresponds to **the minimum discount rate having any substantial positive probability**.”¹⁶⁷ The NAS makes the same point about discount rates and uncertainty.¹⁶⁸ In fact, uncertainty over the discount rate is best addressed by adopting a declining discount rate framework.

Third, a 7% discount rate **ignores catastrophic risks and the welfare of future generations**. As demonstrated in the frequency distribution graphs included in some agencies’ recent and misguided attempts to calculate the social cost of greenhouse gases at a 7% discount rate,¹⁶⁹ the 7% rate truncates the long right-hand tail of social costs relative to the 3% rate’s distribution. The long right-hand tail represents the possibility of catastrophic damages. The 7% discount rate effectively assumes that present-day Americans are barely willing to pay anything at all to prevent medium- to long-term catastrophes. This assumption violates statutory duties under NEPA to protect the future needs of Americans. At the same time, the 7% distribution also misleadingly exaggerates the possibility of

¹⁶³ See also this article by the former chair of the NAS panel on the social cost of greenhouse gases: Richard Newell, *Unpacking the Administration’s Revised Social Cost of Carbon*, Oct. 10, 2017, <http://www.rff.org/blog/2017/unpacking-administration-s-revised-social-cost-carbon> (“It is clearly inappropriate, therefore, to use such modeling results with OMB’s 7 percent discount rate.”); see also Comments from Robert Pindyck, to BLM, on the Social Cost of Methane in the Proposed Suspension of the Waste Prevention Rule, BLM-2017-0002-16107 (submitted Nov. 5, 2017) (explaining that 3%, not 7%, is the appropriate discount rate).

¹⁶⁴ Circular A-4 at 34. See also OMB 2015 Response to Comments, *supra* note 151, at 21 (“While most regulatory impact analysis is conducted over a time frame in the range of 20 to 50 years . . .”).

¹⁶⁵ Circular A-4 at 36.

¹⁶⁶ *Id.*

¹⁶⁷ *Id.* (emphasis added); see also CEA, *supra* note 161, at 9: “Weitzman (1998, 2001) showed theoretically and Newell and Pizer (2003) and Groom et al. (2007) confirm empirically that discount rate uncertainty can have a large effect on net present values. A main result from these studies is that if there is a persistent element to the uncertainty in the discount rate (e.g., the rate follows a random walk), then it will result in an effective (or certainty-equivalent) discount rate that declines over time. Consequently, lower discount rates tend to dominate over the very long term, regardless of whether the estimated investment effects are predominantly measured in private capital or consumption terms (see Weitzman 1998, 2001; Newell and Pizer 2003; Groom et al. 2005, 2007; Gollier 2008; Summers and Zeckhauser 2008; and Gollier and Weitzman 2010).”

¹⁶⁸ NAS Second Report, *supra* note 142, at 27.

¹⁶⁹ E.g., EPA, *Estimated Cost Savings and Forgone Benefits Associated with the Proposed Rule, “Oil and Natural Gas: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources: Stay of Certain Requirements”* at 19 (Oct. 17, 2017).

negative estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases.¹⁷⁰ A negative social cost of greenhouse gases implies a discount rate so high that society is willing to sacrifice serious impacts to future generations for the sake of small, short-term benefits (such as slightly and temporarily improved fertilization for agriculture). Again, this assumption contravenes statutory responsibilities to protect the welfare of future Americans.

Fourth, a 7% discount rate would be inappropriate for climate change because it is based on **outdated data and diverges from the current economic consensus**. Circular A-4 requires that assumptions—including discount rate choices—are “based on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, and economic information available.”¹⁷¹ Yet Circular A-4’s own default assumption of a 7% discount rate was published 14 years ago and was based on data from decades ago.¹⁷² Circular A-4’s guidance on discount rates is in need of an update, as the Council of Economic Advisers detailed in 2017 after reviewing the best available economic data and theory:

The discount rate guidance for Federal policies and projects was last revised in 2003. Since then a general reduction in interest rates along with a reduction in the forecast of long-run interest rates, warrants serious consideration for a reduction in the discount rates used for benefit-cost analysis.¹⁷³

In addition to recommending a value below 7% as the discount factor based on private capital returns, the Council of Economic Advisers further explains that, because long-term interest rates have fallen, a discount rate based on the consumption rate of interest “should be at most 2 percent.”¹⁷⁴ The latest OMB updates to Circular A-94, the document on which Circular A-4 based its discount rates,¹⁷⁵ also show that more up-to-date long-run discount rates are historically low. In the February 2018 update to Circular A-94’s discount rates, OMB found that the real, 30-year discount rate is 0.6 percent,¹⁷⁶ the lowest rate since the OMB began tracking the number.¹⁷⁷ Notably, OMB also shows that the current real interest rate is negative for maturities less than 7 years.¹⁷⁸

These low interest rates further confirm that applying a 7% rate to a context like climate change would be wildly out of step with the latest data and theory. Similarly, recent expert elicitations—a technique supported by Circular A-4 for filling in gaps in knowledge¹⁷⁹—indicate that a growing consensus among experts in climate economics for a discount rate between 2% and 3%; 5% represents the upper range of

¹⁷⁰ In the Monte Carlo simulation data from EPA, the 7% discount rate doubles the frequency of negative estimates compared to the 3% discount rate simulations, from a frequently of 4% to 8%.

¹⁷¹ CEQ regulations implementing NEPA similarly require that information in NEPA documents be “of high quality” and states that “[a]ccurate scientific analysis . . . [is] essential to implementing NEPA.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b).

¹⁷² The 7% rate was based on a 1992 report; the 3% rate was based on data from the thirty years preceding the publication of Circular A-4 in 2003. Circular A-4 at 33.

¹⁷³ CEA, *supra* note 161, at 1; *id.* at 3 (“In general the evidence supports lowering these discount rates, with a plausible best guess based on the available information being that the lower discount rate should be at most 2 percent while the upper discount rate should also likely be reduced.”); *id.* at 6 (“The Congressional Budget Office, the Blue Chip consensus forecasts, and the Administration forecasts all place the ten year treasury yield at less than 4 percent in the future, while at the same time forecasting CPI inflation of 2.3 or 2.4 percent per year. The implied real ten year Treasury yield is thus below 2 percent in all these forecasts.”).

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* at 1.

¹⁷⁵ Circular A-4 at 33.

¹⁷⁶ OMB Circular A-94 Appendix C (2018).

¹⁷⁷ <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a94/dischist-2017.pdf>.

¹⁷⁸ Circular A-94 Appendix C.

¹⁷⁹ Circular A-4 at 41.

values recommended by experts, and few to no experts support discount rates greater than 5% being applied to the costs and benefits of climate change.¹⁸⁰ Based on current economic data and theory, the most appropriate discount rate for climate change is 3% or lower.

Fifth, Circular A-4 requires more of analysts than giving all possible assumptions and scenarios equal attention in a sensitivity analysis; if alternate assumptions would fundamentally change the decision, Circular A-4 requires analysts to select the **most appropriate assumptions from the sensitivity analysis**.

Circular A-4 indicates that significant intergenerational effects will warrant a special sensitivity analysis focused on discount rates even lower than 3%:

Special ethical considerations arise when comparing benefits and costs across generations. . . It may not be appropriate for society to demonstrate a similar preference when deciding between the well-being of current and future generations. . . If your rule will have important intergenerational benefits or costs you might consider a further sensitivity analysis using a lower but positive discount rate in addition to calculating net benefits using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent.¹⁸¹

Elsewhere in Circular A-4, OMB clarifies that sensitivity analysis should not result in a rigid application of all available assumptions regardless of plausibility. Circular A-4 instructs agencies to depart from default assumptions when special issues “call for different emphases” depending on “the sensitivity of the benefit and cost estimates to the key assumptions.”¹⁸² More specifically:

If benefit or cost estimates depend heavily on certain assumptions, you should make those assumptions explicit and carry out *sensitivity analyses using plausible alternative assumptions*. If the value of net benefits changes from positive to negative (or vice versa) or if the relative ranking of regulatory options changes with alternative plausible assumptions, you should conduct further analysis to determine ***which of the alternative assumptions is more appropriate***.¹⁸³

In other words, if using a 7% discount rate would fundamentally change the agency’s decision compared to using a 3% or lower discount rate, the agency must evaluate which assumption is most appropriate. Since OMB, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Academies of Sciences, and the economic literature all conclude that a 7% rate is inappropriate for climate change, agencies should select a 3% or lower rate. Applying a 7% rate to climate effects cannot be justified “based on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, and economic information available” and is inconsistent with the proper treatment of uncertainty over long time horizons.

Finally, to the extent there is uncertainty around the discount rate over long periods of time, the growing economic consensus supports shifting to a declining discount rate framework. Circular A-4 contemplates the use of declining discount rates in its reference to the work of Weitzman.¹⁸⁴ As the

¹⁸⁰ Peter Howard & Derek Sylvan, *The Economic Climate: Establishing Expert Consensus on the Economics of Climate Change* (Inst. Policy Integrity Working Paper 2015/1); M.A. Drupp, et al., *Discounting Disentangled: An Expert Survey on the Determinants of the Long-Term Social Discount Rate* (London School of Economics and Political Science Working Paper, May 2015) (finding consensus on social discount rates between 1-3%).

¹⁸¹ Circular A-4 at 35-36.

¹⁸² *Id.* at 3.

¹⁸³ *Id.* at 42 (emphasis added).

¹⁸⁴ Circular A-4, at page 36, cites to Weitzman’s chapter in Portney & Weyant, eds. (1999); that chapter, at page 29, recommends a declining discount rate approach: “a sliding-scale social discounting strategy” with the rate at 3-4% through year 25; then around 2% until year 75; then around 1% until year 300; and then 0% after year 300.

Council of Economic Advisers explained earlier this year, Weitzman and others developed the foundation for a declining discount rate approach, wherein rates start relatively higher for near-term costs and benefits but steadily decline over time according to a predetermined schedule until, in the very long-term, very low rates dominate due to uncertainty.¹⁸⁵ The National Academies of Sciences’ report also strongly endorses a declining discount rate approach due to uncertainty.¹⁸⁶ In other words, the rational response to a concern about uncertainty over the discount rate is not to abandon the social cost of greenhouse gas methodology, but to apply declining discount rates and to treat the estimates calculated at a constant 3% rate as conservative lower-bound estimates.

One possible schedule of declining discount rates was proposed by Weitzman.¹⁸⁷ It is derived from a broad survey of top economists and other climate experts and explicitly incorporates arguments around interest rate uncertainty. Work by Arrow *et al*, Cropper *et al*, and Gollier and Weitzman, among others, similarly argue for a declining interest rate schedule and lay out the fundamental logic.¹⁸⁸ Another schedule of declining discount rates has been adopted by the United Kingdom.¹⁸⁹ Shifting to a declining discount rate framework would increase the social cost of greenhouse gases.¹⁹⁰ Consequently, a central estimate calculated at 3% should be considered a lower-bound of the social cost of greenhouse gases. But even providing a lower-bound estimate of the social cost of greenhouse gases helps inform decisionmakers and the public, and BLM is required by NEPA to provide some monetization of climate damages, consistent with economic best practices.

Similarly, a 300-year time horizon is required by best economic practices. In 2017, the National Academies of Sciences issued a report stressing the importance of a longer time horizon for calculating the social cost of greenhouse gases. The report states that, “[i]n the context of the socioeconomic, damage, and discounting assumptions, the time horizon needs to be long enough to capture the vast majority of the present value of damages.”¹⁹¹ The report goes on to note that the length of the time horizon is dependent “on the rate at which undiscounted damages grow over time and on the rate at

¹⁸⁵ CEA, *supra* note 161, at 9 (“[A]nother way to incorporate uncertainty when discounting the benefits and costs of policies and projects that accrue in the far future—applying discount rates that decline over time. This approach uses a higher discount rate initially, but then applies a graduated schedule of lower discount rates further out in time. The first argument is based on the application of the Ramsey framework in a stochastic setting (Gollier 2013), and the second is based on Weitzman’s ‘expected net present value’ approach (Weitzman 1998, Gollier and Weitzman 2010). In light of these arguments, the governments of the United Kingdom and France apply declining discount rates to their official public project evaluations.”).

¹⁸⁶ NAS Second Report, *supra* note 142.

¹⁸⁷ Martin L. Weitzman, *Gamma Discounting*, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 260, 270 (2001). Weitzman’s schedule is as follows:

1-5 years	6-25 years	26-75 years	76-300 years	300+ years
4%	3%	2%	1%	0%

¹⁸⁸ Kenneth J. Arrow *et al.*, *Determining Benefits and Costs for Future Generations*, 341 SCIENCE 349 (2013); Kenneth J. Arrow *et al.*, *Should Governments Use a Declining Discount Rate in Project Analysis?*, REV ENVIRON ECON POLICY 8 (2014); Maureen L. Cropper *et al.*, *Declining Discount Rates*, AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (2014); Christian Gollier & Martin L. Weitzman, *How Should the Distant Future Be Discounted When Discount Rates Are Uncertain?* 107 ECONOMICS LETTERS 3 (2010).

¹⁸⁹ Joseph Lowe, H.M. Treasury, U.K., *Intergenerational Wealth Transfers and Social Discounting: Supplementary Green Book Guidance 5* (2008), available at [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/4\(5\).pdf](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/4(5).pdf). The U.K. declining discount rate schedule that subtracts out a time preference value is as follows:

0-30 years	31-75 years	76-125 years	126-200 years	201-300 years	301+ years
3.00%	2.57%	2.14%	1.71%	1.29%	0.86%

¹⁹⁰ This assumes the use of reasonable values in the Ramsey equation. But in general, as compared to a constant discount rate, a declining rate approach should decrease the effective discount rate.

¹⁹¹ NAS Second Report, *supra* note 142, at 78.

which they are discounted. Longer time horizons allow for representation and evaluation of longer-run geophysical system dynamics, such as sea level change and the carbon cycle.”¹⁹² In other words, after selecting the appropriate discount rate based on theory and data (in this case, 3% or below), analysts should determine the time horizon necessary to capture all costs and benefits that will have important net present values at the discount rate. Therefore, a 3% or lower discount rate for climate change implies the need for a 300-year horizon to capture all significant values. NAS reviewed the best available, peer-reviewed scientific literature and concluded that the effects of greenhouse gas emissions over a 300-year period are sufficiently well established and reliable as to merit consideration in estimates of the social cost of greenhouse gases.¹⁹³

Sincerely,

Susanne Brooks, Director of U.S. Climate Policy and Analysis, Environmental Defense Fund
Tomás Carbonell, Senior Attorney and Director of Regulatory Policy, Environmental Defense Fund
Louisa Eberle, Associate Attorney, Sierra Club
Denise Grab, Western Regional Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Anne Hedges, Deputy Director, Montana Environmental Information Center
Jayni Hein, Policy Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Peter H. Howard, Ph.D., Economic Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Chase Huntley, Energy & Climate Change Program Director, The Wilderness Society
Benjamin Longstreth, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council
Martha Roberts, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund
Iliana Paul, Policy Associate, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Richard L. Revesz, Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Jason A. Schwartz, Legal Director, Institute for Policy Integrity, NYU School of Law*
Thomas Singer, Senior Policy Advisory, Western Environmental Law Center
Peter Zalzal, Director of Special Projects and Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund

For any questions regarding these comments, please contact:

Jason A. Schwartz, Legal Director, Institute for Policy Integrity
139 MacDougal Street, 3rd Floor, New York, NY 10012
jason.schwartz@nyu.edu

*No part of this document purports to present New York University School of Law’s views, if any.

¹⁹² *Id.*

¹⁹³ NAS First Report, *supra* note 142, at 32.