

Financial Risks of Merchant Coal Plants: West Virginia case studies

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Outline


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- Intro to WV's electricity system
- Proposed coal plant sales (AEP and FirstEnergy)
- What is driving these sales?
- How would they impact WV ratepayers?
- Conclusions

West Virginia's electricity system

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- Served by AEP and FirstEnergy
- Part of PJM




West Virginia's electric rates

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- Appalachian Power (AEP): 74% coal
- Mon Power / Potomac Edison (FE): 100% coal

Residential Rates and Price of Coal Delivered to Electric Power Sector



Current cases: AEP

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- Sell coal plants from Ohio Power (deregulated) to Appalachian Power and Kentucky Power (regulated):
 - 1647 MW to Appalachian Power
 - 780 MW to Kentucky Power
- Coal plants:
 - John Amos Unit 3 (1973)
 - Mitchell (1971)
 - Supercritical, fully scrubbed

AEP's rationale

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- WV's customers already buying energy and capacity from these plants anyway through power pool
- When power pool dissolves, Appalachian and Kentucky Power will have large capacity shortages
- Buying Amos and Mitchell is the least cost option

FirstEnergy's case

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- Sell 80% of Harrison plant (1576 MW) from Allegheny Energy Supply (deregulated) to Mon Power (regulated); and sell 100MW of Pleasants plant from Mon Power to AES
- Harrison (1972-1974): supercritical, scrubbed
- Sell at inflated book value:
 - 20% of Harrison (Mon Power): \$319/kW
 - 80% of Harrison (AES): \$767/kW
 - Legacy of 2011 merger of FE with Allegheny Power

FirstEnergy's rationale

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“Opportunities to acquire existing generating facilities are scarce since they require the intersection of a willing seller and an asset that meets the requirements of the prospective buyer. Mon Power is fortunate to have uncovered such an opportunity.”

(Mon Power's 2012 Resource Plan)

FirstEnergy's rationale

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- Need capacity due to subcritical retirements
- Staying in market is highly risky – would be buying 32% of energy and 40% of capacity from market by 2026
- Lowest cost option:
 - Harrison: 7.4 cents/kWh
 - Market purchases: 7.5 cents/kWh
 - New natural gas plant: 11.5 cents/kWh
 - Energy efficiency: can't be evaluated

Drivers of proposed plant sales: short-term financial outlook

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- Low natural gas prices → declining competitiveness of coal in PJM
 - Coal as percentage of PJM generation:
 - 2008: 55%
 - 2010: 49%
 - 2012: 42%
 - AEP East's coal capacity factor:
 - 2011: 58%
 - 2012: 49%
 - Harrison's capacity factor:
 - 2007: 80%
 - 2012: 53%

Drivers of proposed plant sales: long-term financial outlook

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- Long-term financial outlook highly uncertain
- Impending environmental regulations:
 - Boiler MACT rule
 - Coal combustion residuals rule
 - Clean Water Act 316(b) rule
 - Climate change ?????

Drivers of proposed plant sales: bad market for coal plants

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- Recent coal plant sales
 - Dominion's sale of Brayton Point, Kincaid, and Elwood (natural gas) to Energy Capital Partners
 - \$650 million after-tax for 2686 MW of coal and a gas plant
 - Exelon's sale of 3 MD plants (largely coal) to Raven Power Holdings in 2012
 - \$400 million for 2648 MW
 - Estimated \$275M pre-tax loss for Exelon
- FirstEnergy: \$1.2 billion for 1576 MW
- AEP: ~\$1.5 billion for 1647 MW

Drivers of proposed plant sales: FirstEnergy's debt

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- High levels of debt in competitive generation segment
- Targeting \$1.5 billion in debt reduction in 2013 from Harrison sale and sale of “additional non-strategic assets”
- Struggling to maintain credit ratings

Impact on WV ratepayers

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
- Locked in to 27 years of coal investment
- Little hedge against coal price volatility
 - Appalachian Power: 71% coal (after other retirements)
 - Mon Power: 100% coal
- FirstEnergy WV: 90% of internal generation from two 40+ year-old coal plants
- Over-capacity: stifling CHP, distributed generation



Conclusions

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- Economics of coal are changing. Over-reliance on regulated coal capacity not working so well in WV anymore.
- WV: aging coal fleet, flattening demand growth in PJM, under-investment in distribution, no resiliency / climate change preparedness
- Nationally: increasing risk/uncertainty in utility sector, steadily declining credit ratings, but \$80 billion/year investment needed through 2030



Source: R. Binz, "Practicing Risk-Aware Utility Regulation," Ceres, April 2012.

Conclusions / Future directions

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- What is vision for future of West Virginia's electricity system?
- Lack of appetite for major new investment: new coal, new natural gas, new nuclear all face very uncertain future
 - Good opportunity for utilities to reduce risk by dumping merchant coal plants
- Energy efficiency, demand response, decentralized power – threatening to WV utilities' business model, when will the balance of power shift?

Thanks!

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