September 14, 2020

To: Bureau of Land Management, Colorado State Office

The Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law respectfully submits comments on the Draft Environmental Assessment for the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) Proposed December 2020 Competitive Oil and Gas Lease Sale in Colorado. In this proposed lease sale, BLM Colorado is contemplating offering 18 parcels consisting of 13,708 acres located in BLM’s Kremmling and Little Snake Field Offices, and 25 parcels consisting of 33,978 acres of split estate land in BLM’s Royal Gorge Field Office.

Many of the tracts that would be offered for lease are located in areas valuable for recreation, wildlife, environmental conservation, and tourism. Moreover, many of these tracts have low or moderate oil and gas development potential, yet pose myriad multiple-use conflicts.

In these draft Environmental Assessments (EAs), BLM fails to uphold its statutory duty to manage public lands for multiple use, and fails to consider more limited leasing scenarios pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the agency impermissibly fails to consider the informational value of delay, and is therefore unlikely to fulfill its duty to obtain “fair market value” for the nominated parcels under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). If BLM proceeds with the lease sale without correcting these errors, its decision would be arbitrary and capricious.

Specifically, in these EAs:

- BLM fails to properly account for multiple-use values, in violation of FLPMA;

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1 This document does not purport to represent the views, if any, of New York University School of Law.


BLM fails to analyze several viable alternatives that would reduce environmental and social harms and protect other multiple uses, violating NEPA;

- BLM should have analyzed one or more environmentally-protective development scenarios that would offer fewer tracts for lease, particularly in popular recreation and scenic areas, including areas close to national parks, and in important wildlife habitats;
- BLM should have analyzed the option of deferring some of these parcels, especially those that have low development potential, in order to account for option value, or the informational value of delay. In particular, BLM’s failure to assess option value makes it likely that the agency will violate FLPMA by failing to obtain “fair market value” for these parcels;

Should BLM proceed with the lease sale based on such incomplete and flawed analyses, the lease sale would be arbitrary and capricious.

I. BLM Fails to Properly Account for Multiple-Use Values in These EAs, in Violation of FLPMA

Enacted in 1976, FLPMA directs that federal land management adhere to the principles of multiple use and sustained yield. FLPMA explains that “multiple use” requires “harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output.” The statute also mandates that the Department of the Interior “shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”

BLM must manage its lands for a variety of uses, not primarily for oil and gas development. One of the stated goals of FLPMA is to “preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition.” As the Tenth Circuit has held, “[i]t is past doubt that the

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4 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (instructing that “management be on the basis of multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law”); see also Our Mission, U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/MH7Q-W8C7 (“Congress tasked the BLM with a mandate of managing public lands for a variety of uses such as energy development, livestock grazing, recreation, and timber harvesting while ensuring natural, cultural, and historic resources are maintained for present and future use.”) (emphasis added).

5 Id. § 1702(c).

6 Id. § 1732(b).

7 Id. § 1712(c)(1).

8 Id. § 1701(a)(8); see also Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1299 (10th Cir. 1999).
principle of multiple use does not require BLM to prioritize development over other uses.”

The Court further noted, “[a] parcel of land cannot both be preserved in its natural character and mined.”

A. BLM Disregards Numerous Recreation and Wildlife Conservation Conflicts

In this lease sale, BLM proposes to offer large amounts of land—including land with low and moderate oil and gas potential—for oil and gas leasing. The parcels that BLM does expect to be exploited will require access roads and related infrastructure that could have adverse effects on the scenic, environmental, and recreational values of the area. However, the EAs fail to take the requisite “hard look” at these effects, as NEPA requires, and fail to properly account for multiple use values, as required by FLPMA.

For instance, Parcels 60, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, and 5986 in the Kremmling Field Office are in close proximity to (within about 4 miles of) the Arapaho National Wildlife Refuge (Refuge). And several of these parcels directly border the Refuge. The Refuge is situated in an intermountain glacial basin in north-central Colorado, known locally as North Park. This basin is surrounded by Mt. Zirkel Wilderness and Park Range to the west, Rabbit Ears Range to the south, Never Summer Mountain to the southeast, and the Medicine Bow Mountains to the east and north. The purposes of the Refuge are: (1) to provide inviolate sanctuary for migratory birds, (2) to provide suitable fish- and wildlife-dependent recreation, and (3) for the development, advancement, management, conservation, and protection of fish and wildlife resources. The Refuge is a key breeding ground for waterfowl in the state of Colorado and provides important habitat for migratory birds. The greater sage-grouse is a year-round resident of the Refuge, and wintering elk, moose, northern river otters, and American beavers also call this area home. In addition, the Refuge supports at least 40 species of neotropical songbirds such as the yellow warbler, song sparrow, Lincoln sparrow and willow flycatcher.

Leasing parcels directly adjacent, and within close proximity, to the Refuge poses multiple use conflicts that BLM must further assess in order to comply with FLPMA and NEPA. Moreover, BLM would be better served by deferring leasing each of these parcels

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9 New Mexico Ex. Rel. Richardson v. BLM, 565 F.3d 683, 710 (10th Cir. 2009).
10 Id. (quoting Rocky Mtn. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 738 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1982)).
altogether, in light of multiple-use and sage-grouse habitat effects, as described in more
detail in Parts I.B. and II, below. In fact, many of these conflicts have been apparent for
more than a decade; indeed, the Arapaho National Wildlife Refuge Comprehensive
Conservation Plan, released in 2004, states that lands outside of the Refuge represent
valuable wildlife habitat and are “of interest” to the Refuge. The Plan proposed an action
to purchase private lands outside of the Refuge in order to prevent minerals extraction, as
“minerals extraction may destroy wildlife habitats, and prevent goals and objectives from
being met.” The Plan focused on private lands and did not anticipate that BLM would
open up federal lands immediately surrounding the Refuge to oil and gas activities.

In addition, parcels 60, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, and 5986 are located along important
aquatic resources for fish, wildlife, and recreation. Leasing these parcels could have
detrimental effects on the “Gold Medal” trout fishing waters of the North Platte River, as
designated by the Colorado Wildlife Commission. Brook, brown, and rainbow trout thrive
in the North Platte River, offering some of the best trout fishing in the West. Any potential
impact to water quality or other disruption from oil and gas activities could threaten the
river’s “Gold Medal” trout fishing designation and the outdoor recreation economy that it
supports.

Indeed, the parcels in close proximity to the Arapaho National Wildlife Refuge, North
Platte River, Walden Reservoir, Canadian River and the rivers’ tributaries have significant
value for outdoor recreation, tourism, and wildlife protection that must be considered
more closely. According to a 2017 report, fishing, hunting, and wildlife watching in
Colorado together produce over $5 billion dollars of economic output annually, and
support nearly 40,000 jobs within the state.

Further, many of the proposed parcels in the Kremmling and Little Snake Field Offices
overlap with areas that contain migration corridors or high priority big game winter
habitats for the State of Colorado. Elk, pronghorn antelopes, mule deer, and numerous
other big game species have “[h]igh economic and recreational value” in the Kremmling
Field Office, and as BLM explained in its 2015 Resource Management Plan for this area,
“[c]ritical winter ranges for elk, mule deer, and pronghorn antelope are essential to the

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17 FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION PLAN: ARAPAHO NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 24-25 (Sept.
18 Id. at 25.
19 Erin Sendor, Colorado’s Gold Medal Fishing Waters, COLORADOINFO.COM,
20 Id.
21 SOUTHWICK ASSOCIATES FOR COLORADO PARKS AND WILDLIFE, THE 2017 ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUTDOOR
RECREATION IN COLORADO 7 (July 23, 2018),
https://cpw.state.co.us/Documents/Trails/SCORP/2017EconomicContributions.SCORP.pdf.
22 BLM KREMMLING FIELD OFFICE, PROPOSED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 3-60 to -61 (2015) [hereinafter “Kremmling RMP”].
survival of these species in the [region].”23 Yet many of the parcels in this proposed lease sale would encumber the habitats of these species. For instance, Parcels 70, 71 and 72 are in an elk migration corridor. Parcels 38 and 46 are in pronghorn migration corridors. And Parcels 60, 63, 65, 67, 68, 5986 and 6156 overlap with migration corridors and crucial winter range various big game species such as pronghorn, Rocky Mountain Bighorn Sheep, mule deer, white-tailed deer, elk, and moose. Moreover, all of the acreage in these parcels that overlaps with sage-grouse habitat should not be included in this lease sale at all, as discussed in Part I.B, below.

The parcels abutting the Walden Reservoir—numbers 63, 67, and 69—could impair that site’s frequent and valuable use for recreation, bird watching, wildlife protection, fishing, and hunting. The Walden Reservoir is one of the few locations in Colorado where birds such as American White Pelican, Black Tern, and Franklin’s and California Gulls breed.24 In addition, two parcels are within three miles of the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest. Leasing and development of parcels 71 and 72 could threaten the scenic, recreational, and wildlife-protection values of the Medicine Bow-Routt National Forest, which provides year-round recreation opportunities for thousands of people, as well as wildlife habitat, timber, forage for livestock, and a water for irrigation and domestic use.25

Parcels 37, 62, 70, 71, 72, 5984, and 5986 are also within roughly 20 miles of Rocky Mountain National Park, one of the most visited national parks in the country, encompassing protected mountains, forests and alpine tundra.26 But BLM has not analyzed any potential effects on recreation, wildlife protection, or habitat inside or near the national park associated with this proposed lease sale.

Offering these tracts for lease violates BLM’s statutory duty to manage public lands for multiple uses, as leasing even low potential tracts often forecloses other valuable public land uses like conservation of environmentally valuable areas, recreation, scenic uses, and potential renewable energy development. There is no evidence in these EAs or elsewhere in the administrative record that BLM has meaningfully grappled with its multiple-use mandate, for instance, by considering deferring or removing parcels with valuable recreational, scenic, or environmental values such as those parcels within 0 to 20 miles of national parks, wildlife refuges, national forests, sensitive habitat, and/or parcels with important recreational and scenic value to Colorado or the United States. BLM should individually analyze, and consider deferring, each of these parcels.

Unfortunately, leasing even low-potential lands often prevents conservation of environmentally valuable areas and interferes with recreation and other uses that BLM

23 Id. at 3-66.
must consider and protect pursuant to FLPMA. As just one example, even if oil and gas tracts are not developed, their mere presence often precludes BLM from proactively managing the area for wilderness characteristics or important wildlife habitat. Section 201 of FLPMA requires BLM to maintain an inventory of all public lands and their resources and other values, which includes wilderness characteristics. Land management for wilderness characteristics entails closure to mineral resource production, motorized vehicles, timber production, and roads. When conducting a wilderness characteristics inventory, BLM assesses parcels for the presence or absence of wilderness characteristics including their size (roadless areas with over 5,000 acres of contiguous BLM lands are preferred), naturalness, and outstanding opportunities for either solitude or primitive and unconfined recreation. Yet in the past, the presence of mineral leases has foreclosed BLM from managing parcels for wilderness characteristics. In several resource management plans (RMPs) issued by BLM Colorado, the presence of mineral leases prevented the protection, preservation, or maintenance of wilderness characteristics. For example, in the Colorado River Valley RMP, BLM decided against managing lands for protection of wilderness characteristics in the Grand Hogback citizens’ wilderness proposal unit based specifically on the presence of oil and gas leases, even though the leases were non-producing. Similarly, in the Grand Junction RMP, BLM stated that undeveloped leases on low-potential lands had effectively prevented management to protect wilderness characteristics. The presence of leases can also limit BLM’s ability to manage for other important, non-wilderness values, like renewable energy projects and wildlife conservation.

B. BLM Must More Carefully Assess Leases in Sage-Grouse Habitat for Multiple Use Conflicts and Consider Deferring Parcels on That Basis

The proposed lease sale includes parcels in greater sage-grouse habitat, including parcels: 37, 38, 46, 60-65, 67-72, 5984, 5986 and 6156 (all of the parcels proposed for lease in the Kremmling and Little Snake Field Offices). BLM cannot proceed with leasing in sage-grouse habitat until it develops a compliant, transparent approach to prioritizing any future leasing and development outside sage-grouse habitat. Doing so would conflict with both FLPMA’s multiple use mandate and a federal court order instructing BLM to comply with the 2015 Sage-grouse Plans.

28 See, e.g., BLM, GRAND JUNCTION DRAFT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 4-256 to 258 (2012), https://perma.cc/Y6A6-KMDC.
32 BLM, Proposed Grand Junction Proposed RMP 4-289 to -290 (2015) (stating, “133,900 acres of lands with wilderness characteristics have been classified as having low, very low, or no potential...While there is not potential for fluid mineral development in most of the lands with wilderness characteristics units, the majority of the areas, totaling 101,100 acres (59 percent), are already leased for oil and gas development...”).
The 2015 Sage-grouse Plans were reinstated by federal court order in 2019.\textsuperscript{33} Pursuant to the 2015 Record of Decision for the Rocky Mountain Region RMP, BLM must:

prioritize oil and gas leasing and development outside of identified PHMAs [priority habitat management areas] and GHMAs [general habitat management areas]. This is to further limit future surface disturbance and encourage new development in areas that would not conflict with [the greater sage-grouse]. This objective is intended to guide development to lower conflict areas and as such protect important habitat and reduce the time and cost associated with oil and gas leasing development by avoiding sensitive areas, reducing the complexity of environmental review and analysis of potential impacts on sensitive species, and decreasing the need for compensatory mitigation.\textsuperscript{34}

The 2015 Colorado Greater Sage-grouse Plan echoes this directive, including the following objective:

Priority will be given to leasing and development of fluid mineral resources, including geothermal, outside PHMA and GHMA. When analyzing leasing and authorizing development of fluid mineral resources, including geothermal, in PHMA and GHMA, and subject to applicable stipulations for the conservation of [the greater sage-grouse], priority will be given to development in non-habitat areas first and then in the least suitable habitat for [the greater sage-grouse].\textsuperscript{35}

BLM has honored these requirements in some previous lease sales by prioritizing oil and gas leasing in parcels that did not contain sage-grouse habitat while deferring parcels that did. And when BLM has sought under the Trump administration to “render[] the prioritization requirement into a mere procedural hurdle” by failing to actually look to “non-sage-grouse habitat,” rather than habitat areas, for development—as it did in a series of lease plans and sales in Montana and Wyoming—courts have struck down this approach as violating the 2015 Sage-grouse Plans.\textsuperscript{36} In this proposed lease sale, however, BLM

\textsuperscript{33} W. Watersheds Project v. Schneider, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1335 (D. Idaho 2019) (“The BLM is enjoined from implementing the 2019 BLM Sage-Grouse Plan Amendments for Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada/Northeastern California, and Oregon, until such time as the Court can adjudicate the claims on the merits. The 2015 Plans remain in effect during this time.”).

\textsuperscript{34} BLM, Record of Decision and Approved Resource Management Plan Amendments for the Rocky Mountain Region, Including the Greater Sage-grouse Sub-Regions 1-25 (Sept. 2015), https://perma.cc.A4XK-JDGE.

\textsuperscript{35} Colorado Greater Sage-grouse Conservation Plan 2-14 (2015) [hereinafter “2015 Colorado Sage-grouse Plan”]. The 2019 ROD and Approved Resource Management Plan Amendments also did not change this requirement. \textit{See} Northwest Colorado Proposed RMP Amendment and Final EIS at ES-6 (including “Prioritization of fluid mineral leases outside of PHMA and GHMA” in a list of “Issues and Resources Not Carried Forward for Additional Analysis”); Northwest Colorado Greater Sage-Grouse 2019 ROD and ARMPA at 1-4 (“This RMPA retains the majority of the allocations, objectives, and management decisions in the above mentioned plans, including the changes made in 2015.”).

repeats this error by rendering the prioritization process a mere procedural formality, failing to engage in a careful substantive review or actually prioritize non-habitat areas.

Indeed, in a five-page attachment buried at the back of the Kremmling EA, BLM reveals that all 18 parcels assessed in that environmental statement sit entirely or primarily within PHMA and GHMA—the opposite of the types of lands that BLM has espoused to prioritize.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, five of the parcels in this proposed sale are at least 95\% within PHMAs, while a majority of another eight parcels sit within PHMAs. In total, the 18 parcels assessed in the Kremmling and Little Snake Field Offices are within two miles of 14 leks (areas where sage-grouse congregate and breed), and within four miles of an additional 48 leks.\textsuperscript{38} In short, leasing of these parcels would substantially interfere with protection of sage-grouse habitat—an important multiple use that has been recognized by BLM in previous plans and lease sales.

BLM alleges that it has complied with the applicable sage-grouse plans because it has granted “[p]riority .... to leasing and development of fluid mineral resources, including geothermal, outside PHMA and GHMA,” and that the nominated parcels would be subject to certain stipulations for sage-grouse protection.\textsuperscript{39} But it is hard to see how BLM prioritizes non-habitat lands in this sale when every single nominated parcel in the Kremmling and Little Snake Field Offices sit within PHMAs and GHMAs—the very areas that should get low priority under binding BLM plans—and the agency does not even consider the option of deferring these parcels from the lease sale. Moreover, while BLM treats lease stipulations as a panacea to protect sage-grouse habitat, these stipulations are subject to various waivers, exemptions, and/or modifications that may limit their efficacy.\textsuperscript{40}

Moreover, while BLM assesses such factors as the percentage of each parcel within PHMAs and GHMAs, distance from leks and the closest well, and drilling potential,\textsuperscript{41} this analysis overlooks the option of deferring numerous key parcels for sage-grouse protection. For one, while BLM alleges that all 18 parcels have “high” development potential, maps compiled from agency data indicate that at least three of the parcels—

\textsuperscript{37} Kremmling EA Att. H.

\textsuperscript{38} Id.

\textsuperscript{39} Id.

\textsuperscript{40} See, e.g., 2015 Colorado Sage-grouse Plan, supra note 35 at G-1 (“Use or occupancy of the land surface for fluid mineral exploration or development is prohibited to protect GRSG and GRSG habitat. In areas open to fluid mineral leasing with NSO stipulations, fluid mineral leasing activities are permitted, but surface-disturbing activities cannot be conducted on the surface of the land unless an exception, modification, or waiver is granted.”); id. at G-2 (“An exception exempts the holder of the lease from the stipulation on a one-time basis. A modification changes the language or provisions of a stipulation due to changed conditions or new information either temporarily or for the term of the lease. A modification may or may not apply to all other sites within the leasehold. A waiver permanently exempts the surface stipulation for a specific lease, planning area, or resource based on absence of need, such as a determination that protection of winter use is unnecessary for maintenance or recovery of a species.”).

\textsuperscript{41} Id.
numbers 61, 62, and 5984—are actually in low-potential regions.\textsuperscript{42} Moreover, while BLM identifies one parcel—number 6156—as “low priority” for leasing based on “[t]he quality of habitat paired with the inaccessibility to federal minerals,” the agency does not actually consider the option of deferring this parcel.\textsuperscript{43}

Additionally, while numerous additional parcels in this lease sale feature similar characteristics as number 6156, BLM does not address why they are not likewise considered “low priority,” nor does BLM consider deferring them from the lease sale due to clear multiple-use conflicts. For instance, Parcel 60 is 95\% within a PHMA, has no adjacent leases, and has five leks within four miles, including two within two miles. Parcel 61 lies outside the high-potential drilling area, sits entirely within a PHMA, and has five leks within four miles. Parcel 63 is 99\% within a PHMA, nearly six miles from the closest producing well, and has two leks in the vicinity. Parcel 64 is within four miles of four different leks and is entirely within either a PHMA (83\% of parcel by acreage) or GHMA (17\%). And Parcel 68 is also entirely within either a PHMA (84\%) or GHMA (16\%), is five miles from the nearest producing well, and has four leks within four miles.\textsuperscript{44} BLM should individually analyze, and consider deferring, each of these parcels.

In sum, BLM violates FLPMA’s multiple-use mandate by offering numerous tracts for lease that have low or only moderate development potential, yet have other valuable public uses that are equally important (if not more so) under federal law. In light of its multiple-use mandate and the low expected return from leasing in this economic environment as described in Part III, below, BLM should have considered the option of a far more tailored lease sale that avoids multiple-use conflicts, as well as the option of deferring at least part of this lease sale in order to account for the public’s valuable option to delay development.

II. The EAs Fail to Analyze Several Viable Alternatives That Would Reduce Environmental and Social Harms, Protect Other Multiple Uses, and Help Ensure that BLM Obtains “Fair Market Value”

The EAs fail to analyze several viable alternatives that would reduce environmental and social harms and protect other multiple uses better than BLM’s identified alternatives. NEPA regulations specify that the agency must “[r]igorously explore and objectively

\textsuperscript{42} Compare id. with Upcoming Oil and Gas Lease Sales, https://wilderness.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=bedd5928d60b417f829fd1fc5b6d da0 (overlaying proposed parcels with BLM development potential estimates); see also Reasonably Foreseeable Development, 2008-2027 Oil and Gas Activities in the Kremmling Field Office 50, https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_projects/lup/68543/88589/106099/KFO_RFD_with_TC_AND_SIGNATURE_PAGE_01232012.pdf.

\textsuperscript{43} Kremmling EA Att. H.

\textsuperscript{44} Id.
evaluate all reasonable alternatives,” so as to “provid[e] a clear basis for choice among the options.” The agency must also analyze alternatives that are, in fact, distinct.

First, in addition to the “no action” alternative, the EAs should have analyzed one or more environmentally-protective development scenarios that would offer fewer tracts for lease, particularly in sage-grouse habitat and popular recreation or scenic areas, including those close to the Refuge, national forests, and national parks. Second, the EAs should have analyzed the option of deferring some of these parcels, especially those that have low and moderate development potential, in order to account for option value, or the informational value of delay, and help ensure that BLM obtains “fair market value” for these parcels as required under FLPMA.

BLM also fails to consider a deferred leasing alternative that would offer fewer parcels for sale now, and reserve parcels with possible multiple-use conflicts and/or low development potential to a later date after further analysis can be conducted. This failure violates the agency’s legal obligation to consider option value and makes it unlikely that BLM will obtain “fair market value” for these parcels as required by FLPMA.

A. Considering a Deferred Leasing Alternative Is Required by FLPMA and MLA

BLM should assess the environmental, social, and economic costs and benefits of deferring at least some of the nominated parcels. BLM must manage federal fossil fuels to earn “fair market value” for the public and to harmonize energy production with resource conservation. Analyzing a deferred leasing alternative is necessary in order to determine the optimal time to issue any leases and thereby minimize environmental and social risks and secure the public’s right to obtain “fair market value” for its resources.

As BLM has explained in agency guidance, the agency seeks to “assure receipt of fair market value ... for oil and gas leases, rights, or properties” pursuant to FLPMA. While this entails a formal evaluation of fair market value in some circumstances, for most oil-and-gas leases the agency has a policy to eschew such an analysis and “rely instead on competition to assure [fair market value].” But relying on competition alone is insufficient to assure fair


46 See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 177 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 1999) (NEPA analysis failed to consider reasonable range of alternatives where it “considered only a no action alternative along with two virtually identical alternatives”); Wilderness Society v. Wisely, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1312 (D. Colo. 2007) (BLM violated NEPA by failing to consider “middle ground compromise between the absolutism of the outright leasing and no action alternatives”).


50 Id.
market value when so many BLM leases are sold non-competitively for the minimum bid price (see Part II.C, below), when market conditions are depressing both auction prices and royalty proceeds (see id.), and when BLM refuses to consider option value (i.e., the economic value of delay) and the possibility of various alternate uses. By setting aside more public lands for conservation and recreational opportunities now, BLM will have time to gather important information on environmental risks and sensitivities; economic risks, including changing resource prices and impacts from development on tourism; and competing land uses, including renewable energy development, recreation, and habitat and watershed protection.

Moreover, the MLA requires BLM to account for conservation and specifically consider the timing—including potential for delay—of mineral lease sales. Specifically, the MLA requires the agency “to [e]nsure the sale of the production of such leased lands to the United States and to the public at reasonable prices, for the protection of the interests of the United States ... and for the safeguarding of the public welfare,” including the “prevention of undue waste.” As the Supreme Court explained, the MLA emphasizes “[c]onservation through control,” with “one of the main congressional concerns” being “the prevention of an overly rapid consumption of oil resources.”

Yet here, despite legal mandates and practices within other Department of Interior agencies, BLM does not consider the option of deferring particular parcels for this lease sale, as the EAs lack any meaningful evaluation of the timing of the proposed sale or detailed consideration of deferring particular parcel sales. BLM’s failure to meaningfully evaluate the potential for delaying leasing—including due consideration of option value—violates FLPMA and the MLA and, should BLM proceed with the lease sale based on such an incomplete analysis, would render the lease sale determination arbitrary and capricious.

B. BLM Must Account for Option Value by Assessing a Deferred Leasing Alternative, Given the Irreversible Nature of Drilling and Development

At the lease sale stage, BLM has an important opportunity to determine which, if any, tracts to make available to private energy developers. Just because a given tract is nominated and eligible for mineral leasing does not mean that BLM must offer it for lease. In fact, it may be advantageous for BLM to defer part or all of a lease sale altogether, pending more comprehensive environmental information, completion of a relevant cultural or scientific study, or more community input. If BLM learns new information regarding, for instance, environmental or safety hazards, developmental value, recreational value, carbon sink value, or cultural significance, it is much more difficult (if not impossible) to act on this information when land is already leased.

In light of the uncertainty and near-irreversibility associated with leases for mineral development, BLM should account for option value, or the informational value of delay, at

53 See Hein et al., supra note 30, at 17.
the lease sale stage by offering only high-potential lands with limited multiple-use conflicts, if any, in lease sales, and deferring other parcels that pose potential resource conflicts.

**There Is Option Value to Delaying Oil and Gas Lease Sales**

Option value is the informational value of delaying irreversible decisions, such as when and on what terms to sell non-renewable resources to private companies. BLM holds, on behalf of the American public, a perpetual option to develop or lease its fossil fuel resources. When the government sells the right to develop a tract to a private lessee, it extinguishes the perpetual option that it holds on behalf of the American people, and sells a time-limited option to a private actor, valid for the duration of the lease (typically 10–15 years for the initial term of an oil or natural gas lease). Consideration of option value requires that BLM determine when and where exercising its perpetual options would be most socially opportune, including by accounting for environmental, social, and economic ramifications. The value associated with the option to delay can be large, especially when there is a high degree of uncertainty about price, extraction costs, and the social and environmental costs imposed by drilling—each of which are present here with respect to these EAs.

Even if BLM does not account for option value in its leasing decisions, oil and gas companies will, and they will time extraction and resource decisions in a manner that is privately optimal, rather than socially optimal. Indeed, option value explains the routine practice of companies purchasing tracts and waiting years to develop them, when conditions are optimal from their perspective, if they ever do develop them. BLM must strategically plan its own lease sales in order to maximize social welfare.

In fact, the federal government uses option value in other resource management determinations. Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) incorporated option value in its offshore oil and gas leasing program for 2017–2022. BOEM stated that: (i) environmental and social cost uncertainties can affect the size, timing and location of leasing; (ii) option value can be a component of the “fair market value” of a lease; and (iii) BOEM can raise minimum bids, rents, and royalties for leases to account for option value. BOEM also uses a “hurdle price” analysis to ensure that any areas included in its leasing program are expected to earn positive net economic value.

Likewise, BLM has deferred other parcels and lease sales in order to gather more information about risks and timing. For instance, the BLM Pecos District Office deferred thirty-one parcels from a September 2018 lease sale due to concerns about potential water

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55 *Id.*

56 *Id.*


58 *Id.* at 8-2, 8-12 to 8-14.
contamination from oil and gas activity.\textsuperscript{59} For a series of BLM oil and gas lease sales near the Chaco Culture National Historical Park, lease sale protests and public opposition led BLM to defer some parcels until it could conduct more analysis on cultural sites within the proposed leasing area.\textsuperscript{60} Most recently, BLM Utah removed over fifty parcels in the Moab region from its September 2020 oil and gas lease sale after commenters raised concerns about harm to recreation, wildlife, tribal resources, and the low drilling potential of the nominated parcels.\textsuperscript{61} Additionally, the combination of market factors and Covid-19 led BLM, as well as the state governments of Colorado and Utah, to defer a number of scheduled oil and gas lease sales.\textsuperscript{62}

In a similar vein, the Forest Service decided, in May 2019, to reject expressions of interest for oil and gas drilling on 52,000 acres in the Humboldt-Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada. The Forest Service’s analysis revealed:

\dots unfavorable geologic conditions in the area, meaning that there is little to no potential of oil and gas resources in the area. Additionally, camping, hunting, fishing, and motorized recreation are popular activities in the proposed lease area and represent part of a $12.5 billion recreation industry in Nevada—an industry that supports 87,000 jobs statewide. The unfavorable geologic conditions, coupled with concerns over potential impacts to wildlife and to the recreational and scenic values of the iconic Nevada landscape, led to the selection of the No Leasing Alternative.\textsuperscript{63}

Additionally, two cases from the U.S Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit hold that consideration of option value is required when assessing “fair market value.” In \textit{California v.}

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{59} See Hein at al., \textit{supra} note 30, at 23.

\textsuperscript{60} Id. at 28–29.


Watt, the Court remanded an offshore leasing determination because Interior failed to “properly consider[] the economic effect of delaying lease sales,” keying in on the fact that the agency “ignored the price rises in crude oil that make delay a factor increasing the value of any recovered resources.” The Court was even more explicit about the need to consider option value in Center for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell, explaining that an agency may “act[] irrationally in failing to [consider] the informational value of delay,” and highlighting the Department’s “qualitative analysis of the benefits of delaying leasing” as satisfying this standard. As the Court explained, because “[m]ore is learned with the passage of time”—including about drilling costs, safety and environmental risks, and the economics of the oil and gas industry, among others—the “informational value of delay is a relevant cost” that agencies must consider when assessing “fair market value.”

FLPMA’s “fair market value” determination applies to oil-and-gas lease sales, as BLM has previously acknowledged, and so requires assessment of option value when nominating parcels for lease.

In line with this past agency practice and federal case law, environmental, social, and economic uncertainty support waiting as long as possible to develop non-renewable resources, especially areas that have other wildlife, habitat, watershed protection, carbon sink, recreational, or scenic values. BLM should limit the areas it makes available for oil and gas leasing and consider a deferred leasing alternative because there is economic, social, and environmental value in keeping more land protected and off-limits to extraction.

The EAs Should Have Considered a Deferred Leasing Alternative and Analyzed Numerous Uncertainties That Weigh Against Fossil Fuel Leasing

Given the potential for irreversible damage and suboptimal public land uses embedded within BLM’s preferred leasing alternative, BLM should have accounted for the following uncertainties in the EAs by exploring a deferred leasing alternative:

- Current and expected resource prices in the United States and in global energy markets, especially in light of recent record-low oil prices and high market volatility (described more below);
- Environmental conditions and risks from drilling including local pollution, habitat effects, endangered species effects, and greenhouse gas emissions;
- Competing uses of the public lands, including recreational activities, preservation, wildlife protection, renewable energy development, cultural and tribal use, and tourism;
- Current and expected effects of climate change on the ecosystem, which affect environmental sensitivities;

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65 779 F.3d 588, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
66 Id.
67 Economic Evaluation Handbook, supra note 49. See also Kremmling EA at 14, Royal Gorge EA at 13 (alleging that auctions for oil-and-gas leases “contribute[] to sale prices that accurately reflect fair market value at the time of sale”).
• Information on the cost of drilling in the region and bringing those resources to market;
• Safety, pollution-capture, and other drilling technologies;
• Energy efficiency, energy conservation, and fuel economy standards that affect fossil fuel demand; and
• Laws and regulations governing drilling and development on public lands, air pollution, endangered species, and other environmental concerns.

For instance, the Kremmling EA describes how NSO stipulations would be applied to any leases for the protection of sage-grouse habitation, aquatic wildlife, and cultural resources.68 Yet rather than defer any of the numerous parcels that pose these conflicts or contain these sensitivities, BLM brushes away any potential conflicts by resting on such stipulations. But, NSO stipulations are subject to numerous waivers, exemptions, and modifications, as stated in the Kremmling RMP and 2015 Colorado Sage-grouse Plan.69 And even if they remain in place, development on adjacent or nearby non-federal parcels could still lead to many detrimental effects. It is far more logical—and in fact required pursuant to FLPMA and NEPA—for BLM to carefully assess these conflicts and sensitivities and at least consider deferring lease sales in the areas that contain important competing resources and values.

Indeed, BLM should learn more about any potential heightened risks or uncertainties through further study and analysis, rather than lease any such parcels. One fitting, non-exclusive example is the apparent conflict between proceeding with oil and gas leasing on the eighteen parcels in the Kremmling Field Office that are given priority for deferral under the 2015 Greater Sage-Grouse Approved Resource Management Plan Amendment.70

Resource price uncertainty is another factor that counsels strongly towards deferring at least some of these parcels in this lease sale, if not all of them, in order to earn fair market value for the use of public lands. Many of the parcels offered in this lease sale have low or moderate potential for oil and gas, yet pose potential multiple-use conflicts. Moreover, as detailed further below, long-term uncertainty about the economics of oil and gas drilling has caused many developers to show reluctance to invest heavily in new parcels. Yet the mere presence of leased tracts on BLM lands often forecloses BLM managing those areas for wilderness values, important wildlife habitat, Areas of Critical Environmental Concern, and myriad other public uses. BLM must at least consider deferring the sale of low-potential lands at such low resource prices pursuant to NEPA, FLPMA, and the MLA.

In sum, BLM must at least consider the substantial environmental, cultural, and economic benefits of waiting to lease at some parcels that have important conservation and

68 Kremmling EA at 9, 19–21.
69 Kremmling RMP, supra note 22; 2015 Colorado Sage-grouse Plan, supra note 35 at G-1.
70 See id. Att. H (identifying eighteen parcels).
recreational values and limited oil and gas potential. Because BLM has failed to do so here, the EAs do not take the requisite "hard look" at environmental effects and do not evaluate reasonable alternatives, in violation of NEPA.71

C. BLM’s Failure to Consider the Economic Impacts of Delaying Parcels for Lease Sale Violates Its Obligation to Obtain “Fair Market Value” for the Use of Public Lands

BLM’s total lack of consideration of option value also creates a scenario in which BLM is likely to violate its requirement under FLPMA to obtain “fair market value” for any lease sale. By neglecting any consideration of option value—contrary to judicial mandates and administrative precedent—BLM risks repeating a pattern of obtaining minimal payments from oil companies to sit on leased parcels while depriving the public of the enjoyment of those lands. This outcome is particularly likely in the present moment, as recent the economic downturn and long-term trends in the oil-and-gas sector make it especially unlikely that BLM will derive “fair market value” from the proposed sale.

Long-Term Leasing Trends Indicate that BLM Is Unlikely to Receive “Fair Market Value” for the Proposed Sale, Emphasizing the Requirement to Consider Delay

While BLM’s failure to consider option value or genuinely analyze the possibility of delaying leasing is unlawful in and of itself, this failure is particularly egregious because—in light of recent BLM leasing and production trends and record-low oil and gas prices—the agency is highly unlikely to receive “fair market value” for the parcels at issue. What’s more, BLM’s repeated failure to assess option value or consider delayed-leasing alternatives is directly responsible for some alarming federal leasing trends.

Particularly in recent years, BLM has regularly offered lease sales for low-potential lands that developers scoop up at negligible prices and sit on without any development, depriving the public of other—and often more valuable—uses of the land for minimal compensation. As of the end of fiscal year 2018, half of the over 25.5 million acres of federal land locked up in oil and gas leases—nearly 13 million acres—was lying idle without production.72 In Colorado alone, nearly 1.2 million leased were sitting idle,73 and “on average over the last five years only 52% of leased lands [in the state] are held by production.”74 As the Congressional Budget Office explained, “[m]ost leased parcels have no exploratory drilling or production during the lease term,” with leases issued noncompetitively particularly unlikely to enter production.75 These trends are being

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71 See, e.g., Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374.


73 Id.

74 Royal Gorge EA at 39; Kremmling EA at 36.

exacerbated as the Trump administration makes more low-potential lands available for lease: BLM offered more acres for lease during calendar years 2017–2018 than under the entire last four years of the Obama administration, with a lower percentage of those acres receiving bids.\footnote{\textit{Oil and Gas Statistics, Bureau of Land Management tbl. 11}, https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/oil-and-gas-statistics. As these statistics show, BLM made 14,080,439 acres available for lease during calendar years 2013–2016, with 3,275,780 of those acres—roughly 23 percent—receiving bids. During calendar years 2017–2018, BLM made 16,857,751 acres available for lease, with 2,281,123 of those acres—just 13.5 percent—receiving bids.}

Companies engage in the practice of speculative leasing and sitting on low-potential lands for multiple reasons. First, companies often have a “perverse incentive … to sit on undeveloped federal land,” since by having subservice reserves as assets on a balance sheet, a company can “immediately improve its overall financial health, boost its attractiveness to shareholders and investors, and even increase its ability to borrow on favorable terms.”\footnote{\textit{CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Oil and Gas Companies Gain by Stockpiling America’s Federal Land 3} (2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2018/08/29/455226/oil-gas-companies-gainstockpiling-americas-federal-land/; \textit{see also TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, Gaming the System: How Federal Land Management in Nevada Fails Taxpayers} 4 (2019), https://www.taxpayer.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/TCS-Nevada-Federal-Oil-Gas-Report_-_July-2019.pdf (“Certain companies and interests take advantage of the low acquisition and ownership costs for federal leases to amass sizeable lease holdings … Their aim is to profit by re-selling some fraction of the leases to major producers who might want to take a gamble and actually explore for oil and gas reserves on the federal land.”).} Second, although there is frequently “little evidence that much oil or gas is easily accessible,” buyers may be “hoping that the land will increase in value nonetheless, because of higher energy prices, new technologies that could make exploration and drilling more economical or the emergence of markets for other resources hidden beneath the surface.”\footnote{Eric Lipton & Hiroko Tabuchi, \textit{Energy Speculators Jump on Chance to Lease Public Land at Bargain Rates}, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/27/business/energy-speculators-public-landleases.html.} In other words, buyers are considering option value—as rational economic actors do when assessing market value.\footnote{As BLM explained in its 2015 Resource Management Plan for the Kremmling Field Office, expressions of interest from the oil and gas industry within the field office “have been primarily concentrated in … low or no potential areas.” Kremmling RMP, \textit{supra} note 22 at 3-187.} Indeed, developers appear to be taking advantage of BLM’s willingness to offer low-potential lands for bargain prices in the area encompassing this proposed sale: As BLM explained in its 2015 RMP for the Kremmling Field Office, expressions of interest from the oil and gas industry within the field office “have been primarily concentrated in … low or no potential areas”—a seemingly counterintuitive anomaly that can be explained only by the fact that developers consider option value while BLM does not. BLM continues that trend in this proposed sale, failing to consider the prospect of waiting to offer leases until energy prices are higher and justify the costs of leasing, including foregoing opportunities to promote other economically valuable uses like outdoor recreation and wildlife protection.
While it is clear why oil and gas companies often choose to purchase leases with little prospect of near-term drilling, it is far less clear why BLM facilitates these transactions. After all, the nation derives little monetary benefit from unproductive leases. For one, the government does not receive royalties when a parcel is undeveloped, thereby depriving taxpayers of the primary source of income from onshore leasing.\(^8^0\) That leaves only lease and rental payments for the land itself, but these are frequently negligible for low-potential lands. The MLA imposes a minimum upfront bid of just $2 per acre for onshore oil and gas leases—an amount that has not changed since 1987.\(^8^1\) Additionally, a parcel that does not receive any bids can still be leased noncompetitively, whereby the first qualified applicant is entitled to lease the land upon payment of a $435 application fee.\(^8^2\) Rental payments for nonproducing lands are also minimal: A company pays an annual rental fee of only $1.50 per acre during the first five years of the rental term, and just $2 per acre for the remainder of the term.\(^8^3\) For many non-producing parcels, therefore, total revenues are just a few hundred or thousand dollars per year—hardly a fair value for the land’s exclusive use.

Indeed, a large and increasing percentage of federal lands are leased either noncompetitively or at or near the minimum bid value. Roughly half of all parcels leased from 2003–2012 went for less than $10 per acre, including about 4,000 parcels—approximately 15 percent—that did not receive a bid and were leased noncompetitively.\(^8^4\) During that time, over 25 percent of the parcels that were leased competitively yielded just the $2 per acre minimum bid.\(^8^5\) Just in Colorado from 2007–2017, more than 200,000 acres were leased for a low bid of under $10 per acre, with another 61,000 acres were leased noncompetitively.\(^8^6\) Recent years have only exacerbated this problem: The percentage of leases being given away through noncompetitive sales “surged in the first year of the Trump administration to the highest levels in over a decade” and now “make up a majority of leases given out by the federal government” in numerous states.\(^8^7\) In an extraordinary

\(^{8^0}\) The Congressional Budget Office estimates that royalties accounted for 90 percent of the government’s gross income from onshore leasing from 2005 to 2014. CBO Report, supra note 75, at 2. Even here, taxpayers receive an unreasonably low benefit from production on federal land, as the federal onshore royalty rate of 12.5 percent “is less than the royalty rate imposed by many states for production of oil and gas on state-owned land. For example, current state royalty rates are 25 percent in Texas, 18.75 percent in Oklahoma, and 16.67 percent in Colorado, Montana, and Wyoming; New Mexico and North Dakota use both 16.67 percent and 18.75 percent rates.” Id. at 20.


\(^{8^2}\) Id. § 226(c)(1); 84 Fed. Reg. 59,730, 59,731 (Nov. 6, 2019).

\(^{8^3}\) 30 U.S.C. § 226(d). Although the MLA provides these amounts as minimums, BLM regulations set annual rents at these statutory-minimum amounts. 43 C.F.R. § 3103.2-2(a).

\(^{8^4}\) CBO Report, supra note 75, at 2.

\(^{8^5}\) Id. at 18.


\(^{8^7}\) Lipton & Tabuchi, supra note 78. Illuminating examples of this trend abound. As Taxpayers for Common Sense explained in a recent article: “A first quarter lease sale in Colorado that took place in March last year
example, one corporation has secured 227 oil and gas leases in Montana since the start of 2018 covering over 113,000 acres of federal land—without submitting a single bid or paying anything beyond application fees and minimum rent amounts.88

Through consideration of option value, BLM can avoid this result. Specifically, if BLM rationally considers the value of delay (as oil speculators who snatch up low-potential lands already do), it would recognize that parcels currently believed to possess limited development potential could sell for a much greater future price if later discovered to have higher potential. In the meantime, removing these parcels from this lease sale would allow them to be put toward more beneficial uses—such as ecosystem conservation, carbon sink purposes, renewable energy development, watershed protection, or recreation—rather than sitting idly in the hands of energy speculators. Eliminating lands with limited potential from this lease sale could also increase the bids for higher potential lands both here and in other lease sales, as it would restrict supply by making far fewer acres available for lease.

Instead, however, BLM fails to consider option value or timing in proposing to lease these parcels, creating the likelihood that the parcels will be snapped up for minimum value, if not leased noncompetitively, and fail to yield substantial revenues over the lease term. Should BLM proceed in this fashion, it will not obtain fair market value for these parcels, in violation of FLPMA.

*BLM’s Own Data Indicates that Drilling on Most of These Parcels Will Likely be Limited, Reducing the Possibility that the Agency Receives “Fair Market Value” and Further Underscoring the Requirement to Consider Delay*

In light of the BLM’s track record of awarding many parcels that receive low bids and yield little production, there is considerable reason to believe that most of the proposed parcels will not be put to productive use or yield significant revenue if sold in this lease sale. Indeed, BLM’s own estimates in these EAs reveal that the majority of the nominated parcels will see little if any drilling, with the majority of the land remaining unproductive.

Of the 25 parcels proposed for lease in the Royal Gorge Field Office, all but two are considered to have “very low” development potential, with another parcel considered “low” potential.89 Just 1% of the total acreage assessed in the Royal Gorge EA is considered high

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89 Royal Gorge EA at 18.
potential.\(^{90}\) All of the parcels in Las Animas County proposed for lease (assessed in the Royal Gorge EA) are considered by BLM to be “very low” or “low” potential.\(^{91}\) Indeed, although BLM offers 24 parcels for lease in Las Animas County, “no oil has been produced in the county since 2014,” and “there has been no Federal oil production in the county since 2003.”\(^{92}\) Given the very low development potential of these lands, BLM strikingly admits that “as a practical matter the difference between the no action and proposed action are not that dissimilar.”\(^{93}\) In other words, BLM admits that there will be no or very little drilling on the vast majority of parcels for lease in the Royal Gorge Field Office.

Development potential in the Kremmling and Little Snake Field Offices may be somewhat higher, but there is reason to believe that it, too, is limited. According to BLM’s reasonable foreseeable development estimates, the 18 parcels assessed in this lease sale could produce as few as 10 wells throughout the course of the proposed leases (with a high-end estimate of 65 wells).\(^{94}\) While both field offices have had a fair amount of drilling historically, no new wells have been drilled in the Little Snake Field Office since August 2016, while in the Kremmling Field Office no new wells have been drilled this year.\(^{95}\) And as noted above, expressions of interest from the oil and gas industry in the Kremmling Field Office “have been primarily concentrated in ... low or no potential areas”—suggesting that here, too, developers may be interested in the lands for speculative purposes with limited drilling intentions.\(^{96}\) Indeed, while BLM characterizes all 18 parcels from these two field offices as having “high” potential, maps compiled from agency data indicate that at least three of the parcels—numbers 61, 62, and 5984—are in fact in low potential regions.\(^{97}\)

If recent history is any guide, moreover, BLM is unlikely to obtain substantial revenue for those lands. For instance, in the most recent BLM Colorado State Office lease sale, held this past March, only nine of the twenty available parcels sold, with six of those parcels going for less than $5 per acre. The average bid per acre was just $6.35, netting

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\(^{90}\text{Id. at 37.}\)

\(^{91}\text{Id.}\)

\(^{92}\text{Id. at 37; see also id. at 17 ("The Las Animas county parcels are located in minimal oil and gas development in the surrounding area and there are currently no producing well in the general vicinity.").}\)

\(^{93}\text{Id. at 37.}\)

\(^{94}\text{Kremmling EA at 36.}\)

\(^{95}\text{Id. at 31.}\)

\(^{96}\text{Kremmling RMP, supra note 22 at 3-187.}\)

\(^{97}\text{Compare Kremmling EA Att. H with Upcoming Oil and Gas Lease Sales, https://wilderness.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=bedd5928d60b417f829f6d1fc5b6da0 (overlaying proposed parcels with BLM development potential estimates); see also Reasonably Foreseeable Development, 2008-2027 Oil and Gas Activities in the Kremmling Field Office 50, https://eplanning.blm.gov/public_projects/lup/68543/88589/106099/KFO_RFD_with_TC_AND_SIGNATURE_PAGE_01232012.pdf.}\)
BLM only $83,000 for more than 10,000 acres leased.\textsuperscript{98} Notably, several of the unsold parcels from that sale—such as parcel numbers 79,822, 79,824, and 79,825\textsuperscript{99}—are within a few miles of the currently proposed parcels in the Royal Gorge Field Office.\textsuperscript{100} The prior Colorado lease sale, held in September 2019, was not too much better: Only 49 of the 73 available parcels were leased in that sale, with an average bid of $12.58 per acre. In total, BLM obtained approximately $601,000 in total revenue for over 42,000 acres leased.\textsuperscript{101} And in the sale before that, in June 2019, the average parcel sold for just $7.82 per acre, with eight of the 17 parcels sold for minimum bids.\textsuperscript{102}

Like in these recent lease sales, it is likely here that many or most of the nominated parcels will receive noncompetitive or minimum bids and remain nonproductive throughout the lease term, depriving the public of the land’s unencumbered enjoyment and higher-value uses—such as recreation, tourism activities, wildlife conservation, or even renewable energy production—while yielding negligible revenue. Proceeding with the lease sale in the face of this evidence would violate BLM’s obligations to ensure that the public receives “fair market value” for oil-and-gas leases.

**Recent Economic Developments Further Reduce the Likelihood of Obtaining Fair Market Value and Underscore the Option to Delay**

On top of the fact that BLM infrequently obtains fair market value for low-potential lands, economic developments in recent months make that possibility especially remote at this time, and further underscore the need for BLM to account for option value and consider delaying the proposed leasing. Specifically, as the national and global economies have contracted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, two particular developments have affected the oil-and-gas sector and make it particularly unlikely for the government to reap fair value for its lands.

For one, global oil prices have plunged. The price of crude oil is $36.87 per barrel as of September 8, 2020, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, which represents a drop of nearly 40 percent since the start of 2020.\textsuperscript{103} And although oil prices have somewhat rebounded since reaching unprecedented depths in April—


\textsuperscript{99} Id. at 3.

\textsuperscript{100} Upcoming Oil and Gas Lease Sales, https://wilderness.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=bedd5928d60b417f829f6d1fc5b6fda0.


including one day in which prices were negative—a fact they still remain far below pre-pandemic levels, with growing concern about when or if they will reach such levels again. Indeed, some forecasters believe that recent dips in oil prices portend long-term declines: BP recently “cut its estimates for oil and gas prices in the coming decades between 20% and 30%,” as it “now sees the prospect of the pandemic having an enduring impact on the global economy, with the potential for weaker demand for energy for a sustained period.” Likewise, the International Monetary Fund projects only a modest rebound in oil prices toward “about 25 percent below the 2019 average.” And the latest forecast from the U.S. Energy Information Administration similarly projects that oil prices and consumption will remain well below their pre-pandemic levels for the foreseeable future.

Due in large part to these declines in oil prices, energy developers have cut back on their drilling in recent months. Nationwide, there are currently just 256 operational oil-and-gas rigs, according to data compiled by Baker Hughes—a decline of more than 70 percent from the 898 rigs that were operational a year ago. Colorado is one of many states that has seen a sharp decline in drilling over the past year, with just five rigs currently operational versus 27 a year ago (a decline of over 80 percent). This sharp decline in drilling both in Colorado and nationwide indicates that the proposed parcels—even those alleged to have higher development potential—may be unlikely to see any drilling in the near- or medium-term future, thus depriving the federal government of any royalties (even reduced-rate royalties) that it would receive from productive lands.

Not only does decreased long-term oil prices and reduced drilling mean that the government will receive lesser royalty payments than it would likely obtain in a more robust market, but substantial volatility and uncertainty in the oil market likely means that companies will be more cautious in their approach and even less willing than normal to make high bids for leasing rights. Recent lease sales evince this trend. As noted above, Colorado’s March 2020 lease sale netted limited revenues and many unleased parcels. Results for the Utah lease sale in March 2020 were similarly poor, with only four of the 22 parcels sold for above the minimum bid. In Montana, similarly, the March 2020 lease sale netted an average bonus of just $5.47 per acre, with seven of the eight leased parcels going

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104 Id.
107 Short-Term Energy Outlook, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., (“Although the 2021 forecast level is 1.6 million b/d more than EIA’s forecast 2020 consumption, it is 0.4 million [barrels per day] less than the 2019 average.”).
108 Rig Count Overview & Summary Count, Baker Hughes, https://perma.cc/NA7P-WG9P.
Recent royalty-payment reductions compound this trend and supply the second reason that BLM is especially unlikely to obtain fair market value at this moment. Specifically, since the spring, BLM has been granting unprecedented numbers of requests from oil and gas producers to reduce royalty payments from their already-low levels, effectively allowing operators to set their own reduced rates. Specifically, under guidance that BLM issued in April, developers could apply for royalty-rate reductions so long as their leases were “uneconomic at the current royalty rate, but would be economic with a royalty rate reduction.” Under this policy, BLM permitted a rate to be reduced all the way down to 0.5 percent (a 96 percent reduction from the normal 12.5 percent royalty rate) and allowed for unlimited extensions in 60-day increments. Oil companies have been taking advantage: Since March, BLM has granted royalty relief to more than 500 oil-and-gas leases covering 343,000 acres of federal land, with many of these reductions drastically reducing the royalty rate. Since royalty rates are currently so low—and might remain so for the foreseeable future—BLM may receive limited royalty payments for any parcels that are drilled in the near-to-medium term, further diminishing the value that it will receive from the proposed lease sale.

Consideration of option value would account for these developments and counsel strongly towards delay. In particular, low oil prices and royalty rates—coupled with market uncertainty and volatility—make it especially unlikely for BLM to obtain fair market value for the nominated parcels at this time. As BLM has previously recognized in agency guidance, “royalty streams ... are part of market value” and should be considered when assessing a parcel’s fair price. Yet BLM pays this issue virtually no attention for

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112 See, e.g., supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.

113 See supra notes 77-80.


118 Economic Evaluation Handbook, supra note 49, ch. I.B.
this lease sale. While BLM appears to recognize that “the pandemic and the low commodity prices” have the potential to depress the market, it brushes this concern aside by noting that “[m]arkets for all commodities fluctuate over time” and stating that some “[d]evelopment is still occurring on Federal lands.”\footnote{Royal Gorge EA at 13; Kremmling EA at 14. As noted above, development has declined substantially over the past year. \textit{See supra} notes 105–06 and accompanying text.} Furthermore, the agency states that lease auctions produce “sale prices that accurately reflect fair market value at the time of sale, regardless of market conditions”—recognizing, in effect, that depressed markets such as the current climate produce limited revenues.\footnote{Royal Gorge EA at 13; Kremmling EA at 14.} Finally, the agency admits that it “does not attempt to ‘time’ the lease of public lands for minerals development to any particular set of market conditions”—but, of course, private developers \textit{do} time lease purchases and will pay less for resources when market conditions so dictate, so BLM is effectively ceding any economic advantage it had to private developers at the public’s expense.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} This failure to even consider the economic option value associated with delaying lease sales runs counter to the federal court decisions in both \textit{California v. Watt} and \textit{Center for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell}.\footnote{\textit{See California v. Watt}, 668 F.2d at 1319–20; \textit{CSE v. Jewell}, 779 F.3d at 610.}

For all of the reasons outlined above, BLM’s disregard for the currently depressed market is arbitrary and irrational. BLM is incorrect to suggest that low bid prices and deflated royalty rates represent the “fair market value” of a parcel simply because this is the price that an oil-and-gas auction yields at the present moment. As detailed above, this limited and circular analysis overlooks the other beneficial uses that are being forgone by leasing the land—an important consideration in assessing the fair value of the property=. BLM’s aversion to considering market conditions when assessing its leasing priorities is not a rational way to manage federal lands to ensure that the public receives fair market value.

In short, BLM is highly unlikely to obtain “fair market value” or “reasonable prices” in the proposed lease sale, in violation of FLPMA and the MLA. Its failure to rationally consider option value or the possibility of delaying these leases would render its determination to lease these parcels arbitrary and capricious.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

For all the foregoing reasons, BLM’s analysis of the proposed lease sale is deficient. Because BLM fails to account for multiple-use values, does not consider viable alternatives including the alternative of delayed leasing, and disregards key adverse economic impacts
likely to result from the proposed lease, proceeding with the lease would be arbitrary and capricious in violation of FLPMA, the MLA, and NEPA.

Respectfully,

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Attachments:

1) BLM, Economic Evaluation of Oil and Gas Properties Handbook (H-3070-2)
2) CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, Options for Increasing Federal Income from Crude Oil and Natural Gas on Federal Lands (2016)
3) CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Oil and Gas Companies Gain by Stockpiling America’s Federal Land (2018)
4) FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, COMPREHENSIVE CONSERVATION PLAN: ARAPAHO NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE 24-25 (Sept. 2004)
6) Jayni Hein, et al., Look Before You Lease (2020)
7) INT’L MONETARY FUND, World Economic Outlook Update (June 2020)
9) Eric Lipton & Hiroko Tabuchi, Energy Speculators Jump on Chance to Lease Public Land at Bargain Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018)
11) TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, Locked Out: The Cost of Speculation in Federal Oil and Gas Leases (2017)