

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Order Instituting Rulemaking Regarding  
Policies, Procedures and Rules for the  
California Solar Initiative, the Self-  
Generation Incentive Program and Other  
Distributed Generation Issues.

Rulemaking 12-11-005  
(Filed November 8, 2012)

**COMMENTS OF THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY ON  
ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER'S RULING ISSUING ENERGY DIVISION'S  
SELF-GENERATION INCENTIVE PROGRAM GREENHOUSE GAS  
SIGNAL STAFF PROPOSAL**

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September 26, 2018

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**I. Introduction**

In accordance with Rules 6.2, 1.9, and 1.10 of the California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission”) Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Rules”), the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law<sup>1</sup> (“Policy Integrity”) respectfully submits comments on the Assigned Commissioner’s Ruling Issuing Energy Division’s Self-Generation Incentive Program Greenhouse Gas Signal Staff Report of September 13, 2018 in the above-captioned proceeding. Policy Integrity is a nonpartisan think tank dedicated to improving the quality of government decisionmaking through encouraging a rational approach to environmental and regulatory policymaking that makes use of the best available economic tools. Policy Integrity advocates for sound cost-benefit analysis at every level of government and argues for an unbiased approach to measuring the costs and benefits of environmental, public health, and safety policy. Policy Integrity has previously filed public comments and written reports and articles on issues pertaining to economic analysis of grid modernization and distributed energy resources, including energy storage. Policy Integrity seeks to apply its economic, legal, and policy expertise

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<sup>1</sup> These comments do not purport to represent the views of New York University School of Law, if any.

in support of the Public Utilities Commission Staff's proposal to use real-time greenhouse gas emissions signals for the Self-Generation Incentive Program ("SGIP") and create performance-based incentive payments for program participants. Policy Integrity has also conducted significant research on energy storage and offers selected findings below to further assist the Commission.

## **II. Comments**

The Commission should adopt the Energy Division's staff ("Staff") proposals to create a GHG emissions performance-based incentive structure for new projects and to include real-time greenhouse gas emissions signals for energy storage operation. SGIP impact evaluations show that under certain circumstances, the deployment of energy storage under the program increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, contrary to the program's goals.<sup>2</sup> The working group attributes unintended emissions increases to two factors: first, that "TOU peak periods have not aligned with high grid emission times," and, second, that "retail rates incentivized customers to prioritize noncoincident demand charge management over time of use (TOU) rate arbitrage."<sup>3</sup> As a result, the Energy Division working group proposes that the Commission "provide a digitally accessible real-time marginal GHG emissions factor" and transition to performance-based incentive payments for SGIP participants.

In the program, the Commission should include evaluation of GHG effects based on granular (i.e., reflecting precision over short time intervals) marginal emissions signals; this evaluation will give the most accurate representation of the climate impacts of energy storage

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<sup>2</sup> California Public Utilities Commission, Self-Generation Incentive Program Greenhouse Gas Staff Proposal, Rulemaking Regarding Policies, Procedures and Rules for the California Solar Initiative, the Self-Generation Incentive Program and Other Distributed Generation Issues, No. 12-11-005, at 4 (Sept. 13 2018) [hereinafter "Staff Proposal"].

<sup>3</sup> *Id.*; See also Itron, September 7, 2018. 2017 SGIP Advanced Energy Storage Impact Evaluation. On behalf of the California Public Utilities Commission. Available at [http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC\\_Public\\_Website/Content/Utilities\\_and\\_Industries/Energy/Energy\\_Programs/Demand\\_Side\\_Management/Customer\\_Gen\\_and\\_Storage/2017\\_SGIP\\_AES\\_Impact\\_Evaluation.pdf](http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUC_Public_Website/Content/Utilities_and_Industries/Energy/Energy_Programs/Demand_Side_Management/Customer_Gen_and_Storage/2017_SGIP_AES_Impact_Evaluation.pdf).

operation. Furthermore, tying the proposed performance-based incentive payments to this granular evaluation helps align incentives to reduce emissions of energy storage operation.

In support of this proposal, Policy Integrity highlights an important issue: energy storage systems can increase GHG emissions under certain conditions; therefore, incentives based on granular emissions signals are necessary to ensure that SGIP achieves its goal of reducing GHG emissions.

**Energy Storage Can Increase GHG Emissions Under Certain Conditions;  
Therefore, the Commission Should Implement the Correct Incentives for Energy  
Storage to Achieve Emission Reduction Goals**

Policy Integrity has extensively analyzed the relationship between GHG emissions and energy storage operations. In an academic paper published by Policy Integrity’s Director and Energy Policy Director, “Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Energy Storage and Greenhouse Gas Emissions”<sup>4</sup> and in our April 2018 report, *Managing the Future of Energy Storage*,<sup>5</sup> we explain that contrary to the prevailing wisdom, energy storage is not guaranteed to reduce emissions, and may, in fact, increase emissions if policies are not designed carefully. Energy storage can cause an increase in net emissions for two main reasons:

- If energy storage charges from the grid when marginal emission rates are high, and discharges to the grid when marginal emission rates are low, it will increase emissions.<sup>6</sup>
- Energy storage demands more total energy generation to compensate for energy lost during charging and discharging, which may lead to greater emissions.

In other words, the net effect of storage on emissions depends on the difference between the emission rates of marginal plants that supply electricity for charging and the emission rates of marginal plants that are displaced when systems discharge.<sup>7</sup> The emissions of the marginal unit can vary widely, depending on the time of day, location, fuel type, efficiency, and other grid

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<sup>4</sup> Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, *Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Energy Storage and Greenhouse Gas Emissions*, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 139, 143 (2018).

<sup>5</sup> Madison Condon, Richard Revesz & Burcin Unel, *Managing the Future of Energy Storage*, Institute for Policy Integrity (2018) [hereinafter “Future of Energy Storage Report”], available at <http://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/managing-the-future-of-energy-storage>. [Attached as Exhibit A].

<sup>6</sup> Revesz & Unel, *supra* note 4.

<sup>7</sup> See Revesz & Unel, *supra* note 4; Future of Energy Storage Report, *supra* note 5.

constraints affecting the marginal unit. For example, the marginal emissions can be zero when renewables are the marginal generator, but skyrocket if an oil-peaker plant is on the margin.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, marginal emission rates vary by location based on grid operation and transmission constraints. If energy storage charges from the grid when marginal emission rates are high, and discharges from the grid when marginal emission rates are low, it will increase emissions.<sup>9</sup> And, ample academic work using hourly and sub-hourly marginal emission rates demonstrates the possibility of emissions increases.<sup>10</sup> Using average emission rates, or focusing only on emissions avoided during discharging periods, would lead to inaccurate results. For example, if storage is charged when the marginal emissions rate is .4 kgCO<sub>2</sub>/kWh and discharged when the rate is .6 kgCO<sub>2</sub>/kWh, the average emissions rate would be .5 kgCO<sub>2</sub>/kWh over the entire period. This averaging fails to capture, however, the increase in emissions between charging and discharging. Therefore, hourly, sub-hourly or other more real-time marginal emissions rates provide a much more accurate picture of whether there is a change in emissions.

In addition, there are energy losses associated with charging, discharging, and maintaining charge.<sup>11</sup> These “round-trip efficiency” losses vary depending on the technology, and can be quite high.<sup>12</sup> As a result, even if there is no difference in the marginal emission rates between charging and discharging periods, energy storage can increase emissions by simply increasing the amount of energy generation needed to serve the same amount of load.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In California, it is mostly likely natural gas on the margin and the marginal emissions rate may be less extreme than with an oil-peaker or coal on the margin.

<sup>9</sup> Revesz & Unel, *supra* note 4.

<sup>10</sup> Eric S. Hittinger & Ines M. L. Azevedo, *Bulk Energy Storage Increases United States Electricity System Emissions*, 49 *Envtl. Sci. & Tech.* 3202 (2015); Joshua Graff Zivin, Matthew J. Kotchen & Erin T. Mansur, *Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity of Marginal Emissions: Implications for Electric Cars and Other Electricity-Shifting Policies* 1 (2013); Duncan S. Callaway, Meredith Fowlie, & Gavin McCormick, *Location, Location, Location: The Variable Value of Renewable Energy and Demand-Side Efficiency Resources*, 5 *J. Ass’n Env’tl. & Resource Economists* 39 (2017); Eric S. Hittinger & Ines M. L. Azevedo, *Estimating the Quantity of Wind and Solar Required To Displace Storage-Induced Emissions*, 51 *Envtl. Sci. & Tech.* 12988 (2017); Laura M. Arciniegas & Eric Hittinger, *Tradeoffs Between Revenue and Emissions in Energy Storage Operation*, 143 *Energy* 1 (2018); *Storing Solar Power Increases Energy Consumption and Emissions, Study Finds*, UTNews (Jan. 30, 2017), <https://news.utexas.edu/2017/01/30/storing-solar-power-increases-energy-use-and-emissions>.

<sup>11</sup> Revesz & Unel, *supra* note 4, at 166.

<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*

Therefore, the net emissions impact of energy storage varies depending on where, when, and how it operates, and would require a thorough analysis using marginal operational emission rates.

Therefore, energy storage systems should be evaluated by analyzing at their *net* emissions with high temporal granularity, as suggested by Staff, using the difference between the marginal emission rates during the discharging period and the marginal emission rates during the charging period. The granular approach proposed in the Staff Proposal, which would use real-time GHG emissions rates, gives much more accurate information to energy storage operators than the current approach.

Because SGIP has not delivered on one of its key goals of reducing GHG emissions,<sup>14</sup> including for many of the reasons discussed above, the Commission is right to move away from the roundtrip efficiency standard for payments to SGIP participants toward a GHG emissions performance-based incentive payment system. Tying payments to emissions reductions provides the right incentives for operators to deploy energy storage systems only when reductions can be achieved. The real-time GHG signals would also encourage the same behavior.

This way, the Commission can take a step toward solving this problem and maximizing the net benefits of energy storage, as this approach incentivizes storage resources to internalize the externalities tied to GHG emissions. If energy storage operators have the ability to understand the GHG consequences of their operations on a granular level, and if the Commission integrates that value into the program's incentive payments, the incentives of the operators will be more aligned with the GHG reduction goal of the SGIP. Therefore, we applaud Staff's recommendation and highly support Staff's proposal to include a GHG signal as a necessary element of meeting the program's goals.

### **III. Conclusion**

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<sup>14</sup> Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 379.6. ("It is the intent of the Legislature that the self-generation incentive program [to] increase deployment of distributed generation and energy storage systems to facilitate the integration of those resources into the electrical grid, improve efficiency and reliability of the distribution and transmission system, and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, peak demand, and ratepayer costs.").

In order to effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions through SGIP and to maximize the benefits of energy storage more broadly, regulators need to put into place the correct incentives for internalizing externalities related to GHG emissions. Therefore, the Commission should adopt the Staff Proposal to create GHG performance-based incentives and to provide real-time GHG signals for energy storage systems.

Dated: September 26, 2018


Respectfully submitted,

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# EXHIBIT A





# Managing the Future of Energy Storage

*Implications for Greenhouse Gas Emissions*

April 2018  
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This report does not necessarily reflect the views of NYU School of Law, if any.

# Executive Summary

With rapidly advancing technology and declining manufacturing costs, energy storage systems are becoming a central element in many energy policy debates. Policymakers see storage as a potential solution to the challenges that stem from the intermittency of certain renewable resources, such as solar and wind. Storage systems are therefore considered key to hastening the clean energy revolution, and are at the nexus of energy and climate change policy. Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are often a stated goal of policymakers encouraging energy storage installation.

Energy storage systems, undoubtedly, will be a key part of the future of the electric grid. They have the potential to provide many benefits to the grid, such as lowering the price of electricity at peak demand times, and deferring or avoiding new capacity investments. However, contrary to the prevailing wisdom, energy storage is not guaranteed to reduce emissions, and may, in fact, increase emissions if policies are not designed carefully. Further, while this oft-cited (but not guaranteed) benefit of storage dominates headlines in policy discussions around the country, many other types of benefits that energy storage systems can provide are not well recognized in policymaking.

This report seeks to be a resource to policymakers interested in maximizing the benefits of energy storage. It highlights the underappreciated benefits of energy storage and discusses the ways in which current policies are failing to encourage socially optimal deployment of storage technology. As policymakers start to rely more heavily on energy storage systems to achieve clean energy goals and other improvements to the grid, it is helpful to first understand the ways that the current regulatory and policy landscape fails to reward storage systems for the variety of benefits they provide to the grid, including ancillary benefits such as frequency regulation. Further, policymakers must keep in mind that the greenhouse gas impact of energy storage depends primarily upon whether the type of generation used to charge the storage is cleaner than the type of generation avoided when the storage is used; otherwise, storage could produce pernicious results.

Policy reforms that account for the range of benefits provided by storage, including reduced air pollution, are required at both state and federal levels. This report recommends that policymakers focus on:

- Accurately pricing externalities caused by greenhouse gases;
- Eliminating entry barriers for energy storage systems; and
- Eliminating barriers to multiple value streams.

This report outlines what is needed to realize each of these three goals and provides an overview of state and federal actions currently under way.

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# Introduction

There are 25.2 gigawatts (“GW”) of operational energy storage in the United States, with an additional 7.2 GW announced, contracted, or under construction.<sup>1</sup> The current total corresponds to about 2.7 percent of the current U.S. generation capacity.<sup>2</sup> It is expected that annual new deployment of energy storage will exceed 1.9 GW in 2019 and 2.7 GW in 2020.<sup>3</sup> By comparison, annual capacity additions of all other technologies are expected to be 11.1 GW in 2019 and 14.8 GW in 2020, making energy storage an increasingly important component of the electricity grid in the near future.<sup>4</sup>

This report seeks to be a resource to policymakers interested in maximizing the benefits of energy storage. It highlights the underappreciated benefits of energy storage and discusses the ways in which current policies are failing to encourage socially optimal deployment of storage technology. As policymakers start to rely more heavily on energy storage systems to achieve clean energy goals and other improvements to the grid, it is helpful to first understand the ways that the current regulatory and policy landscape fails to reward storage systems for the variety of benefits they provide to the grid, including ancillary benefits such as frequency regulation. Further, policymakers must keep in mind that the greenhouse gas impact of energy storage depends primarily upon whether the type of generation used to charge the storage is cleaner than the type of generation avoided when the storage is used; otherwise, storage could produce pernicious results.

In February 2018 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued its Final Rule on Electric Storage Participation in Regional Markets, Order 841 (Storage Rule).<sup>5</sup> This Storage Rule is a crucial step toward removing regulatory barriers that have prevented the efficient deployment of energy storage resources around the country. This report considers how FERC’s Storage Rule provides for the removal of certain regulatory barriers and highlights the questions that remain for energy storage system developers.

This report serves as a guide to policymakers at multiple jurisdictional levels and highlights the need for: (1) accurately pricing externalities caused by greenhouse gases; (2) eliminating entry barriers for energy storage systems; and (3) eliminating barriers to compensation from multiple value streams.\*

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\* This report is based on the recent article, Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, *Managing The Future Of The Electricity Grid: Energy Storage And Greenhouse Gas Emissions*, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 139 (2018).

# Overview of the Electric Grid

The electric grid contains three components: generation, transmission, and distribution. Electricity is produced by large generators, transmitted by high-voltage transmission lines closer to the end-users, and finally distributed by low-voltage distribution lines to energy consumers. Ensuring the stability of the grid requires that the supply of electricity at all times be equal to the demand of electricity, which changes throughout the day. In addition to the need for energy resources that can generate enough electricity and vary generation based on the demand, this balancing act requires a variety of “ancillary” services, such as frequency regulation, to ensure stability.

## Key Terms

**Baseload:** The baseload is the minimum level of demand on an electrical grid over a span of time. Baseload demand is satisfied by generators that can continuously meet this minimum demand at a comparatively low cost. It is important to note that the term ‘baseload’ is not technology specific and does not refer to certain types of resources that have historically been used to meet the minimum demand, such as nuclear or coal plants. ‘Baseload resources’ is technology neutral and refers to low-cost resources that would be most often called upon to meet the around-the-clock minimum level of demand, and therefore can be any low-cost resource that can help reliably meet the minimum level of demand.


Energy system operators are tasked with achieving this balancing act at the lowest possible cost. They ensure that the electricity demand at any given moment is met with the cheapest supply possible given the operational constraints of the grid. In simplified terms, most operators ask each generator for bids reflecting the lowest price at which the generator is willing to supply electricity. These bids are ordered from lowest to highest, often referred to as “merit order,” and generators are dispatched in this order and taking the operational constraints of the grid until the demand is met. The bid of the last generator that is needed to meet all the demand, the “marginal” generator, is paid to each of the dispatched generators.

Instantaneously meeting electricity demand, which varies during the day, requires plants that are continuously running to meet the minimum level of demand during the day, known as the “baseload.” It also requires additional plants that can react quickly as demand varies. Some plants, such as those fueled by coal and nuclear energy, have high fixed costs of starting up and shutting down and cannot easily vary their output from hour to hour. Their variable costs of generation, however, are low, and they therefore generally bid low prices. Thus, it often makes economic sense to continually operate these plants at a set level of output to meet the baseload demand.

These “baseload” plants are enough to meet all of the demand by themselves when the demand is low, typically at night. As demand starts to increase and the baseload plants no longer provide sufficient capacity to meet the demand, intermediate plants, such as natural gas combined cycle plants, are brought online. These plants have higher variable costs of generation, so their bids are higher, but they are not as costly to start up or shut down as baseload plants. When demand is highest, peak plants, which have high variable costs of generation and thus the highest bids, are dispatched. These plants are usually less-efficient natural gas or oil-fired plants. This dynamic means that electricity prices are low when baseload plants are on the margin, and high when peak plants are on the margin.



Figure 1: Illustrative Market Supply Curve<sup>6</sup>



Reliably transmitting electricity from generators to consumers further requires meeting a variety of other operational constraints. The amount of electricity that flows through the transmission and distribution networks must not be higher than the capacity of these networks, for example. And the electricity's cycle frequency and voltage level must be maintained throughout the grid. If these constraints are not met, the system may become unstable, blackouts may occur, or the grid may sustain damage.

# Benefits of Energy Storage

**E**nergy storage can provide numerous benefits to the grid at each of its three levels, as well as to end-users directly. The benefits of energy storage can be broken down into three main categories: (1) demand smoothing and energy arbitrage; (2) ancillary services; (3) assisting renewables and reducing emissions.

## Demand Smoothing and Energy Arbitrage

Energy storage facilitates arbitrage—the purchasing of wholesale electricity when the price is low in order to sell later when the price is high. Arbitrage can help lower the total cost of meeting the electricity demand by reducing the need to generate electricity when it is costly to do so. Energy storage can help meet resource adequacy requirements that are needed to ensure system reliability during system peaks by charging during off-peak times and discharging during peak times. This arbitrage ability reduces the need for generation, transmission, and distribution capacity expansions, and enables higher levels of use of existing cheaper generation resources. Therefore, by engaging in energy arbitrage, energy storage systems can help defer or reduce the need for capacity investment in more traditional resources, such as new natural gas combustion turbines, to meet peak demand and reduce costs significantly.<sup>7</sup>

Further, the ability of energy storage to smooth demand throughout the day enables generators to run at their optimal capacity over longer periods of time, increasing overall grid efficiency. It is costly for certain generators to ramp up and down their power supply in order to meet daily fluctuations in demand.<sup>8</sup> By partnering with storage resources, these generators can produce a continual level of output at a low cost, storing the unwanted power until demand increases later in the day.

## Ancillary Services

Energy storage systems can help grid operators meet a variety of operational constraints of the grid's transmission and distribution systems. Frequency and voltage must be maintained throughout the grid, and the energy supplied must not exceed the capacity of each of the grid's components. Grid operators use ancillary services, such as frequency regulation and voltage control, to help stabilize the grid and assist it in responding to changing demand. Electric storage resources, for example, are capable of faster start-up times and high ramp rates than other resources typically used for these services.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, energy storage

### Key Terms

#### Ancillary Services:

- *Frequency regulation* is used to reduce the minute-to-minute, or shorter, fluctuations caused by differences in electricity supply and demand.
- *Ramping resources* are needed to manage longer-duration fluctuations in the supply due to factors that affect generation such as changes in wind speed or cloud cover.
- *Voltage support* helps maintain voltage levels throughout the system.
- *Reserve capacity* is the extra capacity needed that can respond quickly to ensure system stability in the case of unexpected changes in customer demand.
- *Spinning reserves* are already online and can respond in less than ten minutes, while non-spinning reserves are offline but can come online and respond in less than ten minutes.



has the potential to supply ancillary services at a lower cost than the resources that have been traditionally used, like gas turbines. This can reduce overall system costs, or avoid the need for constructing new capacity from traditional resources.

## Complementing Renewables and Reducing Emissions

Many policymakers see energy storage as a necessary complement to the broader use of clean renewable energy resources, such as solar and wind power, that are intermittent and variable. If the sun is not shining, or the wind is not blowing, these resources cannot produce electricity. Further, peak demand periods may not perfectly correspond to the peak generation times of solar and wind resources.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, providing electricity from solar and wind energy reliably during the whole day requires smoothing out their output throughout the day.

Energy storage is often presented as a solution to the challenges utilities around the country face due to a desire for a higher penetration of renewable energy resources. Wind or solar energy can be stored when there is excess demand and injected to the grid later when the supply is insufficient to meet the demand. Energy storage can also help with minute-to-minute smoothing that would be necessary when a cloud passes by, as well as larger smoothing needs when a large amount of wind energy is generated during off-peak demand hours.



*Solar panels connected to a battery storage system.*

**Table 1: Benefits of Energy Storage at Each Level of the Grid**

At the generation level:	
Energy arbitrage	Purchasing wholesale electricity when the price is low and selling it when the price is high can help lower the total cost of meeting the electricity demand by reducing the need to generate electricity when it is costly to do so.
Resource adequacy	Charging during off-peak times and discharging during peak times can help meet resource adequacy requirements needed to ensure system reliability during system peaks, reducing the need for capacity investment.
Variable resource integration	Energy storage can help “firm” the variable output from a renewable generator by charging when there is not enough demand for the generator’s output and discharging when there is need.
Management of must-take resources	Resources such as hydro, nuclear, and wind must be taken by the buyers regardless of market prices due to regulatory or operational constraints so storage can avoid them having to dump excess energy at low demand.
Frequency regulation	Grid instability is prevented by ensuring that generation is matched with consumer demand at every moment.
Ramping	Ramping counteracts the effects of varying renewable generation.
Spinning/non-spinning reserves	Reserves can provide extra generating capacity in the event of an unexpected energy shortfall.
Voltage support	Voltage must be maintained within an acceptable range to match demand.
Black start	Storage can be used to restore power station operation in the event of a grid outage.
At the transmission level:	
Congestion relief	Storage can reduce the bottlenecks caused at certain locations of the transmission system during high-demand times by discharging at those locations during those periods.
Transmission system upgrade deferral	Shifting the electricity demand to less congested times prevents system overload and reduces the need, the size, or the urgency of new investment in the transmission systems.
Improved performance	Voltage maintenance and increased capacity improve the overall functioning of grid transmission.
At the distribution level:	
Congestion relief	Reducing congestion during peak demand times avoids the need for costly upgrades.
Mitigate outages	Storage can discharge in the event of an unexpected power outage.
Consumers (behind the meter):	
Manage consumption	Lower bills by displacing consumption from peak to off-peak rates, if consumers face time-varying rates.
Storage	Store energy from behind-the-meter generation, such as rooftop solar.
Back-up power	Provides emergency power in the event of grid failure.

## Types of Energy Storage Technology

Energy storage can be provided by a broad range of technologies, each with varying characteristics that make them better or less suited to providing certain storage services. For example, mechanical flywheels' fast-ramping capability and geographic flexibility mean that they are typically used to inject small and precise amounts of electricity into the grid for frequency regulation, despite their limited capacity. By contrast, pumped hydroelectric storage can provide higher-capacity, but require large reservoirs that are challenging to site.

An energy storage system's rated power capacity, duration of discharge, levelized cost, and barriers to installation, are all factors that determine what service the storage system is best suited to provide.

### Key Terms

**Rated power capacity:** storage unit's total output, expressed in kW or MW.

**Duration of discharge:** the time a given system can output electricity at its rated power capacity.

**Levelized cost:** unit cost of providing electricity over the lifetime of a resource, expressed in dollars per MWh.

Table 2: Characteristics of Storage Technologies<sup>11</sup>

Technology	Most Common Use	Installed Capacity (MW)	Projects Announced/ Under Way	Levelized Costs (\$/MWh)*
<b>Mechanical Storage</b>				
Pumped Hydroelectric Storage	Transmission System	22,610	11	152-198
Compressed Air Energy Storage	Transmission System	114	5	116-140
Flywheels	Peaker Replacement; Frequency Regulation; Distribution Substation; Distribution Feeder; Microgrid; Island; Commercial & Industrial	58	3	332-1,251
<b>Electro-chemical Storage</b>				
Sodium	Transmission; Peaker Replacement; Distribution Substation; Distribution Feeder; Island; Commercial & Industrial; Commercial Appliance; Residential	26	1	301-1,837
Lithium-Ion	Transmission System; Peaker Replacement; Frequency Regulation; Distribution Substation; Distribution Feeder; Microgrid; Island; Commercial & Industrial; Commercial Appliance; Residential	635	113	190-1,274
Lead-Acid	Distribution Substation; Distribution Feeder; Island; Commercial & Industrial; Commercial Appliance; Residential	51	2	425-1,710
Flow Battery	Transmission System; Peaker Replacement; Distribution Substation; Distribution Feeder; Island; Commercial & Industrial; Commercial Appliance; Residential	5	5	184-413
<b>Thermal Storage</b>	Transmission System; Peaker Replacement	669	2	227-862

\* These levelized cost estimations vary depending on the end-use of the energy discharged from the storage system.

# Potential Negative Effects of Energy Storage on Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Energy storage is often presented as a solution to the challenges utilities face in trying to promote clean energy resources in the fight against climate change. Storage can indeed encourage the penetration of intermittent and variable renewable energy resources.<sup>12</sup> A corollary to the assumption that storage is necessary for the integration of clean energy resources, is that storage would also lead to a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>13</sup> Storage can certainly serve this goal. When paired with a clean generator, for example, it can store the excess energy generated at times of low market demand and inject it to the grid at a later time, reducing the need for generation from fossil-fuel powered bulk system generators.

However, contrary to common belief, the relationship between increased deployment of energy storage and reduced carbon emissions is not guaranteed in today's energy markets. In fact, several studies have shown that under certain conditions, additional storage can lead to increased emissions. The emissions impact of increased storage capacity depends on several effects, primarily: (1) whether the type of generation used to charge the storage is cleaner than the type of generation avoided when the storage is used; and (2) the amount of additional energy needed to make up for the efficiency losses from storage.<sup>†</sup>

- If storage is charged during off-peak times by dirty generators, and then discharged during peak times as a competitor to more expensive, and cleaner, energy sources, the net effect will be an increase in emissions.
- Energy storage demands more total energy generation to compensate for energy lost during charging and discharging, leading to greater emissions, if charged with emitting resources.

## Marginal Emissions

Understanding how generators are dispatched is important for understanding the greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation and, as a consequence, the avoided emissions resulting from an intervention to the electricity system, such as deployment of more energy storage. Because the combination of the types of generators running varies by time and location, the emissions from electricity generation also vary by time and location.<sup>14</sup> When demand increases, the magnitude of the change in emissions that results from the new electricity generation depends on the type of generator, i.e., the marginal generator, dispatched to meet that new demand. The emission intensity of these marginal generators determine the marginal emission rate. When a coal plant is “on the margin,” the marginal emission rate is high. If a generator that is less carbon intensive, such as a natural gas plant, is on the margin, the marginal emission rate is lower. Because marginal generators vary depending on the time of day and the location, the emissions that can be avoided by using electricity discharges from energy storage systems also vary.

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<sup>†</sup> In addition to these two drivers of storage-induced increases in emissions, there are secondary effects of storage that can increase emissions. Manipulation of market power by large generators, as well as pre-existing regulations, can play an important, and sometimes distortionary, role on the end-effect of storage on net emissions. See Revesz & Unel, *supra*.




The inherent incentive for energy arbitrage is that energy storage systems are charged when electricity prices are low and discharged when they are high. As the external costs of greenhouse gas emissions are not currently reflected in wholesale electricity prices, such arbitrage decisions will be made without considering the resulting changes in emissions. As a result, energy storage can increase emissions if the cheaper energy resources that are used in charging are dirtier than the more expensive energy resources that are displaced during discharging. Thus, when considering the environmental benefits of energy storage, it is critical to consider not only the decrease in emissions from the generator that energy storage avoids, but also the increase in emissions from the cheaper generator used for charging.

The academic literature confirms that this pattern could occur:

- Carson and Novan (2012) model energy arbitrage in Texas and show that with low penetration of renewables into the market, CO<sub>2</sub> and SO<sub>2</sub> emissions increase while NO<sub>x</sub> emissions decrease. Storage charges during off-peak times, when coal plants are on the margin. The storage discharges during peak hours, displacing high heat-rate gas generators, which compared to coal, have lower CO<sub>2</sub> and SO<sub>2</sub> emissions and higher NO<sub>x</sub> emissions.<sup>15</sup>
- Hittinger and Azevedo (2015) model the deployment of bulk storage in 20 locations across the United States find that net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions increased between 104 and 407 kg/MWh of delivered energy, owing to the fact that the marginal electricity provider at night is often a coal plant while the marginal provider at peak demand is a natural gas plant.<sup>16</sup>
- Hittinger and Azevedo (2017) calculate how much wind and solar would be required to offset the increase in emissions due to energy storage deployment. They find that, depending on location, between 0.03 MW and 4 MW of wind, and between 0.25 MW and 17 MW of solar, would be needed to offset the average increase in emissions from the installation of a 25 MW/100 MWh storage device.<sup>17</sup>

Figure 2: Potential CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Impacts of Energy Storage



Source: CO<sub>2</sub> emissions resulting from the addition of bulk energy storage across the continental U.S. when there are no constraints on generation (Hittinger and Azevedo, 2017).

Perverse incentives may be more pronounced if the cost functions of dirtier generators have a particular shape. For example, the fixed costs of turning on certain generators, such as those powered by coal, are high, but the variable operational costs once the generator is turned on are low.<sup>18</sup> This pattern creates incentives for such a generator to continue operating once it is already on, as long as it can get sufficient revenue from the electricity it generates to cover its variable costs. Without energy storage, the amount of generation from such a generator would be limited by market demand. However, when paired with energy storage, this generator can produce additional electricity and store it to sell later. In this case, energy storage leads to increased generation from an emissions-intensive source. A coal plant, for example, that would normally operate below capacity at times of low demand (i.e., nighttime, or during spring and fall), can operate continuously at full capacity with the use of storage technology. In this case, the coal plant's use of storage to sell excess energy at times of higher demand, leads to an overall increase in emissions.

Additionally, it is costly for coal plants to vary their generation levels with changing demand.<sup>19</sup> Because they lose efficiency when varying generation, their fuel costs increase. Energy storage will allow such plants to continue operating at a fixed output level, and possibly at a higher capacity factor, that they find most efficient. The effect of this on emissions is ambiguous. On the one hand, energy storage might increase the efficiency of electricity generation in that plant, and hence would reduce emissions from any given amount of generation, all else equal. On the other hand, energy storage might help increase the total amount of generation from that particular plant, leading to an increase in emissions.

## Efficiency Losses

Even if there is no difference between the carbon intensity of the marginal generators during the charging and discharging periods, energy storage can nevertheless increase emissions because of efficiency losses. Energy losses occur during charging and discharging energy storage systems, as well as during transmission and distribution.<sup>20</sup> As a result, a greater amount of total generation is needed to provide a given amount of electricity using storage, which leads to higher overall emissions. The extent of these losses is measured by “roundtrip efficiency,” which is the ratio of the percentage of the energy put in to the energy retrieved from storage. Roundtrip efficiency varies across technologies. For example, compressed air energy storage, with a roundtrip efficiency of 27–54%, has high efficiency losses, while sodium-sulfur batteries, with a roundtrip efficiency of 85–90%, are much more efficient.<sup>21</sup>

If these efficiency losses are significantly high, energy storage can lead to increased emissions even when it uses less carbon-intensive generation to displace more carbon-intensive generation. Efficiency losses cause energy storage systems to require more energy input than the amount of energy they discharge. For example, if the roundtrip efficiency of a storage system is 50%, charging it would require double the amount of energy needed during discharging. So, unless the marginal emission rate during discharging is at least twice as high as the marginal emission rate during charging, the emissions will increase.

# Policies Needed to Maximize the Benefits of Energy Storage Deployment

**T**he current regulatory and policy framework provides insufficient incentives for developing economically efficient energy storage deployment, where and when it can bring the most benefits to the grid. Procurement mandates and direct investment incentives encourage the deployment of storage indiscriminately, without considering potential negative emissions effects, or which type of energy storage could bring the most benefit to which level of the grid. Some policies are targeted to provide incentives for energy storage only when paired with renewable generators. While this type of targeted incentive reduces the potential negative emissions consequences, they fail to provide incentives for the many other types of services storage systems can provide.

There are three main reasons why the current landscape lacks the proper signals for maximizing the benefits of energy storage systems. First, because prices do not take into account the external costs of electricity provision, such as the damages from greenhouse gas emissions, energy storage investment based on electricity arbitrage revenues does not lead to socially efficient deployment of energy storage. Second, barriers to entry prevent energy storage systems from fully participating in all the markets in which they could provide value. And, finally, energy storage systems cannot earn multiple revenue streams for various benefits they provide at different levels of the grid, so their current earnings do not accurately reflect their true value.

Achieving efficiency requires solving all three of these shortcomings. Therefore, policymakers should:

1. Put in place a regulatory and policy framework that takes emissions into account;
2. Eliminate any uncertainties and barriers to entry; and
3. Ensure that energy storage systems can be compensated for all the benefits they provide to the grid.

## Internalizing Externalities

The most economically efficient way of internalizing an externality is to impose an economy-wide tax on greenhouse gas emissions. This first-best policy, however, requires congressional action, and in today's political climate is infeasible in the near term. Therefore, alternative ways to distinguish between socially beneficial and potentially harmful energy storage systems are required.

Carbon dioxide emissions in the electricity sector can be internalized by a “carbon pricing” policy in the wholesale electricity markets that makes generators pay for each ton of carbon dioxide they emit. Such carbon pricing would make it costlier for emitting resources to generate electricity, forcing them to bid higher prices in the wholesale market and creating an advantage for clean resources. Therefore, it aligns the inherent incentives in energy arbitrage with the clean energy goals of society.

Implementation of such a policy, however, requires more than the approval of state regulators. It requires coordination with grid operators, called “independent system operators” (“ISOs”) or “regional transmission organizations” (“RTOs”),

as well as approval from FERC. Even though there are efforts under way in some jurisdictions, like New York, to achieve this goal, redesigning the wholesale market to internalize externalities will take time.<sup>22</sup> Short-term strategies, at smaller scales, are necessary to hasten and smooth the transition to a cleaner grid.

### *Short-Term Strategy: Cost-Benefit Analysis in Procurement*

As more states are looking into integrating energy storage systems into the grid immediately, an interim policy tool is needed to ensure socially beneficial energy storage deployment in the near term. A societal cost-benefit analysis can help state regulators incorporate greenhouse gas emission impacts of energy storage systems into decision-making, and thus can serve as that interim policy tool until a more comprehensive policy can be enacted in the long term.

The purpose of a cost-benefit analysis is to understand whether a specific investment is desirable. The net benefits of each alternative resource, whether it is a distributed energy resource or a traditional generator resource, can be represented using a common metric of dollars. Thus, as long as all the cost and benefit categories, including the external costs and benefits, are consistently calculated for each resource, comparing the net benefits of each alternative and choosing the one that yields highest net benefit to society will ensure that only socially beneficial energy storage systems are installed. Using cost-benefit analysis for energy storage systems would require a comprehensive analysis of all the benefits, as well as a careful study of the potential effects on emissions discussed. The arbitrage and other revenue opportunities for energy storage systems would help forecast an expected charging and discharging profile, which can then be used to quantify the potential benefits and costs of this system. The cost-benefit analysis would monetize these expected benefits and costs of a particular energy storage system given the specific network characteristics of the area of the planned investment.

The emissions impact of energy arbitrage can similarly be calculated based on the marginal emission rates during charging and discharging times of the expected profile. If the emissions from the generation of the electricity that is used to charge the energy storage system are less than the emissions from the electricity that would have had to be generated in the absence of the energy storage system during the discharge period, then energy arbitrage would lead to a decrease in emissions. If the opposite is true, energy arbitrage would lead to an increase in emissions. Quantifying and monetizing these external costs in the cost-benefit analysis would indicate negative net benefits if a particular energy storage system would provide little benefits at the expense of a large increase in greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, such a well-done cost-benefit analysis can prevent investments in energy storage systems that would use high carbon intensive generation to displace low carbon intensive generation.

An added advantage of cost-benefit analysis is that it can take into account emissions related to the construction and the operation of the storage systems. A comparative study of different energy storage systems finds that lifecycle emissions differ, not only due to the type of the paired generator, but also due to the type of the energy storage system itself.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, a cost-benefit analysis that analyzes the total emissions during an energy storage system's entire lifespan is desirable.

While such use of a cost-benefit analysis can be a solution in the short term, it is not sufficient in the long term. First, it can be applied only to investments over which state regulators have jurisdiction. Therefore, it cannot prevent an unregulated energy company from investing in energy storage systems that might have detrimental emissions consequences. Second, carrying out a comprehensive analysis for every single investment opportunity might turn out to be burdensome given the expected increase in energy storage projects over the next decade, and may lead to delays in construction. Therefore,



while policymakers can rely on cost-benefit analysis in the short term, long-term policy priorities must focus on that the market price signals are accurate, and that externalities are internalized in the market.

## Eliminating Barriers to Entry

At present, ISOs and RTOs integrate energy storage systems into their organized wholesale markets in different ways. Some markets already allow certain storage technologies to provide ancillary services. However, these rules were designed with traditional generators in mind and lack the flexibility to recognize unique characteristics of energy storage systems.<sup>24</sup> Some aspects of these market rules, such as performance penalties that penalize storage systems for not providing certain services while charging, create disincentives for energy storage systems.

Redesigning market rules to ensure participation of energy storage systems fully in the market to the extent of their unique technical capabilities will increase the efficiency of the electricity markets. With the Storage Rule, released in February 2018, FERC has made progress towards this goal by aiming to remove some of the barriers currently hindering electric storage resources.<sup>25</sup>

In the Storage Rule, FERC recognized that energy storage systems have the ability to provide a variety of services such as energy, capacity, and regulation, yet are restricted by compensation schemes that were designed for other resources.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, FERC asked ISOs and RTOs to revise their tariffs to accommodate the participation of energy storage resources based on their physical and operational characteristics, and their capability to provide energy, capacity, and ancillary services. For example, FERC proposed new bidding parameters such as charge and discharge time and rate, which can give ISOs and RTOs information about the characteristics about energy storage systems, and hence the services they can provide.

However, some questions regarding the implementation of the Storage Rule still remain, and how they are resolved will affect the incentives for the development of energy storage resources. Performance requirements, such as minimum run-times, are allowed to remain in ISOs and RTOs market rules. Some commenters on the proposed version of FERC's Storage Rule argued that these limitations, as well as other requirements like "must-offer" rules, can limit the ability of some storage systems to provide value to the grid that they are technically capable of providing.<sup>27</sup> While FERC acknowledged this possibility, it further explained that while it was not "appropriate to establish one standard" regarding performance requirements' accommodation of energy storage, it was expecting ISOs and RTOs to demonstrate compliance with the mandate of the overall rule and show that their "market rules provide a means for electric storage resources to provide capacity."<sup>28</sup>

Further, FERC has not ordered ISOs and RTOs to remove any requirements that resources providing ancillary services must also have an energy schedule, meaning all resources must be online and running at the time they are called upon to provide ancillary services.<sup>29</sup> Some commenters pointed out that this requirement excludes electric storage resources that are able to start and ramp-up more quickly than traditional resources, and are therefore technically capable of providing ancillary services despite not already being online.<sup>30</sup> FERC acknowledged that this rule may limit the participation of certain resources, but ultimately concluded that ordering ISOs and RTOs to allow storage resources without an energy schedule to participate in the market for ancillary services could complicate, and render inefficient, the dispatch process. Nevertheless, FERC encouraged ISOs and RTOs to consider how to allow storage resources to provide ancillary services without participating in the energy market.<sup>31</sup>

Ensuring that energy storage resources are able to receive compensation for all the values they are technically able to provide to the grid is essential for efficient resource deployment. Therefore, beyond these FERC mandates, ISOs and RTOs have the responsibility to reshape market mechanisms in order to maximize storage benefits. In order to encourage storage resource participation, ISOs and RTOs need to examine their existing participation models, which are designed for traditional resources, and eliminate or redesign any rules that inadvertently create disincentives for energy storage resources.

## Eliminating Barriers to Earning Multiple Value Streams

Accurate price signals show the true value of a good or service to the society, and therefore lead to economically efficient investment signals. Therefore, maximizing the benefits of energy storage requires investors to be able to receive compensation for the wide range of services that energy storage can provide to every level of the energy grid.

Because the revenue potential based on only one category of benefits does not justify the current high upfront investment that is needed, one value stream is not enough to give enough incentives for large scale storage deployment.<sup>32</sup> A new framework that allows compensation for different value streams should be developed, even if those value streams are based on benefits that accrue to different parts of the market and, thus, have to rely on different compensation mechanisms. Ensuring accurate price signals requires unbundling the different services that energy storage systems can provide and ensuring that they are able to be compensated for each service.

Further, because energy storage can provide benefits to both wholesale markets, which are under FERC jurisdiction, and retail markets, which are under state jurisdiction, coordination between the federal authorities and state regulators is needed. FERC and state regulators must coordinate to explicitly lay out the categories of benefits of energy storage systems and how to compensate for each benefit. In its Storage Rule, FERC clarified one narrow issue: that storage should be allowed to provide value to the wholesale markets. FERC did not directly address complications that may arise from a storage resource's simultaneous participation in both the wholesale and retail markets. Future coordination between regulators at both the state and federal level will be needed to resolve these complications.

Under FERC's Storage Rule, ISOs and RTOs must create a participation model that allows energy storage resources to receive compensation based on their physical and operational characteristics, including: state of charge, minimum state of charge, maximum state of charge, minimum charge limit, maximum charge limit, minimum discharge limit, discharge ramp rate, and charge ramp rate.<sup>33</sup> FERC declined to require ISOs and RTOs to make each of these characteristics an individual bidding parameter, but explained that they must demonstrate how their market rules account for each of these characteristics.<sup>34</sup>

Some current state-level initiatives provide a blueprint for the accurate valuation of the benefits of energy storage. New York's "value stack" approach is a regulation scheme in which storage systems can be compensated based on specific categories of benefits they provide.

**Table 3: New York State’s Proposed Value Stack Compensates for Five Different Values**

Value	Service	Provided to
Energy value	Provides energy	Generation and partially transmission
Installed capacity value	Reduces the need for generation capacity expansion	Generation
Environmental value	Reduces emissions	Society at large
Demand reduction value	Reduces the need for distribution-level infrastructure investment	Distribution
Locational system relief value	Reduces distribution-level congestion	Distribution

## New York’s “Value Stack” Approach

New York State is currently in the process of establishing a methodology to value all distributed energy resources.<sup>35</sup> The New York State Public Service Commission recently issued an order in this proceeding outlining a framework that is generally described as a “value stack” approach.<sup>36</sup> In this approach, distributed energy resources, including energy storage systems, are compensated for their energy value, capacity value, and environmental value of their net exports. In addition, to account for the distribution system value of DERs, the systems that can reduce demand during the ten highest usage hours of a utility’s territory are paid a demand reduction value, and the systems located at “high value” grid locations are paid a locational system relief value.

The New York State Public Service Commission’s initial order, which is only an interim order until a more complete methodology can be established in the second phase, restricts this value stack compensation to resources that can provide net exports to the grid. Therefore, energy storage systems that are not paired with a generating resource are not currently eligible for this compensation. However, the second phase of the proceeding is expected to broaden the scope of the value stack approach to include other energy storage systems that provide value to the system by modifying or shifting the customer demand even if they do not provide net exports to the grid.<sup>37</sup> This second phase will also improve and modify the initial value stack to include more benefits categories, at more granular levels. Further, it will improve the methodology for calculating some of the value categories that do not already have an established methodology, such as the locational system relief value, or the demand reduction value.

In an unbundled compensation approach, each value component can receive compensation from multiple grid actors based on where the benefits accrue. For example, an energy storage system can be compensated for the energy value in the wholesale electricity market, while simultaneously receiving compensation for its locational system relief value at the distribution level. The environmental value that energy storage systems provide by avoiding any (uninternalized) emissions, if it exists, can be paid by the ratepayers as a whole. FERC’s Storage Rule neither specifically endorses nor prohibits this model, but does leave open some questions that must be resolved moving forward, namely how to address concerns around accounting for behind-the-meter storage and avoiding double-compensation.

## *Challenges Related to Behind-The-Meter Energy Storage*

Storage resources located behind the meter pose a challenge to regulators depending on how they are used: these resources may charge using energy from the grid, and then later discharge either to satisfy behind-the-meter energy demand of the consumer, or back to the grid. FERC has determined that energy purchased from the grid for the purpose of later resale back the grid to provide capacity, energy, and ancillary services constitutes a “sale for resale” and therefore should be charged the wholesale rate. Energy consumed behind the meter, however, should be charged the retail rate. Therefore, in order for ISOs and RTOs to accurately charge storage resources the correct rates for all energy withdrawn, they must be able to determine the end use of that energy. The Storage Rule requires ISOs and RTOs to developing metering and accounting practices that would enable this determination.<sup>38</sup> It remains to be seen exactly what methodologies will be proposed by each ISO and RTO and whether FERC will find that the proposed method meets the requirements of the Final Rule.

The second challenge for properly valuing behind-the-meter energy storage resources is related to the retail rates. Because current retail rates are flat, bundled volumetric rates that are set by state utility regulators and roughly correspond to average cost of providing electricity to the end-users, they lack the necessary granularity to provide efficient price signals for behind-the-meter energy storage systems.<sup>39</sup> Setting up a framework for accurate valuation is especially critical as behind-the-meter energy storage systems are likely to become more prevalent in the recent future.<sup>40</sup> Behind-the-meter systems can provide benefits to both the distribution system and the wholesale market and thus have the potential for conferring large benefits on the grid. Therefore, retail rate reforms by states are necessary to complement FERC action in order to incentivize the right type of energy storage system at where and when it is needed, both in front of- and behind-the-meter.

### *Market-Based and Cost-Based Rates: Concerns Over Double Compensation*

In recent debate, the concerns of regulators that energy storage systems not receive “double compensation” for their services has impeded the development of policy allowing for compensation through multiple value streams. While preventing duplicate compensation for the same service is, of course, necessary for economic efficiency, ensuring that distributed energy resources can be fully compensated for the unique benefits they can provide at every level—generation, transmission, and distribution—is also necessary for economic efficiency in energy storage deployment.

A framework that enables energy storage systems to be compensated for the many services they are able to provide must account for multiple value streams, not only paid for by different grid entities, but also compensated at different rates, using different methods of rate calculation. Electric storage resources providing value to the energy grid through transmission or grid support services are generally compensated through “cost-based” rates, which are pre-determined and fixed to guarantee a minimum return. These rates are based on the system’s cost of providing a given service. Energy supply, however, is compensated according to “market-based” rates, which are determined through supply and demand. A system that generates and sells electricity in a competitive wholesale market will receive whatever the market-driven “market-rate” is for each kWh sold.<sup>41</sup>

#### **Key Terms**

**Cost-based rates:** fixed, pre-determined rates that guarantee a minimum return, based on a storage system’s cost of providing the service.

**Market-based rates:** set by supply and demand in a competitive market.

Storage resources can perform ancillary services entitled to cost-based compensation while also selling power in wholesale markets at a market-based rate, even switching between the two almost instantaneously.<sup>42</sup> In January 2017, FERC issued a Policy Statement that provided guidance on how electric storage resources could receive both cost-based rate recovery and market-based revenues without receiving double compensation.<sup>43</sup> FERC acknowledged the possibility that storage systems might recover their costs of operation through market-based sales while also receiving cost-based rates specifically designed to cover operation expenses, thereby receiving a windfall at the expense of ratepayers. FERC noted, however, that instances of double recovery could be addressed by crediting a storage system's market-based revenues back to ratepayers.

Further, FERC largely dismissed fears that the ability of storage systems to receive two streams of revenue would enable storage owners to sell electricity at prices low enough to suppress wholesale market rates. Here, FERC noted that other market participants currently receive some form of cost-based rate recovery while simultaneously supplying to the market. For example, “vertically-integrated utilities,” which own generation as well as transmission and distribution, receive cost-based compensation for electricity sold within a defined area, while also engaging in market-based sales of electricity outside that area. FERC concluded that the compensation mechanisms for storage, including the setting of “just and reasonable” cost-based rates, could be designed in such a way as to avoid anti-competitive effects in the market.

FERC's 2018 Storage Rule did not address commenters' concerns about cost-based recovery and multiple value streams, explaining that the issue was outside the scope of the storage rule.<sup>44</sup> However, the order does require that RTOs and ISOs provide compensation to storage systems for services that are not typically procured through a market mechanism, such as black start services that help restore power to a generator without the need for withdrawals from the grid, primary frequency response, and reactive power services.

Under the value stack approach described above, preventing double compensation is straightforward. If, for example, a system is already being compensated for its energy value by the wholesale markets, the same system would not be allowed to get compensated for its energy value by any other retail program, but would be allowed to be paid for its distribution level benefits by a retail program. Similarly, if a system is already being paid for the environmental value directly, it would not be allowed to participate in additional programs such as renewable energy credit markets. Such a categorization would allow energy storage systems to be compensated for the full benefit they provide, while alleviating double compensation concerns.

Implementing such an approach will require coordination among ISOs and RTOs, which determine the eligibility rules and tariffs; federal regulators, which approve these rules and tariffs; state regulators, which regulate utilities; and utilities, which serve the customers. Such coordination is especially important for behind-the-meter distributed energy storage systems, so they can be compensated for the value they provide to the entire electric system, not just the value they provide to their owners. Unless this fundamental coordination problem can be resolved, neither the level of energy storage deployment, nor the composition of the types of energy storage systems that are deployed will be efficient.



# Maximizing Benefits from Energy Storage: A Road Map

## 1. Internalizing Externalities

- In the absence of economy-wide carbon pricing, policymakers should implement a carbon pricing policy in the wholesale electricity markets.
- In the shorter-term, policymakers should employ cost-benefit analyses that price the societal costs of climate change into specific regulatory and procurement decisions.

## 2. Eliminating Barriers to Entry

- ISOs and RTOs must revise tariffs to accommodate energy storage systems for the range of services they have the technical ability to provide, allowing storage systems to be precisely compensated for the value they provide to the grid.
- Rules that currently provide disincentives because they are designed for traditional resources should be redesigned.

## 3. Eliminating Barriers to Earning Multiple Value Streams

- Federal and state policymakers should coordinate to explicitly lay out the categories of benefits of energy storage systems and how to compensate for each benefit.
- A framework should be developed that allows for services to be paid for by different grid actors, at different rates, using different methods of rate calculation.
- Policies should avoid double compensation without preventing storage systems from receiving compensation for all services provided.



# Regulatory Roles and Challenges

As with other grid-connected technologies, energy storage resources fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of both federal and state entities. Under the Federal Power Act (FPA), FERC holds plenary jurisdiction over wholesale interstate markets, while state officials exercise authority over their respective in-state markets and utilities.<sup>45</sup> In general, federal and state governments share the task of regulating grid operation as well as any interconnected systems, like generation and transmission resources. Understanding this jurisdictional divide and establishing the roles each regulator can play in implementing emissions-reduction policies is crucial to the success of energy storage policies.

## Regulatory Roles

There are two main regulatory actors that each have their own role to play in the formation of a regulatory and policy framework that encourages the efficient allocation of storage resources: FERC and state governments.

- The Federal Power Commission was established by Congress in 1920, and renamed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1977. FERC is an independent agency tasked with overseeing the transmission and wholesale sales of natural gas, oil, and electricity in interstate commerce.
- State governments have the authority to regulate utilities within their borders and to implement state-wide policies, such as storage infrastructure requirements and net-metering programs, which can influence the incentives for energy storage deployment.

While establishing clear jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal regulators has been increasingly difficult as new types of energy resources such as demand response come into play,<sup>46</sup> this challenge is especially complicated for energy storage systems. Because energy storage systems can provide benefits at different levels of the electricity grid regardless of where they are physically located, jurisdictional boundaries for regulating energy storage systems are particularly uncertain.

## Tasks for FERC

FERC has an important role in achieving efficient price signals in the wholesale markets. The FPA directs FERC to ensure that rates and rules are “just and reasonable,” and are not unduly discriminatory or preferential.<sup>47</sup> Therefore, ensuring that the ISO and RTO tariffs, relevant price formation mechanisms, and other payment mechanisms such as performance payments provide accurate compensation, and that these tariffs do not hinder the efficiency of the markets by insufficiently compensating an energy resource, or by preventing it from being compensated at all, is FERC’s main responsibility.

In the Storage Rule, FERC clarified that sales of power into energy storage facilities for the purpose of later resale to the grid, including in the form of provision of ancillary services, constitutes a sale of wholesale power.<sup>48</sup> Power sold to storage resources that is later used by retail consumers for their own purposes, however, is a retail sale within the jurisdiction of state entities. Because how assets are compensated differs based on whether an asset is subject to a FERC or state jurisdiction, this clarification provides much needed financial certainty for energy storage developers.

Energy storage systems can bring benefits to generation, transmission, and distribution systems at the same time, and therefore they cannot, and should not, be classified as assets in only one of these traditional categories. But, because energy storage can perform all three of these functions, regulators and developers are unsure about how to design rate schemes, allocate cost recovery, and prevent double-counting of various energy storage services, while also ensuring that storage providers are compensated fully for all the functions storage performs.

The Storage Rule went a long way in establishing more clarity, by requiring RTOs and ISOs to establish participation models for energy storage systems that recognize their physical and operational characteristics and allow them to be compensated for all the services—energy, capacity, and ancillary—that they are technically capable of providing. In order to effectively implement this model, ISOs and RTOs must define and categorize the benefits energy storage systems can provide, and determine which benefit is going to be compensated at what level to ensure full, but not double compensation.

While FERC identified a list of technical characteristics that must be taken into account when developing a pricing scheme for energy storage services, it did not mandate that RTOs and ISOs use specific bidding parameters. Neither did it order ISOs and RTOs to remove run-time and must-offer requirements that could potentially limit the full integration of energy storage resources into the compensation model. Instead, FERC explained that it was choosing to allow ISOs and RTOs flexibility in designing their participation models. However, it remains FERC's responsibility to ensure that the specific ISO/RTO participation models are truly eliminating barriers to entry and hence ensuring just and reasonable rates.

## Tasks for State Regulators

While the task of eliminating inefficient wholesale market rules and barriers primarily rests on FERC's shoulders, states also have the responsibility to implement policies for efficient deployment of energy storage systems.

If the wholesale markets fail to fully internalize greenhouse gas emissions, then the responsibility of ensuring that energy storage systems are indeed socially beneficial rests with the states. State regulators should direct their utilities to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to consider the potential impact of energy storage systems on greenhouse gas emission before deploying them. When wholesale markets fail to internalize emissions, using a cost-benefit analysis would help ensure that the installation of energy storage systems would not increase greenhouse gas emissions.

States also have an important role in creating accurate price signals. While FERC is responsible for ensuring efficient price signals for the transactions in the wholesale markets, states bear the same responsibility in the retail markets.<sup>49</sup> Creating a framework for energy storage systems to be compensated based on all the values they bring—even when installed locally behind-the-meter—is crucial to efficiency. Relatedly, it is up to state regulatory mechanism to coordinate with ISOs and RTOs to ensure that energy storage system are not receiving inefficient double compensation from both the retail and wholesale markets for provision of the same service.

It is, of course, challenging to quickly move to an approach that both unbundles payments based on different value stacks for each category of benefit, and also calculates the remuneration for each of these stacks in a temporally and locationally granular fashion. State regulators have their work cut out for them in determining the value categories, the granularity of each category, and the compensation formula for each category.




# Conclusion

To ensure that energy storage systems can help achieve climate policy goals, externalities related to greenhouse gas emissions should be internalized, entry barriers should be eliminated, and market rules should be modified to guarantee accurate price signals that can value all the benefits energy storage systems have the technical ability to provide. Unless these reforms can be enacted, both the level and the composition of energy storage deployment will remain far from efficient.

# Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> DEP'T OF ENERGY GLOBAL ENERGY STORAGE DATABASE, <https://perma.cc/6S2W-3V3T>.
- <sup>2</sup> ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2015 70 (2016).
- <sup>3</sup> Energy Storage Association, 35x25: A Vision for Energy Storage, 1, November 2017.
- <sup>4</sup> ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 71 (2017), <https://perma.cc/4BBB-SLBK>.
- <sup>5</sup> See Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 841, 83 Fed. Reg. 9580, 9582 (March 6, 2018), 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter "Storage Rule"].
- <sup>6</sup> U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost of operation*, TODAY IN ENERGY, August 17, 2012.
- <sup>7</sup> GARRETT FITZGERALD ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., THE ECONOMICS OF BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE 16 (2015), <https://perma.cc/A6PY-V66E>.
- <sup>8</sup> See P. Bennet et al., *Impacts of Intermittent Generation*, in LARGE ENERGY STORAGE HANDBOOK 17 (Frank S. Barnes & Jonah G. Levine eds., 2011).
- <sup>9</sup> See Andrew H. Meyer, *Federal Regulatory Barriers to Grid-Deployed Energy Storage*, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 513-14 (2014).
- <sup>10</sup> See Gwen Bredehoeft & Eric Krall, *Increased Solar and Wind Electricity Generation in California Are Changing Net Load Shapes*, TODAY IN ENERGY (Dec. 9, 2014), <https://perma.cc/4QUF-A3VW>.
- <sup>11</sup> Table reproduced from Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, *Managing The Future Of The Electricity Grid: Energy Storage And Greenhouse Gas Emissions*, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 139, 155 (2018) using data from LAZARD, LAZARD'S LEVELIZED COST OF STORAGE ANALYSIS—Version 3.0, (2017) and Version 2.0, (2016).
- <sup>12</sup> See *Frequently Asked Questions*, ENERGY STORAGE ASS'N, <https://perma.cc/HFMS-BMWA>.
- <sup>13</sup> See Amy L. Stein, *Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making A Case for Energy Storage*, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 709 (2014).
- <sup>14</sup> See Kyle Siler-Evans et al., *Marginal Emissions Factors for the U.S. Electricity System*, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4742 (2012); Joshua S. Graff Zivin et al., *Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity of Marginal Emissions: Implications for Electric Cars and Other Electricity-Shifting Policies*, 107 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 248, 249 (2014).
- <sup>15</sup> See Richard T. Carson & Kevin Novan, *The Private and Social Economics of Bulk Electricity Storage*, 66 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 404 (2013).
- <sup>16</sup> Eric Hittinger & Ines Azevedo, *Bulk Energy Storage Increases United States Electricity System Emissions*, 49 ENVIRON. SCI. TECHNOL., 3203, 3208 (2015).
- <sup>17</sup> Eric Hittinger & Ines Azevedo, *Estimating the Quantity of Wind and Solar Required To Displace Storage-Induced Emissions*, 51 ENVIRON. SCI. TECHNOL. 12988, 12990 (2017).
- <sup>18</sup> See KEITH E. HOLBERT, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., ELECTRIC ENERGY ECONOMICS 1 (2011), <https://perma.cc/GPS3-69H8>.
- <sup>19</sup> See Paul Denholm & Tracey Holloway, *Improved Accounting of Emissions from Utility Energy Storage System Operation*, 30 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 9016, 9018 (2005) ("As it ramps up and down, the plant will operate at different efficiencies. In addition, startup and shutdown result in lost heat energy.").
- <sup>20</sup> RICHARD SCHMALENSEE & VLADIMIR BULOVIĆ, MASS. INST. OF TECH. ENERGY INST., THE FUTURE OF SOLAR ENERGY 154, 285 (2015), <https://perma.cc/S478-9CNH>.
- <sup>21</sup> *Id.* at 293.
- <sup>22</sup> See, e.g., Order on Phase One Value of Distributed Energy Resources Implementation Proposals, Cost Mitigation Issues, and Related Matters, Case Nos. 15-E-0751 & 15-E-0082, N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM'N. (2017).
- <sup>23</sup> See Paul Denholm & Gerald L. Kulcinski, *Life Cycle Energy Requirements and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Large Scale Energy Storage Systems*, 45 ENERGY CONVERSION & MGMT. 2153 (2004).
- <sup>24</sup> Storage Rule at 9582.
- <sup>25</sup> See *id.*
- <sup>26</sup> See *id.*
- <sup>27</sup> See Advanced Energy Economy, Comments on FERC's Proposed Storage Rule (proposed Nov. 17, 2016), Docket No. RM16-23-000, at 14–15; GridWise Comments on FERC's Proposed Storage Rule (proposed Nov. 17, 2016), Docket No. RM16-23-000, at 3.
- <sup>28</sup> Storage Rule at 9595.
- <sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 9598.
- <sup>30</sup> See *id.* at 9596 (summarizing comments).
- <sup>31</sup> *Id.* at 9598.

- <sup>32</sup> See JUDY CHANG ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., RENEWABLES AND STORAGE: DOES SIZE MATTER? (2010), <https://perma.cc/VC2U-3GCE>; JUDY CHANG ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., THE VALUE OF DISTRIBUTED ELECTRICITY STORAGE IN TEXAS (2014), <https://perma.cc/D37X-DFTM>.
- <sup>33</sup> Storage Rule at 9613.
- <sup>34</sup> *Id.* at 9609.
- <sup>35</sup> See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N., SUPPLEMENTAL STAFF WHITE PAPER ON DER OVERSIGHT (2017).
- <sup>36</sup> Order on Phase One Value of Distributed Energy Resources Implementation Proposals, Cost Mitigation Issues, and Related Matters, Case Nos. 15-E-0751 & 15-E-0082, N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N. (2017).
- <sup>37</sup> See Notice of Phase Two Organizational Conference, Case No. 15-E-0751, N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N. (2017).
- <sup>38</sup> Storage Rule at 9625.
- <sup>39</sup> See Richard Revesz & Burcin Unel, *Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Distributed Generation and Net Metering*, 44 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 94 (2017); see also Dave Gahl et al., *Getting More Granular: How Value of Location and Time May Change Compensation for Distributed Energy Resources*, Solar Energy Industry Association, 7, January 2018.
- <sup>40</sup> See Peter Maloney, *How Behind-the-Meter Storage Could Make Up 50% of the U.S. Market by 2021*, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 31, 2017), <https://perma.cc/AF89-J9WC>.
- <sup>41</sup> For a general discussion regarding difficulties classifying energy storage, see Anita Luong, AM. INST. OF CHEM. ENGINEERS, GRID-SCALE ENERGY STORAGE, 14–16 (2011), and Stein, *supra* note 9 at 717–30.
- <sup>42</sup> Storage resources can inject small amounts of power into grid transmission lines, or absorb excess power that isn’t immediately consumed, to maintain grid frequency – an ancillary service that entitles the storage resource to cost-based rate recovery. In addition, recall that most storage technologies don’t literally “store” electricity – as a silo literally stores grain – but rather hold the kinetic, potential, mechanical, or thermal energy that is converted into electricity upon request. Accordingly, a storage system can generate electricity this way and sells its output in wholesale markets at the competitive market-based rate. See Stein, *supra* note 9 at 718–19.
- <sup>43</sup> See FERC, Utilization of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple Services When Receiving Cost-Based Rate Recovery, Policy Statement, 158 FERC ¶ 61,051 (Jan. 19, 2017).
- <sup>44</sup> Storage Rule at 9626.
- <sup>45</sup> Since the Federal Power Act of 1935, federal regulators have exercised regulatory jurisdiction over “matters relating to . . . the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” so long as such matters “are not subject to regulation by the States.” 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824w (2017). The Act, for example, expressly reserves to states oversight of facilities either “used for the generation of electric energy,” “in local distribution,” or “for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012).
- <sup>46</sup> See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 775–782 (2016) (holding that FERC’s Order No. 745 was a valid exercise of FERC’s authority over wholesale demand response).
- <sup>47</sup> 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d–824e (2012).
- <sup>48</sup> Storage Rule at 9601.
- <sup>49</sup> See generally, Frank A. Wolak, *Regulating Competition in Wholesale Electricity Supply*, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 195, 210 (Nancy L. Rose ed., 2014) (discussing the role played by state regulators in price signaling on the retail markets).



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